Frontiers of Global Sociology

Research Perspectives for the 21st Century

Markus S. Schulz
(Editor)
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. Frontiers of Research and the Futures We Want: Towards a New Agenda for Sociology

Markus S. Schulz
President of the Third ISA Forum and Vice-President for Research, International Sociological Association (ISA)

The 21st Century’s intensified uncertainties with its risks and opportunities demand renewed efforts of forward-oriented research. At certain times and places, the future appears closed, without alternatives, with no other options even imaginable. Royal dynasties have ruled entire countries over generations without major challenges. The same assumptions about the proper forms of government and social organization have held sway across centuries. Yet at other times and places, history has become more fluid, futures have opened up, alternatives have become imaginable, sometimes all of a sudden. The new wave of rightist leaders from Trump to Erdogan and Duterte has taken advantage of the void left by the disappearance of bold progressive visions. How can the grammar of these changes be better understood?

In the past, the future was often assumed to be predestined, predetermined, or at least progressing in a certain direction and thus, with the proper approach, predictable. During sociology’s foundational period, religious beliefs in some future telos appeared to give way to the positivist search for social laws, the knowledge of which sociologists—in traditions from Comte to Durkheim—thought to be useful for administering society. Marx shared similar assumptions when he pronounced the laws of history pointed to a necessary triumph of the oppressed proletariat over the bourgeoisie, though he did recognize in his more empirical-historical writings that there were no automatic formulae but plenty of room for contingent action. Revolutionary women such as Goldman, Luxemburg, and Zetkin pursued knowledge for change, as did pioneering female futurists such as Boulding, Meadows, and Masini. Scholars from, or engaged with, the Global South (e.g., Amin, Cardoso, Dussel, Guha, Quijano, Nederveen Pie-
terse, Saïd, Santos, Spivak) have challenged the pervasive modernization models according to which the so-called Third World was behind in its development and could overcome its presumed backwardness only by following the path of the Global North.

In this era of advanced globalization, the contractions and expansions of social imaginaries appear frequently in broader waves. This is so because ideas do not stop at borders. However, global diffusion itself is not new, as demonstrated for example by today’s world religions that are products of global diffusion over centuries. One difference between then and now is an immense acceleration brought about by faster means of transportation and communication, which in turn can facilitate more intense interaction not only among the elites of international diplomacy and transnational corporations, but also among grassroots actors of civil society.

A key inspiration for the alter-globalization movement were the Zapatistas. It was on the very same day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect on January 1, 1994 that some 3,000 indigenous peasants rose up in arms against the Mexican government’s authoritarian imposition of a neoliberal development project that threatened to convert rural subsistence farmers into a slum-dwelling urban proletariat (Schulz, 1998). Their spokesperson argued that the better world that they can see in their dreams is not coming from the past but from the next steps of action. Over the years, the Zapatistas managed to surprise time and again with creative activities that connected local struggles with national and even transnational movements. In the decades since their initial uprising the Zapatistas have built communities of resistance with a whole new generation of activists struggling for alternative futures with dignity (Schulz, 2013).

What can sociology learn from these and other struggles about the malleability of futures? What defines the horizon of social imaginaries? How do assumptions and aspirations about the future influence daily routines and long-term collective lives? How do we need to rethink democracy in the age of advanced globalization? How can pressing problems such as global climate change, environmental degradation, hunger or violence be tackled in sustainable ways? What can be done to democratize governance, infrastructure, production,
media, and technology? How can the distribution of goods, risks, and opportunities be made more equitable? What different forces positioned to shape futures? What can be learned by comparing social struggles in different countries and settings? How do emancipatory movements and everyday practices at the grassroots resist control, exploitation, and misrecognition? What visions for alternative futures are imaginable, desirable, and achievable? What are the roadmaps for social transformation? How can future-oriented social research relate to broader public debates? How do the social actors in a globalizing world debate which tasks should be undertaken and what the priorities are? How do social actors in different walks of life imagine desirable futures and the path toward them? How can the envisioning and the making of futures be democratized? By engaging with these and many other critical questions, an attentive sociology can contribute to the debates across borders about how to open up futures with alternative possibilities for a better world. The courageous wind of change that is emanating from diverse struggles at the grassroots can inspire us to rethink the futures we want, to rethink both the imaginative making of visions and the nature of sociological engagement with those visions. The critical thought and intellectual courage arising from the social sciences rooted in localities around the world are crucial for a thriving global dialogue at this pivotal time.

Connecting Research Fields

This book is based on revised versions of papers that the authors presented at the Common Sessions of the International Sociological Association’s (ISA) Third Forum of Sociology, held in Vienna, Austria, on the theme “The Futures We Want: Global Sociology and the Struggles for a Better World” with over 4,000 participating scholars from 100 countries. The Common Sessions presented distinguished speakers who were nominated by the ISA’s Research Committees (RC), Working Groups (WG), and Thematic Groups (TG) to address the common theme. This theme was prepared prior to the Forum through the online “WebForum on The Futures We Want” (http://futureswewant.net; for further references: Schulz, 2016a and 2016b; see also Schulz, forthcoming). The
presenters were asked to choose how to address the common theme from the perspective of their respective field. The purpose of these semi-plenaries was to foster dialogue and exchange new insights and inspirations across research units by jointly focusing on the theme of the Forum, as well as on forward-oriented modes of sociology, future visions of different social actors and their struggles for a better world, and global sociologies’ contributions to these debates. The format of Common Sessions was pioneered by Arturo Morató Rodríguez for the Barcelona Forum. They are a counter-measure to the discipline’s fragmentation, as they can help to make the work within a given RC/WG/TG better known to a larger audience and to build bridges between different units.

A Sociological Kaleidoscope

The over fifty contributors to this book come from two dozen different countries of all continents. This regional and national diversity is further enhanced by the rich diversity of research perspectives. Taken together, they provide a sociological kaleidoscope. Complementing theoretical, topical, methodological, and regional expertise, they address a wide range of sociological topics from the tiny worlds of micro situations to the broad macro dynamics affecting the entire planet.

The chapters of this book are organized in several thematic sections. The theoretical part (Part II) presents a set of sweeping papers on fundamental issues, including futures of the Anthropocene (Luke), the discursivity of global futures (Keller), national and global sociology (Vanderstraeten), feminism and the Global South (Reddock), participatory democracy (Assunção, Casey, da Costa, Nina-Pazarzi, and Rozanova), sociocybernetics (Scott), and the post- or transhuman condition (Fuller). Part III offers papers that demonstrate the need for historical-comparative approaches in research on futures and transformation (Mennell; Scholtz; Fishbach). Part IV deals with the material basis of human life, specifically climate change (Broadbent), agriculture (Constance), risk perceptions related to food (Fabiansson). Part V addresses citizenship (Kazepov), borders (Yuval-Davis), and the military (Carreiras). Part VI investigates work
Assuredly, many salient issues are not being dealt with here. This volume does not pretend to provide any final list of relevant matters. Nor does it present any monolithic paradigm or singular research approach. What it does provide, however, is a range spotlights based on the expertise of the different research units. It is hoped that these spotlights will inspire a flow of insights and new collaborations across otherwise often segmented research fields.

Building Global Sociology

Any publication rests on the support of many, and this is particularly true in a project of international scope. It would be impossible to list all the sources of inspiration and sustenance, but a few may be mentioned. Great thanks go to the distinguished international scholars who contributed bountiful insights and moderated the Common Sessions as Chairs, including Wilson Akpan (South Africa), Olivier Chantraine (France), Dilek Cindoglu (Turkey), Roberto Cipriani (Italy), Sérgio Costa (Germany), John Holmwood (UK), Guillermina Jasso (USA), Wolfgang Knöbl (German), Paulo Henrique Martins (Brazil), Alicia Itatí Palermo (Argentina), Habibul Khondker (UAE), Arturo Morató Rodríguez (Spain), Abdul-Mumin Sa’ad (Nigeria), Raquel Sosa Elizaga (Mexico), Jan Spurk (France), Shujiro Yazawa (Japan), Chin-Chun Yi (Taiwan), and Aigul Zabirova (Kazakhstan). The Research Committees and the Working and The-
matic Groups are to be thanked for their engaged participation in the Forum and its Common Sessions. Deep gratitude goes to the many participants for the stimulating discussions and feedback. Many thanks go to the dedicated members of the ISA’s Program Committee, Executive Committee, Executive Secretariat, and the Local Organizing Committee in Vienna, Austria, without whose passionate work an event of this magnitude would have simply not been possible. Julie Costa, Guillermina Jasso, Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Peter Sieger, and Michel Wieviorka provided great encouragement and generous support at crucial phases.

Let us orient our joint sociological imagination to the making of better futures!

References


II. THEORETICAL APPROACHES
2. The Anthropocene as Eco-Futurology?

Timothy W. Luke
RC07 Futures Research

Like the Anthropocene idea, this preliminary analysis is imperfect. This situation, however, is unavoidable, given the aspirations of all the social forces pushing to define what is accepted as ‘the future of the Earth.’ In the final analysis, this idea is nothing more than ‘the proposed name for a new geological epoch in which the entire global environment has been altered by humanity’ (E. O. Wilson, 2016: 227). Given Wilson’s observation, how these ‘alterations’ are unfolding are not simple questions, since they coincide with the interconnected expansion of fossil fuel use, rapid population growth, capitalist industrial innovation, and rapid urbanization worldwide over the past 250 years. How these events, as they unfold in blips of historical time, are registering as disruptive effects in the deep record of geological time are being studied (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000: 17–18), but what the best human response to these changes should be is quite ambiguous.

The near useless levels of abstraction associated with Anthropocene thinkers’ utilization of this wholly ‘humanistic’ concept, nonetheless, should not prevent a review of how this notion influences the aspirations of those who accept its plausibility as their vision of Earth’s future (Steffen, Crutzen, and McNeill, 2007: 614–621; Ruddiman, 2005). Despite its incomplete utilization by various social groups and technical experts, what can be learned by reconsidering the alternative futures the Anthropocene thesis presents, and how those visions are influencing political and philosophical debates today?

What is developing here with ‘the Anthropocene turn’ is a new ontography of the future: how reality is written about as well as it is being rewrought. With this ontography, the futurological potentials of the Anthropocene are being translated into political programs and narratives. Like earlier pleas to humanity during the 1940s (Osborn, 1948; and, Vogt, 1948) about finding the ‘road to survival’ on ‘our plundered planet,’ Anthropocene thought is not always taken seriously by all. Many are still motivated by the impulse to plunder the Earth, while pretending to embrace survival-minded preservation. Yet, their real interests remain well-entrenched in pro-growth agendas. If ‘the future’ is about what will ensure effective resilient foundations for Earth’s habitability (Crutzen, 2002: 23), then much more work is needed.

Max Weber once foresaw a comparable future for the Earth and humanity in his sociological speculations about capitalist modernization over a century
ago. He conceded industrial modernity demanded fossil fueled machinic energy to drive ‘the tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order. This order is now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine production which to-day determine the lives of all individuals who are born into this mechanism, not only those directly concerned with economic acquisition, with irresistible force. Perhaps it will so determine them until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt’ (1958: 181). In considering the futures humanity wants for the Earth’s inhabitants, and how those possibilities should come to pass, we cannot wait for the last ton of coal to burn. Better, fairer and stronger alternatives to this ‘modern economic order’ have been needed for decades. These imperatives now are made more pressing in adapting to rapid climate change and considering the multiple meanings of these adaptations on the future in historical and geological time—whether it is the Anthropocene, the Holocene or some yet to be coined name for this extraordinary epoch in the Earth’s history (Pyne and Pyne, 2013; Luke, 2014; 2015).

Earth Science and the Anthropocene

Like ‘sustainability,’ or ‘resilience,’ Anthropocene terms can be, and already are becoming, key power predicates inasmuch as they provide pretexts for new research and policy projects, despite having mixed blessings as scientific categories (Schellenhuber and Wenzel, 1998). In this respect, Jussi Parikka, a professor of technological culture and aesthetics at Winchester School of Art, University of Southampton, is enchanted by ‘Paul Crutzen’s original pitch’ regarding the Anthropocene, because it lays out ‘a transversal map across various domains: from nitrogen fertilizers in the soil to nitric oxide in the air; carbon dioxide and condition of the oceans; photochemical smog to global warming’ (2014: 35) to plant a thousand flowers for new academic research.

In such analyses, however, as the seeds of those flowers bloom, the Anthropocene notion typically bobs about as an empty vessel ready to be loaded with almost any particularity, since it is ‘a concept that maps the scope of any transdisciplinary problem’ (Parikka, 2014: 36). Indeed, many passionate groups of activists and authors could care less about the science involved. For them, the Anthropocene is an active fact. It is quite real, and is creating an inexorable change, simply because, as W. I. Thomas would maintain, many individuals and groups already believe the Anthropocene is real, so its reality-generation capacity now is intensifying. Pure belief trumps confirmed evidence in today's post-truth public cultures.

This faith-based rhetoric in Anthropocene discourse, however, also verges strongly towards reproducing a future of neo-Victorian imperialism, which proclaims at least one ‘half-Earth,’ and especially ‘the best places in the biosphere’ (Wilson, 2016: 133–153) must be put under complete conservationist oversight
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simply so that ‘a great deal of Earth’s biodiversity can be saved’ (Wilson, 2016: 136). Still, most of these places in question are already under regulation by major G-8 powers, so their conservation by Western nation-states would continue to be assured very well as their national ‘natural resources for the future.’ Otherwise, many of the other best places for this ‘Half-Earth’ would be carved out—to use Samuel Huntington’s infamous ‘Clash of Civilizations’ maps—of several realms of ‘The Rest’ where ‘The West’ once ruled, but does not any longer. In writing an anti-Anthropocene brief, E. O. Wilson sounds more like a soft Anthropocenarian. Indeed, his program for planetary preservationism asks that much of Mexico, South America, Africa, Asia, and Australia be consigned to his ‘Half-Earth’ reserved for Nature alone.

Rather than waiting for evidence-based confirmation of a provisional scientific theory (Lewis and Martin, 2015: 171–180), are too many intellectual networks mobilizing the Anthropocene as a futurological meganarrative to influence various aspects of contemporary individual and collective existence (Klein, 2014; Lynas, 2011; Dukes, 2011; and, Allenby, 2005)? For many, the Anthropocene models a nascent ‘Future’ whose impact on ‘the Present’ rises with the greenhouse gassing from burning coal, gas, and oil deposits from ‘the Past.’ Anthropocene boosters then produce nebulous ontographical accounts of what ‘is,’ which are continuously churned to generate ethical and political agendas for deciding what the future ‘ought to be’ with respect to such accounts of what ‘is’ (Steffen, et al. 2015).

These futurological projects vary, but they center upon the ‘Anthropos’ of the Anthropocene (Schwägerl, 2014). Once the figure of ‘Man,’ or ‘We,’ with historical agency is understood better, then humanity’s fate putatively will be guided to improve all future developments in the Anthropocene, which now are regarded as being either quite negative (Zylinska, 2014; and, Wuerthner, Crist and Butler, 2014) or unexpectedly positive (Bailey, 2015; Heck and Rogers, 2014; Steffen et al., 2011; and, Ellis, 2009). Ironically, many of ‘the achievements’ by this Anthropos of modernity were accidental, unanticipated or unwanted developments, and they remain that way. And, in the long span of deep time, the boundaries between the late Holocene and early Anthropocene are but the thin trace of moments depicted in the last shallow layer of deep geological time².

The Futures Experts Want

Nonetheless, policy appeals made by proponents of the Anthropocene thesis (Crutzen, 2002: 23) are not fully ratified by all science communities. Efforts, in turn, to empower Earth System Scientists, who have neither been elected by anyone nor granted any authority to act with legitimate governing powers, only confirm Robert K. Merton’s notion of the ‘self-fulfilling prophecy.’ As he notes, ‘the self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the
situation evoking a new behavior which makes the original false conception come true. This specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the beginning’ (Merton, 1948: 195).

One assertion is very common. Rapid climate change is so far out of hand that greater control must be given to those who declare they should be in command—due to their professional probity and superior knowledge of the past, present, and future (Dobbs, Manyika, and Woetzel, 2015). This move would permit such experts to trigger new practical actions that would make declaring an ecological state of emergency more concrete. Such new behaviors would allow present trends, which Anthropocenarians now see at work, to become just true enough for the Anthropocenarian cause to be ratified as warranted (Vince, 2014; and, Lovelock, 2015). And, once in command, every changing twist and turn in many terrestrial conditions tracked by Earth System Science would be accepted as minimally credible proof that Anthropocenarian interventions were justified from their very beginning to protect and preserve Earth’s future. Yet, those data can be interpreted otherwise. No sets of statements pertaining to matters of fact necessarily affirm any moral imperative to evoke a state of emergency, but that point of intellectual credibility is simply overlooked (Steffen and Smith, 2013).

Here, Earth Science policy wonks and climatological think tank employees have, oddly enough, posed what Nietzsche believed was ‘the great task and question’ before humanity, namely, ‘how shall the earth as a whole be governed?” (1963: 501). This question arguably has been on the table for over 70 years. After the first three atomic bombs—Alamogordo, July 16, 1945; Hiroshima, August 6, 1945; and, Nagasaki, August 9, 1945—were detonated above ground to practice for, and then actually deploy, nuclear fission technologies for war, the Anthropocene question has been posed forthright. The radionuclide pulses first emitted widely during those 24 days grew in scope and severity globally for nearly 20 years as countries other than the USA—the USSR, Great Britain, France, China—also exploded hundreds more fission and fusion devices in the air, on the ground, at sea, and then underground. As Davies (2014: 104) affirms, the best origin time and point for the Anthropocene might well be July 16, 1945 at the Trinity atomic test site. The golden spike needed for undeniable geological evidence is out there in the Earth’s geology for anyone to see, like americium-247, cesium-137, cobalt-60, iodine-129/131, plutonium-239, strontium-90, technetium-99m, and uranium-234.

It is from these decades onward Nietzsche’s question gains greater weight. With his challenge, the Anthropocene, along with all of the other ‘words and things’ in Earth Science, gels as futurology. It constitutes ‘the emergence of a group of rules proper to discursive practice’ with regard to the Earth and its environments through time, and the discourses about the Anthropocene have
become ‘practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (Foucault, 1972: 49), namely, Earth Systems, Earth System Science, Humanity, the Great Acceleration, or the Anthropocene as such (Ackerman, 2014; Cohen, 2014; Hazen, 2013; McNeil and Engelke, 2014; and, Sale, 2013).

To defend humanity’s species-being, the stewards of Earth Science would halt the threat of the Anthropocene becoming ‘for humanity a one-way trip to an uncertain future in a new, but very different state of this Earth System’ (Steffen, 2011: last page). How they will assure this certainty is not evident. Despite talk about defending the planet, the tools for such governance (to the extent that they exist) are crude, dispersed, and not even tested as means of responsive control (Zalasiewicz, Williams, Steffen, and Crutzen, 2010). Moreover, the nature of geological time, which Earth Science has no ability to stop, accelerate or change, has always been a one-way trip forward into new and uncertain future states of the Earth System for humanity and non-humanity alike.

Conclusions

Many voices are raising the same worries about the future of the human condition in the twenty-first century. Despite evidence to the contrary, enthusiasts of the Anthropocene idea, like Erle Ellis contend,

‘Nature is gone. It was gone before you were born, before your parents were born, before the pilgrims arrived, before the pyramids were built. You are living on a used planet. If that bothers you, get over it. We now live in the Anthropocene—a geological epoch in which Earth’s atmosphere, lithosphere and biosphere are shaped primarily by human forces’ (Ellis, 2009).

Who this ‘us’ is that will be, or is, the decider for ‘human forces’ is vague. Such rhetoric aims less at explaining the alleged disappearance of Nature to concentrate on identifying who is, or should be, the ‘we’ that will assume the role of world historical agency as the alleged end of Nature becomes a confirmed fact.

Most Anthropocene discourse, as Ellis illustrates, is hyperbole. For all intents and purposes, with minor exceptions at attaining success at inducing local rainfall events, tilling some soils, damming many rivers, tunneling through certain levels of the Earth’s outer crust, and forming various microclimates with urbanization, human beings do not have command or control over the complex biophysical processes of ‘Nature.’ Consequently, the unconditional claims made by Anthropocenearians, like Ellis, who assert ‘humans have become the dominant ecological force on the planet,’ and ‘according to the scientists, we are now living in the Anthropocene, a new geological epoch shaped by humans’ (Ellis, 2009) cannot be taken too seriously. There is a spreading consensus among a small circle of scientists and nature writers about the future, but there are no
final accords about the Anthropocene, as the present leading to the future, shared by all scientists.

Actually, too many glowing accounts of the Anthropocene are written not by scientists, but rather by business, science or technology journalists (Ackerman, 2014; Kolbert, 2014; Schwägerl, 2014). As writers of scientific non-fiction, business forecasts or technological projections, they assume things will turn out fine. That is, the irrational pursuit of individual vices will produce rational collective outcomes; scientists are discovering new truths rather overcoming their trained incapacities, past mistakes or accepted errors; and, all technologies are designed to do what they intend to do—now and in the future—with known risks, few unintended missteps, and improved performance at less cost. Yet, these are simply journalistic conventions used to create attentive mass audiences, not effective social, political, economic or cultural analysis.

If the Anthropocene idea did not yet exist, it, or some close analogue, would have to be invented. Its recent popularization, as a futurological narrative, is the essential fuel needed to run such polemical motors. By churning out energy needed to power a global political movement, the Anthropocene imaginary favors a future that places geoengineering, planetarian ecomanagerialism, and Earth Science in command (The Economist, 2011). The existing political assessments of these challenges unfortunately are rudimentary. On the one hand, some are superficially sober about the responsibilities to come; while, on the other hand, their solutions for meeting those challenges in the future, as they mobilize new alliances of technocratic experts, also are at best affable authoritarian futurologies simply waiting to be affirmed by all those committed to taking the Anthropocene turn.

Notes

1. This study is part of a larger work in progress, and it draws upon my prior analyses of the Anthropocene, especially Luke (1995; 2009; 2014; and, 2015).
2. See the International Chronostratigraphic Chart, v2013/01 at www.stratigraphy.org for more detail.

References

Theoretical Approaches


3. The Complex Discursivity of Global Futures in the Making

Reiner Keller
RC33 Logic and Methodology in Sociology

Introduction

The third ISA Forum in Vienna (July 2016) was titled “The Futures We Want; Global Sociology and the Struggles for a Better World.” Whilst wondering if—and in fact doubting that—there is such a thing as “global sociology,” I would like to address in the following a core element implied in this title: the role of knowledge and knowledge-making in the global age, or, to be more precise, in transnational regimes of power/knowledge. Arguing for futures that someone or some collectivity (and some “we”) wants, involves a kind of imagination based upon accounts of a situated past and present, as well as elaborations of future wishful states and strategies to attain them. This is all a very contested and conflictual terrain, a field of struggle involving multiple actors. And all of this is about knowledge and discourse. The core argument of the following text amounts to a plea for a perspective on such processes and conflicts that is grounded in a sociology of knowledge and discourse and which goes beyond narrow considerations of norm making, social movement analysis, or think tank research in transnational fields.

When we discuss “global futures,” we have to account for a whole set of dimensions: structurations (Anthony Giddens’ term), figurations (Norbert Elias’ term), imaginations (Arjun Appadurai’s term), practices, processes, relations of power and dominance, etc. And to these I will add discourses. I refer to the various uses Michel Foucault made of this concept. There is no single definition of discourse in Foucault’s work (Keller, 2008, 2017). In his 1969 book The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault conceived of discourses as practices which constitute objects (of knowledge). A few years later, in his inaugural speech at the Collège de France, he talked about The Order of Discourse (see both texts in Foucault, 2010). He then discussed the multiple ways by which discourses and their institutional apparatuses determine the scarcity of speakers (by producing those allowed to speak and to be heard), the separation of the true (that which is to be known) and the false (that which is to be forgotten), the taboo (discussion of which is forbidden), or the commentary (which separates the good, the bad, and perhaps the ugly texts). And again later, in his genealogi-
cal period, he talked about discourses as fighting or competing parties in battlefields of meaning making. Here his case in point was the analysis of the Pierre Rivière murder case (Foucault, 1982).

Close to the Foucauldian tradition, the title of this paper—“The Complex Discursivity of Global Futures in the Making”—refers to discourses as processes in power/knowledge regimes, to dispositifs as devices of discourse production, and to discourse-based intervention into fields of practice. But we have to go with and beyond Foucault in order to address such complexities via empirical research. The current moment of transnational, cosmopolitan, and global processes of the discursive construction of realities is a point of transformation that cries out for discourse research. Inquiry into single-issue knowledge settings and knowledge diffusion isn’t enough; such an inquiry has to be informed by a concept of discourse.

Global and transnational civil society, the proliferation of arenas and organisations involved in the definition of “world problems” and “standards making,” the burgeoning economic power of the BRIC states, and the general recognition of a “post-colonial constellation” together constitute a challenging reconfiguration of transnational or global orders of discourse. The ongoing structural transformations linked to such processes are profoundly changing global social relationships of knowledge. The guiding thesis of this paper accordingly is that new transnational orders of discourse are emerging, in the making, and these are in confrontation with heterogeneous local and regional discourse histories. Established ways of evidence building and justification are no longer beyond question; indeed they are at stake. Their future “Gestalt” and shape are still widely contingent, and imply far-reaching social and political effects. In the following I will first introduce my concept of discourse, and then address the issue of transnational arenas or spaces of discourse as entry points for such research.

The sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD)

Despite Michel Foucault’s trailblazing contributions to discourse theory and research, he left a number of issues out of consideration. These include the questions of meaning and interpretation, the concrete work on data: How can the analyst identify the core concepts, schemes of interpretation, etc. in a discursive formation? What is the relationship between the analyst’s own work of interpretation and meaning making and the meaning making present in the data she or he is dealing with? What is the role of actors and their agency in discourse production? How can we determine the co-constitutional relation between speakers as being produced by discourses, and as being those entities which perform those very same discourses, and which sometimes transform them by their interpretative practices? What theory of signs or meaning in use,
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and what methodology of research might help us out of the problem we face, given that interpretation is everywhere and cannot be avoided and that researchers just produce discourses about discourses?

The sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD) suggests that we can elaborate on Foucauldian concepts by drawing on a broader perspective in the sociology of knowledge, namely the Berger and Luckmann tradition, with its close links to social phenomenology (Alfred Schütz, 1932, 1945) and to the American pragmatism of George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, and others, all of whom, by the way, talked about “universes of discourse” decades before Foucault. SKAD guides inquiry into social relations of knowledge and politics of knowledge: How do regimes of power/knowledge come into being and with what kinds of effects for fields of practice? How are hierarchies of the realness of reality established, questioned, transformed? Which actors and knowledge claims are involved in such symbolic ordering, meaning, and world making? Knowledge herein is conceived in the Berger and Luckman (1966) tradition: It is not (only) about so-called positivist or factual knowledge. It refers to everything considered or established by someone (individual or collective) as “real.” This might be a train station, a big master narrative concerning “capitalism” or “the unconscious,” political ideologies, or religious cosmologies with their gods or devils. The term “social relations of knowledge” is an adaptation of Ulrich Beck’s idea of relations of definition. He coined this concept in his analysis of (world) risk society (Beck, 2008: 24–46). Who defines how and when, and to what effect on what counts as risks for physical health, for example, or for social life, etc.? Beck was quite clear that he referred back to Karl Marx’s idea of the “relations of production.” Not in the narrow sense of capital versus labour force, but more widely in order to account for hierarchies, power and domination, unequal distribution of resources in definition making, etc. “Social relations of knowledge” therefore address Foucauldian questions of power/knowledge regimes.

The term “politics of knowledge,” then, indicates all kind of performative processes which reproduce, challenge, or transform relationships of knowledge. A good example is the pope, who recently gave a new role to women in the Catholic liturgy. This is some kind of macro strategy of reality re-construction, with global reach. When this news was broadcast in Germany, the female news-reader on TV added some micro-politics of her own, by presenting this momentous news with a mildly ironic smile.

I will not enter into further details of SKAD here. This has been done and will be done elsewhere (in German and in English). Let me just restate that it is a theory-methods package, or to be more precise: a theory of what this object of inquiry, discourse could be; what heuristic toolbox is useful to account for it, what methodology it implies, and what methods we could use to do research (see Keller, 2011a, 2011b, 2013).
Transnational orders and arenas of discourse

Up to now social sciences discourse research has all too often followed some kind of “methodological nationalism”; that is, it has looked for discourses in a specific nation-state container (the British discourse on nuclear energy, the German discourse on climate change) or has done some kind of comparative study (e.g., between British and German discourses on nuclear energy). This is not a problem per se; it is even needed, because media-scapes and language-scapes differ, and nation-state governments are sites for social problem debates, rule making, and so forth. But such a focus neglects a discursive sphere which has emerged over the last decades: the transnationality of orders of discourse.

Due to the ongoing structural transformations brought about by globalization and transnationalisation, the state of knowledge and knowledge relationships in societies and between societies is changing dramatically. The concept of transnational orders, spaces, and arenas of discourse explores new forms of discursive formations and interconnectivity in which social actors and assorted politics of knowledge concern themselves with the construction and problematization, as well as the alteration and adaptation of knowledge and corresponding plans for action, going beyond and transcending national borders in the process. New transnational orders of discourse are emerging in which heterogeneous local and regional discourse histories now confront one another, reconfiguring available speaker’s positions, and readjusting knowledge relationships. Established processes of evidence and justification are not simply adapted, but indeed find themselves at risk and subject to transnational reconfiguration. The future shape of transnational spaces of discourse is highly contingent, and suggests far-reaching social and political effects.

We have to assume that in such processes and emergent structurations, complex and competing definitions of global or transnational situations meet, and these are shaped by heterogeneous cultural traditions, rationalities, cultures of the factual and of evidence and justification, as well as by unequally distributed resources of proof and fact finding. An ongoing current example is the conflict centred around the General Declaration of Human Rights and the opposing Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights set up by the European Islamic Council in 1981 or the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, supported by 57 nation states in 1990 (Favret-Saada, 2010).

Another case in point is the emergence of global assemblages. Collier and Ong (2005: 3ff.) define them as “spatial forms,” “that are nonisomorphic with standard units of analysis . . . abstractable, mobile and dynamic. As global forms are articulated in specific situations—territorialized in assemblages—they define new material, collective and discursive relationships.” Transnational orders of knowledge can be considered as emerging “singularities” which are “neither the simple expression of national or regional histories nor the product
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of global circumstance, but somewhere in between” (Reid, 2005: 244). Such complex discursivities have to be analyzed “as localized, grounded, and situated temporally, spatially, historically, economically, politically, culturally, socially, and so on.” (Clarke, 2010: 389)

Within the topic of transnational spaces of discourse the following complex question is suggested: how and to what effect do social stocks of knowledge, distributions of knowledge, and knowledge policies—in other words, present-day discourse landscapes—change under the auspices of transnationalisation and globalisation? The fact that social stocks of knowledge are always very complex in character, structured at different levels of abstraction, and in social terms are also rather unequally distributed, is one of the core assumptions of modern sociology of knowledge. The national (state) form of knowledge also represents a specific form of the constitution of this sort of socially unequal distribution. For since their foundation, modern nation states have functioned not only as political protagonists of the imagined communities of populations that are deemed to be homogeneous; they also have functioned—and still function—as the developers, carriers, and promoters of special stocks of knowledge that are nationally specific. In this way they have attempted, on the one hand, to monitor their special nature in an international context, and on the other hand to compete, in the area of international economic competition, for better placements (for example by means of national statistics and support for science or the economy) and also to cultivate their “special forms” of socio-cultural collective identity and identification.

Already in the late-1990s Manuel Castells’ trilogy on the “information age” (Castells, 2009a, 2009b, 2010) had commented on a new immediacy between individuals and the Internet-accessible global world of knowledge in which, on the one hand, transnational expert communities and discourse formations were producing, stabilizing, and modifying “transnational knowledges” and global distributions of knowledge, and where, on the other hand, by contrast, professional knowledge was being increasingly questioned and criticized. At the same time, the recent debates on multiple types of modernity, post-colonialism, and the epistemological “provincialization of Europe” (Chakrabarty, 2007) have made it clear that we can no longer proceed on the basis of an uninterrupted westernisation of the planet and of knowledge. Of course, the historical impact of “European” knowledge formations should in no sense be denied; but because of the economic and “discursive” ascent of other regions of the world (such as the “Global South”) we can undoubtedly see that in this respect new actors are successfully entering into the relevant transnational arenas of discourse.

The concept of transnational order, arenas and spaces of discourse (Knaut and Keller, 2012) addresses observations such as these in a broader theoretical and methodological framework. It denotes comparatively new, trans-border
topic- or cause-specific arenas for the construction and problematisation of world-phenomena, or—to put it differently—transnational forms, fora, and arenas, in which actors and knowledge policies or knowledge production are interrelated in the form of discursive formations or discourse relationships. In this context I speak of transnational spaces of discourse in order to demonstrate that here trans-border knowledge relationships and policies are being developed, without these processes and participations necessarily having global reach, and without having to decide in advance which actors or constellations of actors are involved or what their concrete topography in a given case might look like: this may differ substantially, depending upon the particular topic. We may again speak of transnational discourse spaces in order to emphasize the fact that the corresponding arenas, their institutionalisations, the participating actors, and the discursive positions being represented all contribute to constructing and following specific structures (establishing a kind of “field-logic”).

For concrete examples of such discursive structurations, we may refer to the global warming debate, to worldwide competition in education, to financial regulation, war against terrorism, citizens’ engagements across the planet, the development of global social and health care policies, or the global arenas of art production and circulation (ranging from blockbuster movies to literature, painting, etc.; see Appadurai, 1996). In such processes, it should be assumed that we cannot talk per se of general involvements in globalisation, but that we may observe variously constituted networks and sites of discursive struggles which may be differently structured according to a particular topic. That is to say, they may comprise widely differing types of participation, scope, arenas, orders of discourse, and so on.

Such orders are complex configurations, which imply a huge range of dimensions, shaped by the cases of concern. Please allow me to mention just a few:

- different nation-state– or local culture–based universes of discourse meet;
- heterogeneous fields of conflict and consent, as well as more or less connected networks of interaction, entities, and forms of cosmopolitisation confront each other;
- the confrontation of rationalities of knowledge cultures, shaped by religious or secular traditions, democratic or autocratic/authoritarian political regimes;
- the hybrid melange of professional expertise/experts, and a heterogeneous range of actors in making knowledge claims (as NGOs, indigenous people movements, local actor movements, etc.);
- the urgent need for translation between cultures and languages (sign systems);
• a confrontation of different—for example, secular or spiritual—
  rationalities, with different extensions, effects, and dispersions;
• historically established hierarchies of power/knowledge regimes and lan-
  guage regimes, including dominant and marginalized structurations, lim-
  ited possibilities of translation, as well as interpretative flexibilities in
  translation;
• a confrontation of different and asymmetric resources of making
  knowledge claims, of proving or deconstructing evidence, etc., of rela-
  tionships and politics of knowledge;
• a heterogeneous constellation of regimes of visuality, of emotions, of eth-
  nics and values, of “materiality,” of combining “the factual” and its “eval-
  uation” via “measurement.”

Conclusion

The complex discursivity of such sites and processes of discourse, communica-

tion, and knowledge production is a result of the hybrid constellations of the

actors and knowledge claims involved, interconnections of heterogeneous are-

nas of dialogue and negotiation, diverse cultural rationalities of factuality, evi-

dence, and legitimation, and also of translation between epistemic cultures and

languages from around the world. Such current (re-)orderings of discourse

largely differ from the global formations of discourse established in the last

centuries. In order to address these current challenges, we have to develop soci-

ological tools for analysing transnational and global discourses as knowledge-

making activities which will profoundly shape the global future.

Notes

1. This paper is my Vienna talk presented in Common Session 2a, Tuesday, 12 July 2016,
2. This was translated into English as The Discourse on Language.
3. Please note that this is not the narrow idea of sociology of scientific knowledge predominant
   in Anglo-Saxon contexts (and sciences & technology studies, or standpoint epistemologies in-
   spired by Karl Mannheim).
4. SKAD has been established since the late 1990s and up to today has been guiding a wide
   range of discourse research in education, political science, sociology, and others, mostly in
   German contexts, and increasingly in Anglo-Saxon work too (see for more references,

Literature


polis: University of Minnesota Press.


4. How Global Is Global Sociology?

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National contexts and national scientific communities have traditionally played a central role for the social sciences. Our disciplines emerged within the framework of nation-states and national systems of higher learning. The precise chronology remains open to discussion, but there is little doubt that the institutionalization of the social sciences as a relatively autonomous scientific domain, as a “third culture” situated between the sciences and the humanities (Lepenies, 1988), was closely entangled with a long process of state formation. The rise of nation-states created a new institutional setting for scholarship and science, which eventually included the social sciences as well.

Today, however, the social sciences might increasingly be seen as a global system, not only because they have come to include scholars from virtually all countries and regions of the world, but also because international exchange has become institutionalized through international organizations. While several international initiatives emerged during the second half of the nineteenth century, international exchange clearly expanded after the Second World War. Organizations such as the International Sociological Association (ISA) were set up in the mid-twentieth century to bridge the cleavages between national academic systems and to facilitate global cooperation.

Among the first models were the international congresses of statistics, which were founded by the Belgian “social physicist” Adolphe Quetelet. From 1853 to 1876, these congresses regularly brought together hundreds of participants discussing the technical, scientific, and organizational progress of their work. The proceedings of the congresses represented the state of the art that was required for anyone who wished to be up to date. They mainly attracted “state servants,” who were interested in “administering” the state and its population.

The first international association for sociology, the Institut international de Sociologie, was founded in 1893 by René Worms. A few months before founding the IIS, Worms had also launched the explicitly internationalist Revue International de Sociologie. Subsequently, he organized a series of international congresses, the first five of which were held in Paris between 1894 and 1903. Worms’ focus was on intellectual exchange and cross-border socialization rather than on close research collaboration or methodological standardization (as in the case of Quetelet’s congresses). The IIS still exists, although its role now seems to be largely taken over by the ISA.
National contexts are currently embedded in global relations of various kinds (Heilbron, 2014). Global exchanges have become organized through several closely related institutions, such as international journals, international scientific conferences, and international scientific associations. But how does the globalization of the social sciences take place? I hereafter particularly look at the history of two journals, which deliberately attempt(ed) to enhance international exchange. The first case is *Isis*, the second one *International Sociology*. A historical analysis of both journals allows for a critical view on the future of the social sciences. Power relations between countries and regions may be shifting, but there is little evidence that the future world will consist of communication flows between more or less equally endowed individuals, organizations, or states. In spite of all attempts to globalize production and access to sociological knowledge, forms of inequality do persist.

**Isis**

The journal *Isis* is now associated with “history of science,” but its disciplinary orientation was broader about a century ago. The journal was founded in 1913, thus about a century ago, by the Belgian-born George Sarton. Its original *Comité de Patronage* included prominent figures with diverse disciplinary orientations, such as Émile Durkheim, Karl Lamprecht, Henri Poincaré, and Arnold van Gennep. In the programmatic opening essay of *Isis*, Sarton also put forward his view on the identity of a yet-to-be-established scientific “interdiscipline.” He defined it as a “psycho-sociological investigation” (Sarton, 1913: 36–37). Sociology remained important for Sarton. About four decades later, when he was generally respected as the “dean” among the historians of science, Sarton still referred to what he called “my sociology of science” (1952: 94).

The first issues of *Isis* were published in Sarton’s place of residence in Belgium (Wondelgem-lez-Gand). Almost immediately, however, the First World War interrupted its publication. After the German invasion of Belgium, Sarton emigrated via England to the United States. The second issue of the second volume of his journal could only be published in 1919.

Sarton ended up at Harvard University. At Harvard, Sarton and Talcott Parsons jointly supervised the Ph.D. dissertation of Robert Merton (titled *Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England*). Merton also became associate editor of *Isis* in the late 1930s, first responsible for what was called “the social aspects of science” and, as of 1942, for “sociology.” Sarton himself remained the chief editor of *Isis* for four decades.

From the onset, Sarton tried to address an international, globalized audience with *Isis*. In 1913, his journal appeared as a multilingual quarterly review—with contributions in French (Sarton’s own native language), German, Italian, and English. In 1919, however, when the publication of *Isis* was re-
sumed in the New World, Sarton made a plea for one lingua franca in science. After a short French-language “Avant-Propos,” he reiterated in an English-language text Isis’ commitment to the formation of a globalized community devoted to the history of science, but also communicated his intention to henceforth “restrict its publication to one language instead of four” (Isis, 1919: 321). For Sarton, Isis’ “poly-glottism” had been “a serious and unnecessary obstacle to its circulation and consequently to the diffusion of the history of science” (Isis, 1919: 321). He concluded by stating that he himself would from now on only write and publish in English.

Sarton continued to publish in English until the end of his life. Throughout his editorship, he also continued to defend the choice for one language in order to support the international character of (the history and sociology of) science. Shortly after the Second World War, in a comment revealingly entitled “The Tower of Babel,” he observed that “during the last decades, the number of languages employed for scientific purposes has considerably increased” (Isis, 1948: 14). But he immediately added his own point of view: “In the field of science the excessive multiplicity of languages is not only objectionable, but stupid and wicked. The scientific needs of mankind are served best by the monopoly or quasi-monopoly of a few languages” (Isis, 1948: 14). The material published in Isis allows us to shed light on the transformations of Isis’ internationalist aspirations.

Figure 1 provides an overview of the language of all articles published in Isis since its foundation. As this figure shows, Isis would continue to publish a limited number of contributions in other European languages for quite some years after the Great War. The explanation for this multilingual trajectory was probably rather prosaic. In the interwar period, the journal often had little or no
backlog of articles. Quite to the contrary, Sarton often had to actively solicit submissions within his own personal network (which in part was still situated in Europe). Altogether, contributions in six—not four—“international” languages were published. There appeared one Latin text in Isis: a reprint of a fourteenth-century treatise on trigonometric methods (Isis, 1923: 99–115). Sarton also included a few publications in Italian or Spanish. In the 1920s, 1 out of 5 published articles could be written in either French or German. There was nevertheless a relatively sharp increase in the number of articles written in English during the interwar period. The last non-English-language article was included in 1974; it was a French-language contribution by a Québec-based historian of science (Isis, 1974: 212–228). In the last four decades, Isis has been an English-language journal.

Figure 2 should be read in conjunction with Figure 1. Figure 2 provides an overview of the countries of residence of the first author of the articles published in Isis. It displays changes in the geographical distribution of the members of the scientific community who have been able to publish in Isis. After Isis had left Europe for the United States (during World War I), the number of American contributions increased strongly. Around the middle of the twentieth century, almost 90% of the authors were affiliated with American institutions. Of course, this shift also reflected practical problems caused by World War II, such as the problems of obtaining publishable material from the occupied territories. But after World War II, the American dominance decreased only gradually. At present, two-thirds of the authors list institutional addresses within the United States. Concomitant with the rise of the number of US contributions, there was a sharp decrease in the number of European contributions in the first decades after Isis’ foundation. Only from the 1970s onwards have European authors again become more visible on the pages of Isis. But from the middle of the twentieth century onwards, most non-US contributions have come from authors from other English-speaking countries, such as Canada, England, and Australia. Seen in this light, Isis thus has not only become an English-language journal, but also a journal of the English-language world.

In the field of history and sociology of science, Isis arguably is the oldest journal in this field that still appears. Its leading role in the field has never been disputed. According to its official websites, it remains “the widest circulation journal in the history of science.”2 As the analyses show, however, Isis is also a journal which particularly features research conducted at American universities and research institutions. The postwar expansion of its “interdiscipline” has also reinforced the scientific authority of communication media and individuals with American credentials. For the American Sarton, “the scientific needs of man-
kind are served best by the monopoly or quasi-monopoly of a few languages” (*Isis*, 1948: 14), but the preceding analyses of the contributions published in his journal also indicate that certainly not all of mankind is to the same degree able to actively participate in the disciplinary communication in an English-language *Isis*. Despite good intentions, globalization may consolidate, reinforce, and deepen forms of inequality between center and periphery.

**International Sociology**

World War I had a negative impact on many experiments of internationalization. Despite new initiatives like the League of Nations (1920), the interwar years were a period of national closure and mounting international hostilities. A renewed expansion of international scholarly associations only occurred after World War II. In the years after the war, UNESCO initiated and funded international disciplinary associations like the International Political Science Association (IPSA), the International Sociological Association (ISA), and the International Economic Association (IEA).

The ISA was founded in 1949 at the instigation of the Social Sciences Department of UNESCO. According to its own website, the “goal of the ISA is to represent sociologists everywhere, regardless of their school of thought, scientific approaches or ideological opinion, and to advance sociological knowledge
throughout the world.” It is added that its members, over 5000 in total, come from 126 countries (for a history of the ISA, see Platt, 1998).

Communication and information exchange have always been important goals for UNESCO and the ISA. The ISA publishes two widely distributed journals: Current Sociology (CS) and International Sociology (IS). CS was first published in 1952. It was initially a bibliographic journal that contained overviews of sociological publications from all over the world. Later it also published trend reports, systematic overviews of particular themes or of the state of sociology in particular nation-states or regions, and papers from ISA conferences. Only after the ISA World Congress of 1998, which took place in Montreal, did it adopt a conventional format and became a peer-reviewed journal to which researchers could submit their papers (instead of the older invitation-only system).

The first issue of IS was published in March 1986. Fernando Cardoso, who was president of the ISA at that time, wrote a programmatic essay for the first issue. In his words, the focus of the journal had to be on “international sociological analysis in a specific sense: made by sociologists from diverse cultural traditions and national origins.” By launching the new journal, the ISA wanted “to create a new possibility for sociologists across the world to be better acquainted with each other’s work” and thereby “increasing our knowledge about contemporary societies and sociologies.” This should, furthermore, “be done by maintaining a balanced editorial policy and thus publish authors from diverse regions” (IS, 1986: 2).

Shortly afterwards, Martin Albrow, who was the first editor in chief, reflected on the internationality of the journal. In order to achieve “worldwide accessibility,” he defended an editorial policy of “positive discrimination” with regard to “underrepresented groups.” “Country of origin, age, gender, and to that one might add, region, language, type of institutional affiliation, are relevant background factors in editorial decision-making.” Albrow was also proud to be able to communicate that the papers submitted within the first year came from 35 different countries, while the ones being published came from 13 countries (IS, 1987: 4–6; see also CS, 1991: 101–118). At present, the journal still has the goal or mandate to maintain “high scientific standards, while reaching out to all corners of outstanding scholarship around the globe” (IS, 2015: 342).

IS has always only published English-language articles—although submissions are possible in other languages, and all abstracts are translated into French and Spanish (as the two other official languages of the ISA). Figure 3 displays the geographical distribution of the authors whose work was published between 2003 and 2014 in IS: almost 23% of the authors worked in a US institution, 16% worked in the Netherlands, 10% in Germany, 8% in the United Kingdom, but less than 1% in countries such as Brazil, India, Iran, Poland, Russia, Romania, etc. These figures need to be interpreted carefully, as there is no available list of the total number of individuals by nation-state who might be able to publish.
While some progress has been made since Albrow published his overview, it may however be concluded that the geographical distribution of authorship remains far from equal. To contextualize these data, it may also be added that the disproportionally high participation of Dutch authors occurred in a period in which IS was edited in Amsterdam (2004–2010).

The rates presented in Figure 3 only provide a first impression of the internationality of international sociology. To obtain a more in-depth view, Figure 4 presents an overview of the citation environment of IS. Figure 4 visualizes, more particularly, the ties of IS to other journals. To draw this network, the relatedness data of the Social Sciences Edition of the Journal Citation Reports were used. Although this database only includes part of the scientific literature, these data allow us to sketch an overview of the relevant citation environment of the journal. Both the cited and citing data (in-degrees and out-degrees) of IS were taken into account. To level out annual fluctuations, the average scores for all available years, i.e. the period 2003–2014, were calculated. Journals which happened to have on average less than one relation to IS per year were excluded from the analysis.
Overall, the network of IS is relatively large. It consists of 74 journals (see also Vanderstraeten & Vandermoere, 2015). In Figure 4, the size of the dots indicates the importance (or centrality) of the journals in the citation network. The thicker lines in these graphs stand for stronger connections. Considering the journals to which IS is strongly connected, we mainly see US-based journals in the field of sociology, such as American Sociological Review, American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, Sociological Quarterly, Annual Review of Sociology, Sociological Perspectives, Sociological Theory, and Theory and Society. The other ISA journal, Current Sociology, is only modestly connected with IS. The main British journals in the field appear in the margins of the network: British Journal of Sociology, The Sociological Review, Sociology, and Work, Employment & Society. Together with the Australian Journal of Sociology and the Canadian Review of Sociology, some other European journals also show up here, like Acta Sociologica, European Societies, European Journal of Social Theory, and European Sociological Review. Most of the other journals in IS’s network focus on specific subjects, including political, environmental, urban, and ethnic issues.

The citation environment of IS thus is rather diffuse. But there is no “positive discrimination” with regard to “underrepresented groups.” An ideal-typical “international sociology” that is to represent and strengthen the development of the discipline of sociology all over the world is not what we are seeing in the citation practice of IS. Instead, global patterns of domination and division become apparent from Figure 4. IS may well have achieved some
success in publishing articles from authors from all over the world, but this broader geographical basis goes along with a highly limited knowledge base. In IS’s network, US journals clearly dominate (see also Vanderstraeten, 2010).

Conclusion

What is referred to as “global” social science is best understood in a twofold sense. The expression refers, more generally, to the fact that the social sciences nowadays exist in nearly all countries around the globe. More specifically, it also refers to a variety of institutions that have arisen on the global level. The global system in this second sense consists of both older and more recent institutional arrangements—journals, conferences, networks, workshops, associations—which aspired and aspire to a global role. In many ways, these institutional arrangements significantly shape the production, circulation, and reception of the social sciences across the globe. They provide legitimacy to particular types of research and particular research traditions—at the expense of others. This short paper sheds light on some evolutions that have occurred in the social sciences during the last century or so. Of course, academic journals remain supply-driven. Editors are dependent on submissions and have but limited possibilities to intervene in the production process. But the preceding analyses also show that the international journals Isis and International Sociology were especially important for the diffusion of knowledge from the center to the peripheries. International institutional forms, such as journals and scholarly associations, have contributed to more regular transnational links and exchanges, but they simultaneously also contribute to the formation of an international disciplinary canon and an international hierarchy, dominated by scholars and scholarship from the United States of America.

Notes

1. While I deal with both journals as source material, I will quote from their publications by referring to the journal, publication year and page numbers. I am grateful to Joshua Eykens, Maarten Hermans and Frederic Vandermoere, who helped me with the collection and analysis of the data presented here.

2. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/journals/isis/about (last accessed on September 12, 2016). According to the 2015 edition of the Journal Citation Reports, its “5-year impact factor” is 1,249. Following this indicator, Isis is ranked 5/44 in the subject category History & Philosophy of Science.

3. See http://www.isa-sociology.org/ (last accessed on September 12, 2016).

4. Technically, the relatedness data express the relationship $R$ between two journals $x$ and $y$ by $R_{x>y} = C_{x>y} * 10^9/(P_y*R_f_x)$, where $C_{x>y}$ refers to the number of citations from the citing journal $x$ to the cited journal $y$, $P_y$ refers to the total number of papers published in journal $y$, and $R_f_x$ refers to the number of references cited in journal $x$ (see Pudovkin and Garfield 2002).
5. It should be taken into account that this database only includes part of the scientific literature, viz. articles in journals included in the Journal Citation Reports of the Web of Science. But it should not be overlooked that publications in (high-ranked) periodicals have become the canonical form of scientific communication in a wide variety of disciplinary specializations, including sociological research.

References


5. Sociology, Feminisms and the Global South: Back to the Future

Rhoda Reddock
RC32 Women in Society

A Framework for a Decolonial Sociology

Recent work on postcolonialism and sociology (Bhabha, 2007a, 2007b) and “Southern Theory” (Connell, 2013) reflect critically on the impact of colonial histories and continuing neocolonial and neoliberal realities of postcolonial societies and the implications for the discipline of sociology. In “Sociology and Postcolonialism: Another ‘Missing’ Revolution?” (2007b) social theorist Gurinder Bhambra argued that postcolonial theory, in particular the work of Spivak and Said, represented a missing revolution in sociology, stating:

The “postcolonial,” however, is not only missing from sociological understandings, but is also not recognized as present within the “modern social” except as constituting the context of modernization for once colonized societies. Within sociology, then, the “postcolonial” faces a double displacement—it can be seen as “missing” from the structural framework and absent from the social framework (insofar as the social is categorized as the “modern social”) (Bhambra, 2007: 875).

While the essence of this argument can be accepted, the term postcolonial for many is problematic, as it could be argued that we may not actually be in a postcolonial moment, as the coloniality of power (Quijano, 2007) continues to shape our everyday relations on a global scale and to frame global scholarship. Despite Bhabra’s suggestion of a demise of colonialism as an explicit political formation (Bhabra, 2007b: 875), even the colonial moment is not past, especially in the Caribbean, where a number of countries are still in various versions of colonial relationships with the United States and European countries, and forms of neocolonialism continue to shape our everyday life. Caribbean scholar Aaron Kamugisha speaks to a coloniality of citizenship which continues to define the lives of all Caribbean peoples as a “complex amalgam of elite domination, neo-liberalism and the legacy of colonial authoritarianism, which continue to frustrate and deny the aspirations of many Caribbean people” (Kamugisha, 2007: 21).
Somewhat in response to these discourses has emerged the notion, or rather the method of decolonial thought which Mignolo sees as originating within the Third World but also linked to the immigrant consciousness in the US and Western Europe today. He decentralizes the colonial and instead highlights the critiques of coloniality coming from the Global South, highlighting for example the work of Fanon, who would have been influenced by the earlier work of his teacher Aimé Césaire, the contribution of Latin American dependency thought, and notably also that of the Caribbean thinkers of the New World Group, the latter for their efforts to develop a decolonized New World Thought and Caribbean Freedom (Mignolo, 2013: 135–136). Additionally, the Bandung Conference, through which the three worlds concept emerged, Mignolo identified as an important contributor to the project of decolonization, something which is often forgotten today.

For Connell, *Southern Theory* calls attention to the centre-periphery relations in the realm of knowledge (Connell, 2007: viii) and emphasizes relations—authority, exclusion and inclusion, hegemony, partnership, sponsorship, appropriation—between intellectuals and institutions in the metropole and those in the world’s periphery (Connell, 2007: ix). Also contributing to these debates has been Portuguese scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ *Epistemologies of the South* (2009), which argues that the South is not a geographical concept but rather a metaphor for the human suffering caused by capitalism and colonialism globally as well as the resistance to this. His call for an epistemology of the South is based on the recognition that Western knowledge is not all-encompassing and progressive change for the future may require understanding that goes beyond Western worldviews and ways of thinking about life (Santos, 2012: 51).

These critiques all draw on the work of scholars of the Global South such as Aníbal Quijano (2007) and Paulin J. Hountondji (2009). Quijano’s notion of the coloniality of power has been central to this critique, as it integrates sociology within a nexus of hegemonic Euro-American global power constructed through the creation of unequal racial categories of superiority and inferiority and consolidated through the processes of colonialism and capitalism (Quijano, 2007: 534–535).

The creation and consumption of knowledge is therefore imprecat within unequal arrangements. Hountondji observes critically how the scholarly agenda and scholarship in the South is shaped methodologically and epistemologically by discourses and approaches in the North. Like others before him he notes the ways in which our writing depends on Euro-American audiences and structures for validity, recognition, and publication, concluding that “too often do we tend to investigate subjects which are of interest first and foremost to a Western audience” (Hountondji, 2009: 8).
In this paper I examine the gendered development of sociologies in the Global South and ask the questions: What of the feminist sociological knowledge created in the Global South by scholars of the Global South? Is a truly global and feminist future for sociology possible? What role for the International Sociological Association in this process?

The Coloniality of Gender in Sociology

In her conceptualization of the coloniality of gender, Maria Lugones critically extends Quijano’s notion to the issue of the colonial/modern sex/gender system. While critiquing his discourses on gender and sex and arguing for the centrality of gender to the coloniality of power; Lugones focuses on the impact of colonialism on the sex/gender systems of precolonial societies, a theme that was addressed in great detail by feminist anthropologists in the 1980s. For Lugones and these early feminist sociologists and anthropologists, capitalism is and was a supremely raced and gendered (Lugones, 2008: 4; Mies, 1998) system and therefore had to be analysed as such.

This work therefore also supports the critique often made by feminists of the Global South and by Third World women in the North of the challenges of the wholesale application of conceptualizations developed out of experiences in the Global North. In her article “The Sociology of Gender in Southern Perspective,” Connell argues that while sociology as a discipline has been positively impacted by gender analysis, “The sociology of gender has developed essentially within the framework of twentieth-Century Northern sociology” (Connell, 2014: 552). Indeed as we will see in our discussions on gender theory in India, there are entire bodies of scholarship that take as their starting point a rejection of Northern gender approaches. What is important to note is that for those of us located in the South it is necessary for us to know, interrogate, and critically use Northern as well as the local/regional scholarship.

Like Hountondji, Connell highlighted the resource constraints under which many of the Southern scholars operate; a powerful reason why so many of the best scholars migrate and move to locations in the Northern metropoles. In an increasingly competitive scholarly arena, this has resulted in many strategic alliances and, in some instances, tensions and mistrust on both sides. For instance, the early AAWORD/AFARD (African Association for Women and Development) for many years limited full membership to scholars located on the continent out of concern to ensure that continental voices were not overshadowed.

Today the network Gender and Women’s Studies in Africa (GWS Africa), which started in 1999 at the African Gender Institute of the University of Cape Town, comprises a new generation of African feminist scholars located in the North and the South. In contrast to that earlier discourse, the concerns
of this group are less with the North and more with the patriarchal hegemony of African universities and the need to provide an empowering space for strengthening African feminist theory and scholarship and its impact on the mainstream disciplines. As Mama noted in the inaugural issue of the institute’s journal *Feminist Africa*:

Contemporary reviews of the intellectual production coming out of African academies and research institutes suggest that despite earlier warnings (see, for example, Imam et al., 1997) gender studies is having limited impact on mainstream scholarship (see Sall, forthcoming). Instead, the male-dominated research and publications arena largely continues to ignore the intellectually transformative implications of feminist theory, which, by definition, cuts across all the major discipline (Mama, 2002: 4).

Since its inception, the AGI has become a focal point and clearinghouse for feminist scholarship on Africa and for African feminist scholars of the South and the North. Amina Mama described their origins in these words:

During the last three decades, African feminists have begun to imagine and build a community that brings activist and intellectual work together, to advance social transformations both within and beyond the academy, and to push the disciplinary frontiers of social theory, and develop continental feminist intellectual work (Mama 2015: 41).

As with other locations, the neoliberalization of African universities has resulted in cutbacks and new approaches to their core business. This raises questions about the threat posed to patriarchal capitalism and the colonality of gender by these programmes.

**Feminist Theory and the Global South**

*The Scholarship of Gender and Feminism in India*

In similar vein and with an interesting twist, Purkayasta, Subramiam, Desai, and Bose (2009), four scholars of Indian heritage located in US universities, provide a useful review of feminist and gender scholarship in India. In outlining the parameters of the paper they problematize the boundary of what constitutes “Indian,” noting that

We focus primarily on scholars who are natives or primarily based in India and/or who have written first for Indian audiences. We... include work that would not be considered “academic” in the United States; however, our collective experience suggests that these “non-academic” publications are important
sites in which gender has been conceptualized. The role of the public intellectual remains much more vibrant in India than it is in the United States; thus academic debates and controversies are expressed in multiple platforms (Purkayastha, Subramaniam, Desai, and Bose, 2009: 92).

The critiques of the impact of colonialism, neocolonialism, and the current phase of neoliberalism have been important components of Indian gender scholarship. India has also been characterised by an ongoing conversation between a movement scholarship and that taking place within universities. The authors argue that the strong movement-based literature, including those of activists working with women in urban and rural communities, helped ground the academic agenda through the emergence of organic categories “that move back and forth from activism to analysis” (Purkayastha, Subramaniam, Desai, and Bose, 2009: 101). Methodologically and epistemologically, therefore, this history presents interesting dimensions that may not be present elsewhere, resulting in important and more complex or comprehensive theoretical insights that may have global relevance.

Towards a Global and Feminist Sociology: The ISA and Research Committee 32—Women and Society

Immanuel Wallenstein, ISA President 1994–1998, in his introduction to Jennifer Platt’s A Brief History of the ISA 1948–1997, observed:

ISA is the principal organizational mechanism by means of which sociology is an international activity. As you will see when you read the history, the ISA is only very imperfectly international. Of course, this is part because the numbers of institutions and practitioners are quite disproportionately distributed across the globe, although the disparities are less great than when we started out 50 years ago. No doubt this is also in part because the efforts to make our activities truly international have been less intensive and less persistent than they ought to have been (Wallenstein, 1998: 9, emphasis added).

Despite the presence of pre-revolutionary Cuba, Egypt, India, and Turkey at its Constituent Congress in 1949 and Zambia’s listing as a national association in 1950 (Platt, 1998: 16–17), the ISA continued to be a largely (white) Euro-American enterprise for most of its existence.

It was in 1970 that the first woman was elected to the ISA Research Committee, while RC32 The Sociology of Sex Roles was founded in 1974. Initially, it was the research committee on the Sociology of Sex Roles, and then in 1980 was renamed Women and Society. By 1980 it had also become one of the largest RCs and the RC with the largest membership from the Global South. Founding member Shirley Nuss suggests that despite the Euro-American impetus for
the establishment of this research committee, with first co-chairs Elise Boulding of the US and Andree Michel of France, the leadership was committed to expanding the parameters of this group.

In addition to the core officials, the RC32 board includes 1–4 representatives of the world’s regions currently represented in the membership of the committee—Africa, Asia, Australia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and West Asia, and North America. This assured a diverse management of the committee as well as a pathway to leadership of the committee and ultimately the ISA Research and Executive Councils.

Regional representatives have certain specific responsibilities, which include

i. bring new members to RC32; ii. disseminate information on RC32 and its activities; iii. co-organize RC32 conferences or workshops in their region, if requested by the Board to do so; iv. locate researchers who could organize sessions and/or otherwise participate in the ISA World Congress and other ISA related conferences; and v. identify new issues and creative lines of inquiry for further research on women and society.

While this facilitated the active involvement and recruitment to the committee of a range of women of diverse regions, an examination of the composition of other current RC boards shows that they continue to reflect this white Euro-American dominance, with some representation from South Africa and Australia. RC32 stands out in this regard, with the most diverse representation both in the executive as well as in the board.

Conclusions

What then for the future of sociology and the responsibility of the ISA, which Wallerstein described as “the principal organizational mechanism by means of which sociology is an international activity”? In this article I sought to establish a framework for a gendered and decolonial sociology that acknowledged the connected histories of the Global North and South. In so doing I located this discussion within a growing body of knowledge on the need to bring the epistemologies of the South, or Southern theory, into the mainstream and core of social theory, confronting the coloniality of power that continues to shape social, political, and economic structures at every level of our societies.

The challenges facing sociology as a discipline as well as the sociology of gender at this neoliberal conjuncture are many, and sociology itself has to herald with confidence its ability to provide the powerful intersectional analyses required at this time, both in the North and the South. Sociology has the responsibility to bring the people back into the global discourse which economics has
captured for too long. Feminist knowledge is critical to this project, and global feminist knowledge, including well-developed bodies of scholarship in the South, has much to contribute to our understanding of the complex issues that confront our world. To do this, sociology and the ISA have to confront their own coloniality of power and coloniality of gender by reviewing and concretely transforming the structures and strictures within the global organisation of this discipline that prevent this. The ISA recently published an evaluation of the top 100 sociological texts of the twentieth century. We are all aware of the results. Will this century’s results be different?

Notes

1. Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands—US; Anguilla, Turks and Caicos, Montserrat—UK; Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, St. Maarten, Saba, St. Eustatius—The Netherlands; Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guyane—France
2. A loosely organized grouping of intellectuals, educators, cultural workers, writers and activists mainly from the Anglophone Caribbean or with Caribbean origins and interests (Girvan, 2011:1) Among them –initially Walter Rodney, Lloyd Best, James Millette, Alister McIntyre, Kari Polanyi-Levitt, Norman Girvan and others.
3. While using to some extent Connell’s notions of southern and northern theory; It is important to note that in the same way that southern theory is diverse so is northern theory. For example in my experience North American sociology tends to be much more empiricist and focused on ‘modern’ societies. European sociology tends be more theoretical and critical with a greater focus on political economy.
4. There is now a proposal on the table to rationalize this to two representatives each.

References


6. Participation, Organizational Democracy and Self-Management: Past, Present, and Future

Fátima Assunção, Catherine Casey, Isabel da Costa, Eleni Nina-Pazarzi, Julia Rozanova

RC10 Participation, Organizational Democracy, and Self-Management

Inequality and ecological destruction are increasing at the global level, bringing about protest and struggle, but in many countries the responses to the crises have recently entailed not widespread participation in finding solutions but rather unpopular austerity measures decided in a top-down and technocratic manner that threaten to dismantle existing social and political participative schemes. From our perspective, the struggles for the “futures we want,” with social justice and democratization, should increase “Participation, Organizational Democracy, and Self-Management,” which Research Committee 10 (RC10) has strived to foster since its inception within the International Sociological Association in 1978. The present paper seeks to contribute towards that end. We will start with a brief recall of some of the debates concerning participation and industrial democracy; we will then present a few ideas and topics that would benefit from being developed in interaction and debate with colleagues from other ISA RCs; and we will conclude with a plea for further collaborative research and dialogue.

Debates concerning participation, organizational democracy, and self-management have a long history. Their origins can be traced to movements for democratic inclusion of adult citizens in political and social life, for the abolition of slavery, the end of colonialism, the winning of voting rights for men and women, and for industrial democracy in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century trade unions. Further significant developments occurred in the decades following World War II, with a search for political settlements among nations and between social classes and populations. The post-war achievements of a more politicized working class, gained through the organization of labour interests in trade unions and political parties, extended confidence for a further widening of democracy and shared interests. Notwithstanding inherent antagonisms in capitalist production relations, socially oriented political leaders led demands for industrial and organizational democracy. By the 1970s, concerted political demand had generated practical institutional developments toward industrial de-
mocracy in various forms across many western countries as well as in other parts of the world.

Key features among concepts of industrial democracy are “common rules” and “citizenship rights” (da Costa, 2008; Casey, 2014). Citizens participate in the world of work and employment, in education, and in social activities in possession of certain rights that are at once individual and collective. In many countries, citizenship rights include degrees of social protection and provision available to all citizens. These social provisions are afforded by the state even as the state may pursue a market or mixed-market economy (da Costa, 2010; Garibaldo et al., 2012; Nicolau-Smokoviti et al., 2013). Some authors have developed the notion of a “welfare citizenship model” (Wagner and Zimmerman, 2004), which prominently favours social conceptualisations of citizenship encompassing more than simply political membership in a nation-state. For other authors, social citizenship refers not only to entitlements to benefits, but encompasses broad citizenship rights, including those of employees in work organizations to certain standards of work and workplace relations, and to trade union representation (Crouch et al., 2001). Movements for industrial and organizational democracy arose, notably in the mid-twentieth century, for the expansion of democratic values and practices through active social citizenship. Active social citizenship includes efforts toward participatory democratic practices in the spheres of economy and production, and in everyday workplaces (Crouch and Heller, 1983; Heller et al., 1998; Gold, 2003; Sünker et al., 2003). Movements toward industrial and organizational democracy that were especially prominent in the 1970s and 1980s sought the expansion of democratic principles of participation and of civil society rights and responsibilities (Blumberg, 1973; Crouch and Heller, 1983; Széll, 1992; Durand, 1994; Heller et al., 1998). Their guiding principles promoted the concept of citizenship as a social role, and a social right. These activities were regarded, along with trade union membership, as important forms of political effectiveness, workplace governance, and self-management (Kester and Pinaud, 1996; Gold, 2003; Casey, 2014).

Industrial and organizational democracy movements sought, and continue to seek, reform of the labour process, to reduce industrial conflict and to encourage more cooperative, less alienating work and workplaces. They challenge the privileged prerogative of employer and managerial power over decision-making structures in the organization and workplace. Advocates of industrial democracy argue that workers, as social citizens, have the right of access to information and of access to and participation and/or representation in the important decision-making procedures within their organizations, even when these organisations operate at the global level. This right is not only to wage bargaining but also to participate in the design of production tasks, job design, and the establishment of workplace rules and conditions. Advocates further argue that these activities improve quality of work experience and employee job satisfaction and that their wide-ranging
benefits outweigh the costs incurred in the time taken in consultative processes that is not “wasted” in command and control management practices (Heckscher, 1988; Rogers and Streeck, 1995; Kester and Pinaud, 1996; Heller et al., 1998; Levinson, 2000; Széll, 2001 and 2009; Gold, 2003; Garibaldo and Telljohann, 2004; Sandberg, 2013).

However, a sweep of neoliberal economics that has influenced societies around the world over the last three decades has brought considerable changes to the world of work and industrial relations with significant consequences for industrial and organisational democracy institutions and efforts (Gray, 2004; Durand, 2007; da Costa and Rehfeldt, 2011; Casey, 2014). Democratic participation, including self-management and workers’ control, trade union representation and workplace forums and work councils, is highly contested terrain. Forums and demands for worker participation remain active and variously effective, and there is extensive literature in industrial relations on voice, participation, and trade union collective bargaining. Nonetheless, researchers and practitioners have observed that employee participation in workplace and organizational politics and decision making is frequently subject to fluctuations in interest, commitment, durability, and effectiveness. Participation presents an ambivalent character. Many have noted a decline in established institutional channels such as work councils and trade union representation as those earlier achievements, in some countries and industries, experience institutional dismantlement or neglect (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013; Waddington, 2015). A distinct unevenness in the active retention of those institutions across sectors, occupations, and demographic distribution is also observed. Traditionally male occupations in heavy industry and manufacturing, and public sector organizations continue to exhibit relatively robust participatory institutions. Other sectors, notably those featuring high numbers of young workers and in newer sectors such as technological product development, communications, and services, demonstrate weaker participation activities and interests. Existing forms of participation require actors to have political skills and competencies, which themselves require formation and forums of practice. Research shows that political skills formation is frequently neglected (Casey, Fiedler and Erakovic, 2012). A pattern of uneven political will and interest in enabling and sustaining democratic participation raises vital questions. Those questions intersect with broader questions concerning crises in democracy, disaffection with political elites, and currents of individualism and social inequalities.

Several colleagues have addressed these questions in RC10 sessions during the ISA Forum in Vienna, and it is worthwhile to mention at least a few here in order to give a sense of the lively exchanges that took place. We learned about important academic developments and practical experiences with participative democracy, local decentralization, urban participation, self-management, social and labor movements, and other related issues in various countries and contexts.
Some examples are: Luis Miguel on Brazilian perceptions of participation and representation; Heinz Suenker on self-management as an alternative form of organization; Shlomo Getz and Yuval Achouch on the evolution of the Kibbutz experience; Aline Pires on cooperative “recuperated” plants in Brazil; Nagender Tadepally on the experience in India with grassroots democracy; Teresa Montagut on social movement in Barcelona; Daniele Di Nunzio on trade unions and precarious workers in Italy; Wolfgang Weber on correlations of individual perceptions of organizational democracy; and many others that we cannot mention here for lack of space. Experiences were shared on concrete examples of how to develop participative democracy, and the debates brought to the fore recent challenges such as the need to develop democracy or go back to authoritarianism, or bottom-up democracy versus representation by elites. Several presentations addressed the issue of democratic representation, pointing out differences between representative and participatory democracy and a need for further research about the significance of different forms of representation for increased participation.

Many other issues also came to the fore and contributed food for thought about the futures we want that will foster participation, organisational democracy, and self-management. All the issues can (and actually do) benefit from exchanges and debates with colleagues from other RCs, such as RC30 on Sociology of Work; RC44 on Labor Movements; RC47 on Social Classes and Social Movements; and RC48 on Social Movements, Collective Action, and Social Change, to mention just a few. The focus of RC10 on Participation, Organizational Democracy, and Self-Management can hopefully also contribute to and benefit from debates on other topics such as gender, for example, studied by colleagues from RC32 on Women and Society. Consider the matter of women and entrepreneurship, which has been explored by some RC10 members as a way of understanding the inequalities that constrain women’s participation in economic activities and undermine the construction of a more participative society (Assunção, 2007, 2013; Nina-Pazarzis and Giannacourou, 2005; Nina-Pazarzis 2013; Heilbrunn and Palgi, 2015). Obviously this issue does not exhaust the predominant problems of gender inequality, which have been widely studied by many colleagues, but it points to a possible avenue of further interaction with other colleagues from ISA.

Researchers’ interest in studying women’s participation in entrepreneurship goes back to the 1970s, when Eleanor Schwartz (1976) identified entrepreneurship as a new female frontier. Since the 1980s several authors have built upon feminist theory to reflect on the biases resulting from analyzing women’s entrepreneurship in the light of theoretical constructions based on men’s experiences (Mirchandani, 1991), which echoed the masculine connotation of the term entrepreneur (Ahl, 2006). Feminist debates contributed to analysing the ways in which the social construction of gender shapes women’s and men’s experiences,
and the ways in which gender relations and their intersections with other axes of social inequality, such as ethnicity and social class, influence women’s access to and experiences of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship came to the limelight of policy-making debates as a way of fighting unemployment and an alternative to discrimination in dependent employment. While there is a positive political discourse on the benefits of entrepreneurship in terms of economic growth and job creation and a praise of the ability to be independent, to have initiative, and to be willing to take risks, these “enterprising qualities” (du Gay, 1996: 56) do not develop in a social vacuum.

Are fresh linkages between capabilities and democratic polities emerging? What stimulates or obstructs the development of the skills and capabilities to take initiative and to participate? Obstruction to participation includes the neglect of development of the skills and capabilities to participate. These skills in turn are contingent upon the development of non-discriminatory inclusive and more democratic practices within organizations as well as society at large. Pointing out obstructions increases awareness and thus the search for possible ways to improve participation in the futures we want. Besides gender, let us take into account for instance how stigma, compromised health status, or policy barriers can entail unequal opportunities to participate and strip some groups of full citizenship rights, particularly within total institutions, such as prisons, hospitals, or nursing homes, a topic that would benefit from exchanges with RC29 on Deviance and Social Control or TG03 Human Rights and Global Justice.

Population aging and the growth of prison populations have been recognized by the United Nations as being among the key challenges of the twenty-first century that must be urgently addressed by research, policy, and practice. The World Health Organization (2016) estimates that about 10 million people were incarcerated in the world in 2015, half in the US, China, and Russia. High rates of incarceration profoundly affect prisoners’ families, contributing to increases in childhood poverty, homelessness, poorer educational attainment, growing unemployment, and translation of inequality to future generations (Wilderman & Wakefield, 2014). Prisons disproportionately contain people from impoverished communities, where lack of jobs, resources, and social services shape behaviours that are criminalized (Goffman, 2014). After release former prisoners experience further discrimination when seeking employment, and remain excluded from self-management and democratic participation that could have been available through work or mainstream civic organizations.

Lack of participation and denial of voice also characterise residents of other total institutions such as nursing homes. Sociologists and practitioners distinguish between the Third Age (when healthy, active retirees enjoy social engagement) and the Fourth Age (a later period associated with mental and physical disability). Although criticized (Rozanova et al., 2016), this understanding underlies assess-
ment for determining older individuals’ placement into nursing homes. When defined as a Fourth Ager an individual is bereft of agency and self-determination and becomes an acted-upon object. There is a profound inequality among nursing homes (Theurer et al., 2015). Financially solvent patients retain some self-determination, while destitute patients become voiceless and excluded.

In sum, institutionalized populations are excluded from organizational democracy and self-management. To foster future positive social change, sociologists would need to rethink forms of participation and representation for residents of total institutions and give a voice to these underprivileged and downtrodden social groups. Many other groups and issues would require mentioning as regards the futures we want, but for lack of space we have chosen to focus first on those traditionally analysed by RC10 colleagues and then on those whose study has been less explored by RC10 and which would benefit from and could foster exchanges with colleagues from other ISA RCs.

Until recently the main goal of sociology was its establishment in academia, but during the last few decades, social science disciplines, and sociology in particular, have developed a discourse on the transition from “pure” science to public social science. A number of sociologists define “public sociology” in general as an approach to the discipline that seeks to transcend academia in order to engage with wider audiences. According to Michael Burawoy (2005: 7): “There are multiple public sociologies, reflecting different types of publics and multiple ways of accessing them. Traditional and organic public sociologies are two polar but complementary types.” For Burawoy the bulk of public sociology is of an organic kind, which entails “sociologists working with a labour movement, neighbourhood associations, communities of faith, immigrant rights groups, human rights organizations” (Burawoy, 2005: 8), and he pleaded for greater visibility and recognition of this organic kind of public sociology. Burawoy’s vision of public sociology became an inspiration for reflection (Nina-Pazarzi, 2014) entirely in tune with RC10 activities, which have always tried to foster collaborative research and dialogue with different audiences and even across disciplines.

Increasing social problems and diverse issues have brought about a need for reconceptualization in many aspects of sociology. The reorientation of sociology to promote collaborative research and dialogue between sociologists and various sorts of publics on issues of social justice, equality, democracy, participation, working-life conditions, democratic decision making, and many others promotes playing an active role in present and future societies characterized by unprecedented risks and opportunities, which require new ways of thinking to achieve a better world, or, as Markus Schulz (2015) puts it: “require forward-oriented scholarship that can go beyond narrow business perspectives and corporate interests and that can reach across borders in search of sustainable alternatives.”

The increased inequalities and social injustices, together with diminished welfare states and industrial relations reforms in many parts of the world, bring
to the fore the need for continuing struggles for democratic participation in societal regulation. We believe that desirable visions for alternative sustainable futures are those that include democracy and participation at all levels, from the workplace to the political sphere. Beyond much needed forward-looking scholarship, we also look forward in our future activities and exchanges to learning more from comparing struggles in different countries and settings and to working towards identifying viable roadmaps for participative social transformation.

References


7. How Sociocybernetics Can Help Understand Possible World Futures

Bernard Scott
RC51 Sociocybernetics

Introduction

Sociocybernetics is concerned with applying theories and methods from cybernetics and the systems sciences to the social sciences by offering concepts and tools for addressing problems holistically and globally. Cybernetics is a trans-discipline (Latin “trans” - across) that abstracts, from the many domains it adumbrates, models of great generality. Such models serve several purposes: they bring order to the complex relations between disciplines; they provide useful tools for ordering the complexity within disciplines; they provide a “lingua franca” for inter-disciplinary communication; they may also serve as powerful pedagogic and cultural tools for the transmission of key insights and understandings to succeeding generations. However, as noted by Immanuel Wallerstein (1997), past President of the International Sociological Association, if a transdisciplinary approach is to make a real contribution in the natural and social sciences, it must be more than a list of similitudes. It must also be epistemologically sophisticated and well-grounded. Cybernetics, with its explicit distinction between first order studies of observed systems and second order studies of observing systems, can claim, not only to satisfy this criterion, but also to be making significant contributions to epistemological debates.

This paper sets out some ideas about how sociocybernetics can contribute to understanding possible world futures. A central concept in cybernetics is ‘governance’, the art of steersmanship. As conceived by Ashby, Beer and others, this art is concerned with the management of variety. How do we face the challenge of managing all the variety that makes up ‘possible world futures’? The distinction between first and second order studies makes clear there are two levels to this challenge:

1. The variety and complexity of first order observed systems
2. The variety and complexity of second order systems, of interactions between observing systems.

Already, the distinction between the two levels has reduced variety. Attempting to understand possible world futures, with studies only at level 1, omits the challenge of bringing about change through social action. Using level
2 studies to address the challenge of bringing about change through social action can only be fruitful insofar as relevant models and data are available from level 1 studies. The paper briefly overviews what some current level 1 models and data are telling us about possible world futures. The paper also briefly overviews what some current level 2 models and data are telling us about possible world futures. The paper goes on to outline ways in which sociocybernetics can address the problems thus summarised.

**Being holistic about global problems**

One of the founding predications of the cybernetics and systems movement is that systemic problems need to be addressed holistically (Beer, 1967). I discussed the question of what it means to be holistic about global problems in Scott (2002). I quote:

‘With respect to the need to be both holistic and global, Luhmann (1989) very clearly warns of two dangers:

(i) failure to “resonate” with the ecosystem (not being global enough in our concerns);

(ii) … too much resonance between social systems (not being holistic enough to dampen unfruitful noise and “excitement”).

‘Examples of (i) are many: being parochial with respect to one’s own ecological niche; focussing on one issue (e.g., “global warming” or “poverty”) but not taking cognisance of related issues (e.g., “opportunities for education” or “political freedoms”). Examples of (ii’) are also many: the promotion of one scientific discipline over another; the promotion of one political ideology over another.

‘(However,) “being holistic” lacks meaning for an individual if the implied theoretical ideal lacks a praxis… Actualising holism requires a “nucleation”, a cognitive/affective centre around which the many facets and levels of our concerns may cohere as insight and intuition. .. I argue that it is precisely the perceived need for a holistic “centring” that may serve as such a centre. As practitioners it is sufficient to intend to be holistic – and to share that intent - in order for ideas to be created fruitfully.’

Sociocybernetics offers guiding principles that bear on the question of how a community of observers can establish and maintain consensus, including:

1. Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety: only variety can control variety
2. Scott’s principles of observation: there is always a bigger picture; there is always another level of detail; there is always another perspective.
3. von Foerster’s ethical imperative: act to maximise the alternatives
4. von Foerster’s corollary to his ethical imperative: A is better off when B is better off.
First Order Problems

Modern economies are based on forms of capitalism where returns on investment lead to reinvestment with the goal of continued economic growth. This growth requires a source of labour, much of it skilled and professional, to keep it going, together with the reinvestment of profits and readily available sources of energy and raw materials. With this growth the rich get richer and continue to do so.

The so-called developed world (e.g., Europe, US, Canada, Australia, Russia) sustains its economic growth by (i) reinvestment and (ii) large scale immigration. The so-called developing world (e.g., South America, India, China and the Pacific Rim) have large populations to support economic growth and, as they develop, also attract and encourage economic migrants. Both developed and developing nations are investing in education and training and are creating relatively wealthy middle classes and super-rich plutocracies. There is a flow of labour, as legal and illegal immigrants from Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia enter Western Europe. There are flows from South America into North America. There are flows into Australia.

The switch from hunter gatherer societies, over millennia, together with a growth in world population, has made humankind net consumers of the earth’s resources. That is, in the long term economic growth is not sustainable. Forests are cut down, species are lost, oceans are depleted of fish stocks, and fertile lands become deserts.

In recent times, fossil fuels, as a source of stored energy and desirable by-products such as fertilisers, plastic and pharmaceuticals, have fed economic growth and continue to do so. The use of such fuels and other resources has triggered climate change, widespread pollution and damage to the ozone layer.

The problems associated with continued economic growth are exacerbated by continued population growth. It has been estimated by some that it would take five earths to support the current population if everyone was enjoying the same standard of living as that now enjoyed by ‘developed’ parts of the world.

In March, 2008, a conference on the topic From Global Warning to Global Policy was convened by the World Political Forum and the Club of Rome and chaired by President Mikhail Gorbachev in Turin on March 28-29 2008. I quote from the final statement.

‘The participants concluded that the world has entered a period in which the dramatic scale, complexity and speed of change caused by human activities threaten the fragile environmental and ecological systems of the planet on which we depend. It is urgent therefore that the world community should agree rapidly on strategies and effective action to avert irreversible change in world systems, brought about by accelerating climate change, the ecosystems crisis, the depletion of energy resources and the diminishing availability of water, the degra-
tion of environments across the world, persistent poverty and deprivation and the rising gulf between rich and poor within and between countries. Also, global population is in the midst of a transition from explosive growth to a new paradigm of development, never before experienced by humankind.’

Figure 2 is intended to be a simple holistic overview of what some current first order models and data are telling us about possible world futures.

Figure 2: An attempt at a simple holistic overview of some global problems
Second Order Problems

Second order problems concern human behaviour and social interactions where the participants are observing systems holding beliefs with associated values, following institutionalised behaviour patterns, engaging in creative problem solving, learning and communicating, all in the pursuit of goals, some of which may be consciously articulated, some of which are the non-conscious consequences of participation in a culture and of genetic heritage.

Some important second order issues are:

1. differing kinds and levels of social and cultural development, including differences in quality of life, access to health services and education, problems of identity and social conflict, for example, as set out in the hypothesis of there being a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington, 1997).

2. pathological belief systems which institutionalise ignorance, prejudice, discrimination and conflict.\(^1\)

3. as noted by Luhmann, the problem of ‘noise’ in the ‘marketplace’ of ideas

4. the problem of empowerment for social action as in the lack of democratic forms of government and lack of access to opportunities for personal development.

These problems can be summed up in terms of two cybernetic principles:

1. Evil is that which restricts the right of actors to interact (Pask, 1991)

2. Act so as to maximise the alternatives (von Foerster, 1993)

The two principles are complementary. Both are predicated on two key assumptions: (i) there is a shared gene pool (ii) ‘persons’ are socially constructed. The first principle helps identify blocks and constraints. The second principle helps to guide creative, positive action. Both are, in essence, corollaries of the Law of Requisite Variety that “Only variety can control variety” (Ashby, 1956). Variety is controlled by identifying redundancies, patterns and lawfulness. Hence the importance of education (L. educare, to lead out of) and the importance of concepts that provide transdisciplinary and metadisciplinary clarity and coherence to manage the variety of theories and models in the academic market place. Cybernetic concepts can serve the latter functions. In Scott (2014), I set out some of the concepts from cybernetics which I believe should be part of the spiral curriculum that, ideally, is revisited throughout an individual’s education from primary to higher levels, at each stage with greater sophistication and detail.

How humans form and maintain systems of belief is a complex business, with rational and non-rational aspects (Wolpert, 2006). Even belief systems that are rationally constructed may in the longer term turn out to be flawed and misguided. A case in point is the faith of economists in classic economic models based on the concept of equilibrium between supply and demand. Ormerod
(2005) points out that failure to predict the future is endemic in the business world. The world, as a whole, continues to surprise us.

**Looking for Solutions**

What might be done? As economies collapse, nation states and coalitions there-of may well go on a war footing, where new orders of doing things are imposed, for example, rationing of food and energy, bans on travel, investment in alternative forms of energy supply, imposition of birth control. As noted above, hopefully there may also be an accelerated process of education, awareness raising and political empowerment that includes the recognition that some belief systems such as ‘individualism’ are unacceptable.

‘Individualism’ is the social disease, currently legitimised and encouraged in all parts of the world, of seeking, as an individual, to become rich and powerful relative to one’s neighbours. Legislative and economic practices reforms of some kind will be required. There will be (indeed, there is) also the requirement to educate, raise awareness and change belief systems.

The tough question is, “How do we (humankind) change our practices while the world is falling apart?” The battle for ‘correct thinking’ has to be won as only ‘correct thinking’ in the long term leads to ‘correct action’. The populace in the developed countries with access to resources such as mass education and mass communication systems are not stupid or necessarily ignorant. They are seduced by consumerism and the lifestyles portrayed in popular entertainment. Insofar as there is a growing awareness that disasters of one kind or another are imminent, this is accompanied by feelings of alienation and disempowerment. We will need a rapid change in popular consciousness delivering the right messages as disasters strike such that politicians and corporate leaders are obliged to change their ways.

It is of value for all of us, as ‘ordinary people’ to engage in discussion about these issues. There are underlying empirical and logical truths as sketched out above, that need to be understood and promulgated. The ‘right thinking’ produced by education will lead to the ‘right action’, including the action of promoting the right thinking and of commanding the means to do so. This requires educational activities to go hand in hand with the evolution of more effective means for democratic participation. The populous, made aware of what is required, must find its voice. We need positive feedback cycles where the demand for better education and more informed knowledge about what is happening and why leads to demands for even better education, knowledge sharing and ways of translating right thinking into right action.

With respect to ‘right thinking’, I have identified two fallacies which I believe need to addressed and corrected:
1. The fallacy of the particular: “I am all right because the problems are happening somewhere else.”

2. The fallacy of the general: “Humankind will survive somehow.”

In relative terms, Fallacy 1 was perhaps once true but is clearly false now that, globally, as noted below, “Everything is connected to everything else.” With respect to Fallacy 2, it is possibly true but, as a pious hope, can blind us to an awareness of the great cost in human lives and suffering that will be (and is being) paid as part of the survival of the species.

There follows a brief listing of some aspects of possible solutions that I have come across in the literature and in the media. There is not space here to present them in any detail. I present them as a means of promoting further discussion.

1. Switching to renewable forms of energy.
2. Using alternative forms of production and waste disposal that are truly sustainable, possibly using nanotechnologies and ‘synthetic biology’.
3. Using just and humane forms of birth control to reduce the global population.
4. Only interacting with the ecosystem in ways that are sustainable and healing of damage already inflicted.
5. Education for social justice and quality of life, rather than for the individualism of wealth accumulation and consumerism.
6. Education and legislation for empowerment as part of more effective forms of democratic government.
7. A move away from the economic growth emphasis of modern capitalism as embodied in ‘limited companies’, ‘corporations’ and ‘shareholders’ towards cooperative forms of institution.
8. New forms of tithing or taxation that change damaging behaviours and/or release resources that can be invested in developing sustainable ways of doing things.

Concluding Comment

Given the scale of the problems at both first and second order levels, it is likely that mankind is inevitably facing major disasters on a global scale. Amelioration of these disasters will, in the limit, be in the hands of whatever communities emerge and survive locally. More global solutions are thinkable. However, as these entail a radical re-appraisal and re-education about what it is to be human, it is not obvious at this stage that these global solutions are doable. It may be too late for such a global transformation of human consciousness to be achieved. It may be that, as proposed by Morrison (1999) and many others, there are intrinsic limitations on the extent to which the human species can embody the beliefs needed to ensure its survival.
A majority of commentators appear to see no alternative to capitalism, economic competition, continually striving for more, for better ‘standards of living’. Some do question the values and their relative importance. What is more important; a high income or safety from harm, riches or job satisfaction? And so on. There are alternatives to secular, materialistic capitalist ways of life. For example, there those based on the concept of sustainable living, abiding by Commoner’s (1971) Four Laws of Ecology. I cite them here as key holistic, systemic, cybernetic ideas that are essential for understanding how we might manage the variety in global systems:

1. Everything is connected to everything else. There is one ecosphere for all living organisms and what affects one, affects all.
2. Everything must go somewhere. There is no "waste" in nature and there is no “away” to which things can be thrown.
3. Nature knows best. Humankind has fashioned technology to improve upon nature, but such change in a natural system is, says Commoner, “likely to be detrimental to that system.”
4. There is no such thing as a free lunch. In nature, both sides of the equation must balance, for every gain there is a cost, and all debts are eventually paid.

It is my belief that ideas such as these should be vital parts of educational curricula, from the cradle to the grave.

Notes

This paper is an abbreviated, amended and updated version of a paper presented at the 8th International Conference of Sociocybernetics, Ciudad de México, México, July 23-27, 2008, and published as Scott (2009).

1. In Scott (2015) I use concepts from sociocybernetics to analyse what I see as pathological about the Abrahamic faiths.
2. The final communiqué of the G7 Conference, Japan, 2016 set ‘global growth as a priority for dealing with threats to the world’s economy and security’.

References


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It is a postmodern commonplace that we live in times of blurred and blended social identities. However, recently the very category of “human” has started to show some fuzzy borders, as advances in medicine and prosthetic technologies (including brain chips) point in the direction of an “enhanced” human, or “humanity 2.0,” which challenges the able/disabled normative divide (Fuller 2011). At the same time, the privilege attached to being human is coming under increasing critical scrutiny. Thus, we see the rise of groups campaigning for the “rights” of animals, nature more generally, and, last but not least, advanced machines (so-called “artificial intelligences”). All of these developments share a broadly “futuristic” orientation which, in some cases, promises solutions to already existing social problems, but which in other cases displaces or replaces those problems. In this paper, I shall consider two meta-sociological problems that arise from this emerging world-view of “humanity 2.0”: (1) Is the future about extending the human as far as possible (“transhumanism”) or resituating the human as one among many life-forms in a common environment (“posthumanism”)? (2) Will it be possible to maintain, if not reinvent, the classical liberal idea of tolerance in a world where the value of being human—and what counts as human—is so much up for grabs?

There are two general attitudes to the “human” in sociology today. The first is that it is a transcendental condition for the very possibility of sociology. In this respect, sociology is intrinsically human, and “social problems” arise because the “humanity” of specific groups fails to be recognized or incorporated into some larger yet distinctly “human” narrative. This general idea was made quite explicit in, say, Comte, Hegel, and Marx, but it has persisted as a background assumption of the normatively domesticated discipline we nowadays call “sociology.” So, who are these humans who constitute the subject matter of sociology? By the time of Comte, Hegel, and Marx, the concept of humanity as a unique species of ape had come into general usage, courtesy of Linnaeus’ coinage of Homo sapiens in 1752. While Linnaeus himself still believed that our uniqueness came from the divine interpolation of a soul into the ape, all that really mattered by the time of Comte, Hegel, and Marx was that you could rec-
nize a fellow human by their having been born of humans. When Wilhelm Dilthey formally shifted the epistemological foundations of hermeneutics from sacred to secular terrain in the late nineteenth century, he grounded the “unity of mankind”—a necessary condition for our capacity to interpret other minds—in humanity’s common biological origins, which ensures that at least some life-problems are the same for all humans simply by virtue of our common physical design as creatures. This then becomes the basis for a kind of empathetic understanding with others living in remote times and places. In the early twentieth century, the field of “philosophical anthropology,” championed by the sociologist Max Scheler, emerged as a complement to Diltheyan hermeneutics. Arguably, the spirit of philosophical anthropology lives on most vividly in that peculiar version of “evolutionary psychology” which still assumes that there is a distinct “human nature,” notwithstanding the atavistic status of that phrase in the neo-Darwinian lexicon (e.g., Pinker 2002; cf. Fuller 2006: Conclusion).

The second attitude to the “human” is a more “Foucaultian” one, which by rather different means arrives at the same place as properly neo-Darwinian accounts of humanity: namely, that the “human” is no more than a symptom, a blip on the radar of evolutionary (aka “archaeological”) history. On this account, appeals to the “human” amount to ideological expressions on behalf of the soi-disant dominant class, whether it conceptualises itself as the party of the status quo (e.g., conservatism) or of the future (e.g., socialism). Meanwhile, everyone else remains a moderately sociable upright ape with few transcendental pretensions. This orientation was even present in the work which first gained Foucault international visibility. In the book translated into English as Madness and Civilization he had already observed that in the pre-modern era, “mad” people were routinely accommodated as ordinary features of social life without any great need either to render them “rational” or to keep them away from “rational” people (Foucault 1965). Moreover, support for the idea that “human” is an artificial category of governance extends beyond Foucault’s own move of looking to Kant’s coinage of “anthropology” in 1785 to put the “human” on a scientific footing. Notwithstanding the relative recency of this fixation on the “human,” appeals to “humanity” have been effective in enabling marginalized groups to acquire formal political recognition by pressuring the dominant classes “to put their money where their mouth is”—that is, to provide the “human” with a concrete normative consistency that it would otherwise lack. For example, the humanity of women started to gain political traction once legislation started to be enacted to ensure the “humane” treatment of animals in the early nineteenth century (Bourke 2011).

But of course, just as Foucault would expect, the long-term trajectory of this latter approach has not been to strengthen the divide between human and non-human, which after all is “merely” conventional. Rather, we have witnessed the return gesture of extending all that has been granted to humans back
to the non-humans. Thus, today’s animal rights activists draw rhetorical and sometimes substantive legal support from, say, the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, especially when it comes to stressing the “protective” or “precautionary” side of such rights, namely, right to bodily integrity, including freedom from torture and other forms of physical harm. (For example, dedicated “sanctuaries” may be required for the full recognition of animal rights.) This may in turn have implications for just how much humans can exercise the “empowering” or “proactionary” side of human rights, which has historically provided a license for risky organized acts of self-transcendence (Fuller 2015). By “self-transcendence” I mean not only religiously inspired acts but also those motivated by reasons of state or commerce. More importantly, those acts may result in harm or unwanted transformation for those engaged in such acts, and perhaps even for others not engaged in them, not least the physical environment and its non-human inhabitants.

The tendency to think that the distinctiveness of the human has been overdrawn is characteristic of the movement known as posthumanism. Perhaps surprising to its adherents today, its roots are deeply embedded in the history of sociology, though typically located outside the discipline’s canon. The first Ph.D. awarded in “sociology” was in 1877 to the French translator of Herbert Spencer, Alfred Espinas, who wrote a work on the social life of animals, with special attention to ants. It anticipated many of the issues that the latter-day ant specialist E.O. Wilson would raise in Sociobiology, a book largely received as an anti-sociological work when first published in 1975. However, Espinas was not a lone pioneer. Emile Durkheim’s main opponent in his original drive to establish the object and method of sociology as sui generis was the jurist Gabriel Tarde, who freely borrowed from animal studies to deny the premise of Durkheim’s argument, promoting the idea that “socialization” is a species-neutral (if not substrate-neutral) phenomenon. To be sure, Durkheim gained the upper hand in the argument, largely because the practical agenda of his version of sociology, “moral education,” was friendliest to the “spiritualism” still dominant in French academic philosophy, which stressed human uniqueness (Brooks 1998). However, in recent years Bruno Latour has attempted to reverse the fortunes of these early sociological posthumanists by adopting Tarde’s name for his chair at the Sciences Po. But there have been several stepping stones along the way, most significantly Gilbert Simondon, who as chair in psychology at the Sorbonne in the 1960s inspired Gilles Deleuze, after having updated Espinas’ original programme, which extended beyond animals to technology, among the non-humans included as social agents (Fuller 2016).

Posthumanism is ultimately about de-centring the “human” as the locus of value in the world. A posthumanist sociology takes off by recalling that in the original Latin, societas was a legal term for alliances made in common cause by people normally governed by different legal arrangements. For example, a mili-

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tary or commercial expedition would by necessity consist of people of different class backgrounds who would nevertheless need to work together—according to the rules set down by the societas—to bring about a mutually agreeable outcome. Originally the idea was that people would return to their default legal status once the outcome had been achieved. This is the sense of “society” that lives on in the idea of “association,” which stands behind actor-network theory. The difference is that actor-network theory and many of the more biologically based “neo-vitalist” sociologies of today assume that humans and non-humans associate more-or-less spontaneously, unless prevented from doing so. However, historically the reverse is the case: Societas was a legal innovation which effectively destroyed the caste-like elements in the Western social system where people’s identities had been largely defined by the families into which they were born. (Something similar might be said about “markets” in the modern abstract sense: They did not emerge spontaneously but were the products of state intervention, overturning decades if not centuries of privilege in the provision of goods and services [Rothschild 2002].) Thus, it is not a trivial point that the “freedom of assembly” is typically listed as a right separate from “freedom of expression” in modern bills of rights.

By analogy, true posthumanists tend to regard, say, the call for sanctuaries by animal rights activists as simply waystations on the road to a more comprehensive integration of humans, animals, and machines into a common “life-world” in the most literal sense of that term; namely, as a world of living beings. This would in turn open humans to experiences and opportunities they would otherwise lack by remaining segregated from non-humans (Fuller 2012: chap. 3). There are many ways of understanding this proposition, several of which would violate ordinary morality (e.g., bestiality, cybersex). However, posthumanists try to recover the moral high ground by observing the debt that goes unpaid to the non-humans for human dominance over the planet. Indeed, the coinage of “Anthropocene” as a new period in geological time whereby humans are deemed to be the primary source of climate change is increasingly taken by posthumanists as a moment of “revenge” on humanity’s refusal to pay its way in nature’s moral economy (aka ecology). Here it is worth observing that posthumanists presume—very much in the spirit of the Marxist critique of capitalism—that whatever “added value” accrues to human domination of the planet can never compensate for the exploitation and often destruction of value of its non-human inhabitants. The difference, of course, is that the posthumanist charge does not rest on any sense of extending the “human” to include the non-humans, but rather a common understanding of “living” or even “being in the world,” in which humans and non-humans are already equal participants. From this standpoint, talk of “rights” handles the posthumanist concern clumsily given the historic tendency of rights talk to extend entitlements on the basis of recognized similarities with the current rights-bearers in a society. Hence, ani-
mal rights activists have been criticized by posthumanists for privileging, say, apes over birds, based on the former’s greater morphological proximity to humans.

In contrast, transhumanists are much more comfortable with rights-based talk because they believe that even normal-bodied wealthy Westerners are not yet fully “human,” in that we have yet to exploit the full potential of science and technology to raise us indeterminately above the animals, perhaps even into some silicon-based immortality (Kurzweil 2005). In this respect, the “human” is a normative ideal—akin to Kant’s regarding God as a “regulative idea of reason”—in terms of which moral and social progress might be measured. Moreover, some transhumanists hold that we might also be morally obliged to “uplift,” both cognitively and physically, those creatures whose company we would wish to keep (Brin 1980; Chan 2009). After all, the end of animal exploitation may require more than simply segregating the exploitable from the exploiters. Were we just talking about *Homo sapiens*, such a policy would normally be seen as going no further in the advancement of social justice than a benevolent form of apartheid. Thus, instead of the enlarged sense of “life-world” envisaged by the posthumanists, transhumanists are more inclined towards a “zoopolis,” in which non-humans might consent to mutually enriching and accountable intercourse with humans (Donaldson & Kymlicka 2011). However, transhumanists may find the animal-centric idea of zoopolis too limited. Instead we might need what I would call *noöpolis*, so as also to include the machine-based intelligences that are bound to pass some advanced version of the Turing Test in humanity’s ongoing attempt to create android companions and warriors to satisfy rather different but already present social demands (cf. Fuller 2015).

To be sure, with regard to the zoopolitan side of noöpolis, there are serious questions about exactly how (e.g., brain chip implants?) and on which creatures (e.g., might it not be our understanding them more than their understanding us?) this “uplift” would be enforced. Nevertheless, it is worth observing that all of this is continuous with the broad “socialist” tradition in the modern era, including the welfare state. Here it is worth recalling that notwithstanding their various differences, socialists differed from “liberals” in doubting that people could be simply left to their own devices to flourish in an environment once traditional (feudal) restrictions had been removed. (We would now call such an environment “de-regulated.”) Rather, they believed that people had to be prepared to enter this new state of freedom, lest they suffer more exploitation under *laissez faire* than they already had. Transhumanists nowadays might call this preparation “uplift” or “enhancement,” and it typically involves drugs and/or surgery. But it used to be administered “externally,” so to speak, under the rubrics of “education” and “healthcare” and under socialist regimes. That people should lead longer, more productive lives was an aim shared by liberals and socialists, but the socialists did not believe that people had the wherewithal to do this for themselves. A vanguard
party or the state itself would need to take charge until people could be trusted to
be left to their own devices (Fuller & Lipinska 2014: chap. 1).

An interesting debate between a liberal and a socialist transhumanist—what Hughes (2004) dubbed “technolibertarian” and “technoprogressive,” respectively—took place a decade ago, which presages the normative issues ahead for any noöpolis (LaTorra 2007). A major bone of contention was that the technolibertarian seemed to worry that in a world where androids are the main creators of value—as judged on human terms—then even the poorest humans might end up exploiting them, if there is no accounting for what it takes to ensure android flourishing. In response, the technoprogressive seemed to suggest that concern for the well-being of such high-grade machines was an ideological cover for the interests of their capitalist manufacturers. However, as the technolibertarian’s follow-up book has argued, machines capable of producing most of the world’s economic value—a situation which appears to be desirable to virtually all transhumanists—deserve a level of recognition, perhaps even rights, even if they are ultimately self-programmable versions of human brain emulations. Anything short of that would amount to humans engaging in what economists call “rent-seeking” behavior; namely, imposing a tax simply by virtue of having provided the platform for others to do something productive. The endgame of this scenario is that humans end up becoming increasingly marginal yet also protected within this emerging post-Anthropocene “Cybercene,” very much along the lines of today’s endangered animal species which command a modicum of care from their human overlords (Hanson 2016).

A full range of normative issues on the agenda of any sociology of the post/trans-human condition have already been implied. A complicating factor is that these conditions are unlikely to occur either all at once or all of a sudden—notwithstanding the fixation on the year 2045 by followers of Kurzweil (2005) as the techno-millennium. There is likely to be an extended transition period in which many of today’s normative sensibilities about humanity interact in curious ways with the emergent post/trans-human horizon. In conclusion, I propose two prospective aporias, which need to be pursued in future work:

First, sociologists have already begun to notice that the development of “enhancement” technologies has the potential to amplify already existing global social inequalities. However, the argument is normally cast in terms of the invisible (evil) hand of the market favouring the rich over the poor. But what if people—or entire societies—refuse to be enhanced, even if they can afford the relevant treatments? The meaningfulness of individual lives and the stability of social structure draw on some conception of intergenerational succession, in which people do things at certain ages. The transhumanist argument that immortal life simply extends modern medicine’s ongoing battle against death fails to distinguish between someone who dies “before their time” and someone who never dies. For example, someone may gladly undergo a treatment to prevent
Alzheimer’s without necessarily wishing to have their cells reproduce indefinitely without deterioration. Can humanity—even in its post/trans-human forms—remain coherent in the face of such likely variation in attitudes towards the place of “death” in life?

Second, sociologists have already begun to observe that humans—especially the younger generation—are developing stronger affective bonds with animals and machines than with fellow humans. Admittedly much anthropomorphism is invariably at work, and so it is difficult to tell whether this marks a “post” or a “trans” human turn in sentiment. However, in either case it is true that bonds with humans whose lives are of little direct relevance to them—namely, the radically poor of the “Global South”—are disappearing from normative view, even though they remain a substantial part of the human population. Are we slowly drifting into a version of the world that Peter Singer spoke about forty years ago, whereby our normative preferences should be ordered according to beings capable of living the best lives of their kind—regardless of species (Fuller 2006: chap. 14)? Complicating this picture is the “uplift” agenda, which in many respects extends the classic positioning of the radically poor as in need of “human development,” but now across species and even substrate boundaries.

References

III. HISTORICAL-COMPARATIVE APPROACHES
9. History Is Not Bunk: Why Comparative Historical Sociology Is Indispensable When Looking to the Future

Stephen Mennell
RC 56 Historical Sociology

‘To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain always a child’—Cicero

‘People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors’—Edmund Burke

‘Those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it’—George Santayana

Introduction

The ISA Forum in Vienna July 2016 marked the emergence, out of the chrysalis of Working Group 02 (Historical and Comparative Sociology) of the fully-fledged Research Committee 56, under the title Historical Sociology. Why did the group drop the word ‘comparative’ from its title? That was pure ISA politics: there already exists RC20 Comparative Sociology. But does that really matter? If Durkheim was right, all sociology is comparative: ‘comparative sociology is not a particular branch of sociology; it is sociology itself, in so far as it ceases to be purely descriptive and aspires to account for facts’ (1964 [1895]: 139).

What is more remarkable is that the ISA never had a section on Historical Sociology before, considering that in its origins sociology was Historical Sociology: it can be argued that the Holy Trinity of Marx, Weber and Durkheim were all historical sociologists as well as comparative sociologists, and the same goes for many of the lesser deities, the angels and archangels in the celestial pantheon of sociology, from Montesquieu in the eighteenth century through Tocqueville in the nineteenth century. Until about the middle of the twentieth century, understanding the development of human society was the central concern of sociology—and of cognate disciplines such as anthropology and political science. In its origins, then, sociology was comparative—historical sociology. It no longer is. In the modern neoliberal university, money flows to present-centred (or ‘hodiecentric,’ to use Goudsblom’s, 1977, term) research, which
politicians, policy-makers and administrators believe to be useful—a belief in
which some mainstream sociologists seem to find it advantageous and lucrative
to share. Both sides may also share the common belief that, because the mod-
ern/postmodern/digital/globalised world is changing and so new in character,
studying the past is irrelevant.

It is therefore not the intention of the new RC56 to promote ‘historical so-
 ciology’ as one more empirical specialism in a hermetically sealed box, along-
side all the other empirical specialisms into which the ISA is organised: the
watertight compartments represented by its 56 Research Committees, 3 Work-
 ing Groups and 4 Thematic Groups.

Rather than to promote ‘historical sociology’ as yet another special area, I
want to argue that, just as all sociology is comparative, so all sociology is—or
should be—historical. And that, if it is not, it diminishes our ability to contrib-
ute to the goal expressed in the title of the ISA Vienna Forum: the pursuit of
‘The Futures We Want: Global Sociology and the Struggles for a Better World.’

It was Henry Ford who said that ‘History is bunk.’ To be exact, what he
said was ‘History is more or less bunk. It’s tradition. We don’t want tradition.
We want to live in the present, and the only history that is worth a tinker’s damn
is the history that we make today’ (quoted in Chicago Tribune, 25 May 1916).
Too often, sociologists seem to have believed him. The nearest echo of Henry
Ford in sociology was perhaps John Goldthorpe’s 1991 essay ‘The uses of his-
tory in sociology.’ Goldthorpe argued, in an essay that was strongly critical of
some prominent ‘grand’ historical sociologists—notably Barrington Moore—
that we should leave history to the historians. Curiously—but on reflection not
very surprisingly—for someone whose first degree was in histor

ography. That is, so to speak, the equivalent of old-fashioned positivism in sociology: he stressed that
historians dealt with ‘relics’—documents that have survived from the past, and
whose representativeness of all the documents that once existed is not to be
taken for granted. The task of sociologists, he contended, should be to ‘create
their own relics,’ by gathering quantitative data about present-day society. In a
way he was right, because—to give one example—his own massive data on
social mobility in Britain, gathered at huge public expense in the 1970s, have
now become historical evidence, ‘relics,’ in their own right.

Now I am never quite sure how extensive Popper’s influence was outside
Britain, but certainly in Britain his books The Poverty of History (1957) and The
Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) instilled in many social scientists a feeling
that it was ideologically unsound to study the past and even more suspicious to
attempt to predict the future. Elsewhere in the world, notably in the USA a gen-
eral anti-Marxist influence—see for example Robert Nisbet’s book Social
Change and History (1969)—probably had much the same effect as Popper had.
Whatever the exact influence, in the post-war decades, the majority of sociolo-
gists conducted a strategic ‘retreat into the present’ (as Norbert Elias called it). The reason may not have been entirely abstractly intellectual: the fact that quantitative research on contemporary social problems attracts far larger funding has been, and continues strongly to be, a consideration. No matter what the cause, sociology has become largely ‘hodiecentric’—today-centred.

**Physics envy and scientism**

Part of this syndrome is ‘physics envy.’ Popper was not alone among philosophers in taking physics as the model of what all ‘science’ is, or ought to be. This was broadly true of all the logical positivists and similar philosophies. One consequence was that the ‘covering law’ model of a theoretical explanation became the ideal against which social scientists measured their own theories. This has gone furthest among economists, especially those of the modern Chicago, neoliberal persuasion. It is not unknown for them to compare the ‘law of supply and demand’ with Newton’s laws of motion.

But it has affected sociologists too. Most vulnerable to physics envy are quantitative sociologists, especially the high positivistic establishment, notably in American sociology and in what Goldthorpe calls ‘the sociology of the research institutes’ (in contrast to the ‘sociology of the university departments). But there is also a risk that it may afflict the very numerous ‘qualitative’ sociologists too, albeit in a different and negative way. Easily recognising that their own activities do not meet up to the physics model, they may be tempted to swing to the opposite pole and reject ‘scientism’ altogether—which is also a mistake. Furthermore, partly because qualitative sociologists find it more difficult to adhere to the quantifiable measures, outputs and outcomes that the performance managing funding bodies demand, the rules for the funding game continue to be based upon pseudo-scientific criteria. The qualitative mainstream may thus come to suffer funding envy even if they resist physics envy.

There really is no reason for sociologists of any variety to suffer from physics envy. Although it often lingers on as a sort of ideal yardstick, we all know in our heart of hearts that the simple ‘covering law model’ of theory and explanation does not fit the social sciences.

How, then, to steer between the Scylla of philosophical absolutism and the Charybdis of sociological relativism? (Elias, 2009 [1971]: 16). Underlying both, says Elias, is a shared assumption. They both reduce everything that people know to two diametrically opposite states: either to a state of absolute dependence of knowledge on the situation of the groups where it is used or produced, or to a state of absolute independence from it. Most scientific knowledge, he points out, contrary to the older philosophical suppositions, has the character of ‘a structured flux,’ and, on the other hand, modern ideologies have absorbed a good deal of factual sociological and economic knowledge compared with the ideologies of earlier
ages. There are no zero points—forms of knowledge have to be located along the continuum. In order to see this, one needs not to contrast physics with sociology, but rather to climb step by step up the ladder of Auguste Comte’s (1830–42) hierarchy of the sciences.

Elias argues, process theories are necessary. In the biological sciences, explanations and theories were never static and three-dimensional—they always involved irreversible processes of development, and a fourth explanatory factor of time. Today, even physics deals with processes, in which time is an essential component, and much of what cosmologists observe is not reversible (not yet, anyhow, or we are in trouble from a contracting universe!). Process theories embody four-dimensional models they involve both the spatial dimensions and time. They are models of structured processes of change over time, exemplified already in nineteenth-century science by the theory of evolution of species.

What about the social sciences? Our data are all essentially developmental, not static, and I would argue that all good sociological explanations involve time. But there is something else, beyond the fourth dimension of time. There is also experience, which Elias identified as the fifth dimension in sociological explanations: our data include how people experience the social processes and social interdependencies through which they live. And thus experience must form a component of our five-dimensional theories. More technically, sociological explanations need to involve not only the directly visible ‘behavioural’ aspects of human activity in the four dimensions of space and time, but also the ‘experiential’ aspects of human thinking, feeling and psychological drives. While these experiential aspects are not directly accessible to observation in the same way as bodily movements, they are nevertheless accessible to human observation through the examination of linguistic and other symbols carrying meaningful messages from one person to another (Elias, 2007: 116).

The Problem of Historical Analogy

None of this is to deny that there can be serious problems with generalisation in historical sociology, especially in what Goldthorpe called ‘macrohistorical sociology.’ Goldthorpe did score some direct hits. A theory as ambitious as Marxism can lead to oversimplification. Barrington Moore (1967) probably did offer too many hostages to fortune in his generalisations about ‘lord and peasant in the making of the modern world,’ drawing analogies as he did between ‘modernising’ revolutions in England, France, America, China, Japan and India. On the other hand, Michael Mann, in his even more ambitious multi-volume study of power and its transformations throughout human history (1986–2013), seems to me largely to avoid such problems by means of his careful, scholarly, Weberian weighing of evidence. Not all historical sociology involves large-scale historical generalisations; not all of it involves what Charles
Tilly (1989) called ‘big structures, large processes, huge comparisons.’ Norbert Elias expressed his research strategy in more modest terms. He said he did not think that he had a methodology, but perhaps he had a method. In a note to himself he described his method in terms of ‘investigating micro-structures to make macro-structures visible’ (quoted by the editors of Elias, 2007:18). This is more or less the modest strategy that I followed in my book *All Manners of Food* (Mennell, 1985), in which I sought to explain through the use of documentary evidence how England and France—although in close contact with each other for centuries—had come to have very different ‘culinary cultures.’

Historical analogies do, however, sometimes over-reach themselves, and this is not a problem just for academic historians and social scientists. It enters too frequently into the rhetoric of politicians and the decisions they take. A well-known example is that of British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s disastrous decision in 1956 to conspire with France and Israel to launch a military invasions of Egypt to seize back control of the Suez Canal, which had been nationalised by President Nasser. Eden had been a valiant opponent of the appeasement of Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s, and it seems clear that he saw Nasser as another example of the species ‘fascist dictator.’ Or another example, much more recent, from the 2016 referendum on whether Britain should cease to be a member of the European Union: that of Boris Johnson, described as ‘a keen classical scholar.’ He argued that the past 2,000 years of European history have been characterised by repeated attempts to unify Europe under a single government in order to recover the continent’s lost ‘golden age’ under the Romans. ‘Napoleon, Hitler, various people tried this out,’ he said, ‘and it ends tragically. The EU is an attempt to do this by different methods’ (Daily telegraph, 15 May 2016).

This betrays a curiously ahistorical conception of history—such a statement recognises no awareness of how the structure of global society and the complexity of interdependencies has changed, since Hitler, let alone since Napoleon (or Charlemagne, or the Romans!). Probably Johnson was thinking—as so many people continue to do—in terms of some unchanging ‘human nature.’

Now, you may say, the meanderings of one mis-educated buffoon—even if he is now the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom—are of no great scientific importance. But that prominent people can still use rhetoric of this kind is symptomatic of something that has worried me for a long time: the discipline of sociology’s failure to penetrate the popular consciousness. Auguste Comte, who invented the very word ‘sociology’ aspired to the new discipline shaping the way human beings understand the societies in which they live. Yet today, I fear, the man and woman in the street still tend to think psychologically about the motives of particular individuals. This is commonly linked to attribution of blame as a means of orientation (Benthem van den Bergh, 1980). They do not seem easily to think in terms of lengthening chains and denser webs of interde-
pendence between people, groups, economies and states—nor in terms of the fluid, fluctuating power ratios that are always involved in such webs of interdependence. Johnson’s remarks imply a romantic entanglement in the notion of ‘sovereignty,’ and that he cannot perceive the UK’s entanglement in far wider constraints. Nor, it would seem, had he noticed the extent to which not just Europe but the whole world has been unified under American hegemony via such organisations as the WTO, OECD, capital markets, credit rating agencies, NATO and so on.

This failure of sociology to penetrate the popular consciousness with its central insight of social interdependence is not to be lightly dismissed. It is a matter of practical importance. The rigid polarity between ‘scientist’ and ‘layman’ is a false dichotomy. As Mazlish has written:

The community that is willing to accept the knowledge acquired in the pursuit of the human sciences and that is prepared to act on the basis of such acquisition ideally has to be humanity at large; only then can the sciences whose subject matter is evolving humanity go forward. … Given my thesis about the necessity of a scientific community composed of much or most of humankind, it is only fitting that I write both for the general public and for specialists prepared to think outside their own field. (Mazlish, 2001: 3, 6)

What we may over-dignify as the ‘Borisonian fallacy’ is also linked to a problem common both to social scientific and lay thinking, the problem of what Norbert Elias (2012b [1970]: 106–11) calls Zustandsreduktion or ‘process reduction.’ By that, he means the tendency to form concepts in a static mode. Drawing on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf, 1956) about ‘Standard Average European’ languages, he writes:

We say, ‘The wind is blowing,’ as if the wind were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point in time, begins to move and blow. We speak as if the wind were separate from its blowing, as if a wind could exist which did not blow. This reduction of processes to static conditions, which we shall call ‘process-reduction’ for short, appears self-explanatory to people who have grown up with such languages. (Elias, 2012b [1970]: 107)

This mode of concept formation contributes to hodiecentrism in sociology as well as to idiocies of popular thought such as that I have illustrated with reference to Boris Johnson.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I want to stress that I do not oppose the use of historical analogies, whether by social scientists or politicians. But I do advocate that they
be sociologically informed analogies, and better supported by historical understanding too. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has said that he wishes he had read history rather than law at university (Schama and Blair, 2007) It is (I hope) hard to believe that he and US President George W. Bush, or at least some of their very powerful advisors, would not have acted differently had they had better historical understanding when they embarked on the actions that led to the catastrophic destabilisation of the Greater Middle East. The distinguished journalist Robert Fisk habitually refers to Blair as ‘Lord Blair of Kut Al Amara,’ a reference to the defeat and surrender of a British army to the Ottoman forces in 1916, during the First World War. He strongly implies that Blair knew nothing of earlier British military interventions in the Arabian region, let alone of the rebuff of three British incursions into Afghanistan (1839–42; 1878–80; 1919) long before the recent defeats suffered there by the Russians and the Americans. On the other hand, it has to be admitted that in that case, the people who shaped the policy did infer that there had been structural changes that made historical precedents irrelevant. They seem to have decided to ignore, or never to have thought about, the large literature in political science and sociology on ‘the social foundations of democracy’ (Mennell, 2016). One reason for that may be that in the period of American triumphalism after the collapse of the Soviet Union some writers—most prominently the philosopher Francis Fukuyama (1989 [1992])—convinced themselves (and, unfortunately, some of the powerful) that liberal democracy was now the default setting to which human society would ‘naturally’ revert if given the chance by the forcible removal of market imperfections such as authoritarian rulers.

What an indictment of sociology that it seems to have less influence on world events than—for a time at least—did one philosopher’s musings on another philosopher’s pre-war Hegelian musings! The philosophers have been performing their ancient round-dance for more than two thousand years, without saying anything very empirically grounded. Sociologists seem content for their theoretical–empirical investigations to have some marginal influence on social services and education policy, rather than upon thinking about global events. If only historically-informed sociological voices were able to make themselves better heard!

I have argued that all sociology needs to be historical as well as comparative. We have to know where we are coming from—our direction of travel, and other people’s direction of travel—before we can make intelligent predictions about or chart the way forward towards—in the words of the theme of this ISA Forum—‘the futures we want.’
Note

This is an abbreviated version of my paper. I should like to thank Stephen Vertigans for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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**10. Why Are the 2010s So Much Like the 1930s? And What Will Follow?**

Institutions of individualized responsibility and information efficiency as predicted by an analytical theory of modernity

*Hanno Scholtz*

RC45 Rational Choice

Somewhat tired and perplexed—that was how in 2015 the Western world commemorated the end of World War II seventy years ago. Challenges such as terrorism, war, and migration, being complex and puzzling no less than those of the 1930s, shatter the former complacency of having built a sustainable world order on the ruins of 1945. Even commemoration has changed its face: Over decades, ever new groups of former victims have been included into remembrance. This year, the usual rituals suddenly reminded how many people currently die.

This parallel of challenges should be, however, more a stimulus than a hindrance. It opens the perspective towards changes necessary to cope with the current problems. Instead of seeing the current challenges as signs of an end of modernity, they can be read as signs for a current transition to a second step of modernity—far beyond what Beck ([1986] 1992) and his followers (e.g., Giddens 1990) have discussed during the last three decades.

**Insights of an analytical theory of modernity**

An analytical theory of modernity (as demanded by Aakvaag 2013, based on, e.g., Coleman 1990; Little 1990; Hedström 2005) takes it as given that the interactions of everyday life change when resources and information become abundant.¹ One “principle of modernity” is rationality: Poor societies are bound to once-found solutions and have to value tradition above everything else, simply because they lack the means of trying other ways. Rich societies can “rationally” check processes to see whether they are best done the way they are done, or if they can be improved in some way. Tradition still has an own value, and so can the conservative notion that the merits of time-tested procedures extend beyond the readily understood. But under conditions of social wealth, this is only one argument and no longer the only possible option. And rationality is not
the only principle of modernity; deliberation and competition are other ways interaction processes change when more resources and information are available.

Analytical sociology does not yet completely understand whether, to what extent, and why these principles of modernity occur at the same threshold values of per capita income and information supply, but the historical evidence of the processes that have taken place indicates that the new social practices and regulating institutions according to their new principles diffuse in parallel processes. But unlike the naïve modernization theory of the 1950s (Lerner [1958] 1965; see Knöbl 2003) that soon became disproved by sad reality, an analytical theory of modernity has to acknowledge that this is not an easy process. Organizations exist, especially in the Christian European tradition, which distinguish two levels of interaction: one of individuals interacting within organizations, and one around organizations, either of interacting organizations or of individuals who are going to form an organization. And organizations matter on two counts: They differentiate interaction levels on which rationality, deliberation, and competition are introduced, and they differentiate levels of institutions that regulate interaction. Hence, the existence of organizations unfolds a transition process of one simple diffusion of institutional innovations into no less than four subsequent diffusion processes: There are two transitions in which the principles of modernity are introduced, first between organizations and later within organizations, and there are two waves of institutional innovation within each of these transitions, first within organizations and later on the macro level of society that regulates interaction around organizations. And between the two waves of any transition, social problems occur when organizations already apply the new principles of interaction but are not appropriately regulated. Hence, parallel problems result from two steps of modernity, each in a stage of transition when organizations already follow new rules while society and its institutions do not yet correspond to the new logic.

Between 1813 and 1930, the modern principles of rationality and deliberation were implemented around organizations as households, firms, or parties. But it took a long, bad period until the macro-social acceptance of collective bargaining provided a stable base for industrial society after 1945—at least in societies that were used to the European (and Japanese, and partly Indian) tradition of stable group bargaining structures under generally accepted institutions. The introduction of the modern principles of rationality and deliberation within these organizations, however, started only in 1968, and the related macro-social arrangements are not yet established. This is where the current problems come from: Democracy based on organizing society in groups works less and less in Western societies and did never work as well in societies outside group-related traditions and on the supra-national level. Labor relations based on organizing
society in groups exclude more and more people in Western societies and did never work as well in non-Western societies.

Currently, societies’ power positions are occupied by cohorts that grew up in times of industrial-society stability and hence tend to attribute stability to the group-based institutions which in the interim have turned from being the solution to being part of the problem. The speed of generational sequence has more or less stayed the same; so, starting in both cases with a terrorist attack, the time from June 28, 1914, to 1949 may relate to the time from September 11, 2001, to 2036, until power positions will be filled by “millennials.” The latter no longer attribute social stability to group affiliations, but to individual social networks. What is being perceived as normal is already changing, and in about twenty years this process will be completed.

**Predicting IRIE institutions**

But what kinds of specific institutions will emerge in this process? Which changes will result to cope with the more individualistic setting of these days and of the non-Western (and non-Japanese and, with regard to politics, non-Indian) world? To understand this, we have to step back a bit to a more general understanding.

Generally, the increasing complexity of society means that less is fixed. Modern rationality and deliberation imply more decisions. Efficient decision-making needs the creation of responsibility and the co-operation of individuals and organizations to make use of the mutual advantages of both levels, and hence a linkage between both levels (to make inter-level co-operation possible), and competition (to assess the performance of organizations).

In the crisis of the 1930s, competition was the crucial point. From the past, people were used to unquestioned authority, and first experiences with competition violated stability images that had been shaped against the background of the Thirty Years’ war and other cases of collapsing order. The answer was the fascist and communist attempts to eliminate competition in politics and labor relations. After fascism’s abysmal end, Churchill ironically described democracy as “the worst form of government, except all that have been tried”—and surprised, everyone nodded: As unexpected matter of course, industrial society was now tied to a commitment to democracy and workers’ rights, since appropriately regulated campaigns and labor disputes efficiently transmitted information about scarcity relations and power relations in a world that had become more complex. Compared to this, the linkage between individuals and organizations was rather trivial, because the combination of modern competitive relations between organizations and traditionally stable relations between organizations intensified the occidental assignment of individuals to groups, so that organizations (parties, unions, schools) needed to address only groups.
Currently, this situation has turned: Although currently critique of competition is en vogue again, people are used to it. But the linkage between individuals and organizations has become problematic. Responsible linkages between individuals and organizations collide with images of privacy that have been shaped against the totalitarian background of the 1930s but have gathered momentum in a way that currently hinders social development. This is where information efficiency is hidden, and it will be used, simply because this is the only way out of the current crisis. The individual linkages between people and their organizations will become more efficient, and with a newly appropriate regulation they will allow the provision of information transmission and responsibility allocation as efficient as necessary for today’s increased complexity levels.

With regards to politics, the problem is vote detachment: We fear violations of ballot secrecy, set a taboo, throw our vote into the ballot and take back our hand. And hence we deprive ourselves of all possibilities which are included in keeping that linkage. Although the responsibility of last resort for every decision is with people, individual people are always kept away from most of these decisions, and although in most areas other groups than parties are more knowledgeable, these advocacy organizations are completely excluded from formal decision making and relegated to informal lobbying processes. But when the taboo is tackled, individualized responsible and information-efficient democracy (IRIE democracy) will be possible that stores trust assignments—encrypted, hence extensively secure, but possibly never perfectly safe against potential insight. But that allows to make more decisions subject to a flexible direct democracy where those who do not want to make the cognitive investment in an own opinion can be represented through their stored trust assignments and the positions of the supported groups. With IRIE democracy, specialized organizational competences are integrated, most legitimacy problems of current votes cease, and even the danger of a tyranny of the majority can be banned.

With regards to skills and work, the problem is leaving school: We fear violations of independence, set a taboo, and leave school, university, and every coach and career counselor on our way, pay the bill (or others pay it for us) and go our way. And hence we deprive ourselves of all possibilities which are included in keeping that linkage. The appropriate incentive for all these organizations on our way should not be to be paid when we leave but to add to economic autonomy, performance, and development over our life trajectories. But when the taboo is tackled, individualized responsible and information-efficient support (IRIE support) becomes possible that pays education, training, and coaching for their factual contribution to individual human capital, including liabilities in the opposite case. IRIE support eliminates the problem of being left on one’s own unproductively in a productivity-based world that is, as stated by either inequality or unemployment figures, or both, overwhelming for an in-
creasing part of populations even in the advanced economies, not to speak of other parts of the world.

Currently, these taboos are still valid. They are so valid that even related research is difficult. Universities, funding institutions, and even journals and publishers focus on research that is directly applicable and questions current institutions at most in single aspects. And for the sketched institutions, a lot of additional knowledge is needed.

But in only ten to twenty years from now, such knowledge will be available, and institutions as sketched (or along similar lines) will structure the political and economic world distinctly differently than it is today, and help solve the current problems—plus the global environmental problems that are here to stay anyway, with an unprecedented increase in relevance and a complete impossibility to be solved within the current institutional framework.

As example take a small sketch of how different the world would look with the future institutions with reference to the current migration problems. Migration arises in countries where neither the industrial-era dichotomy of group-oriented Western democracy nor old-style dictatorship fits any longer and the false friends (or inappropriate attempts to cling to one of these old alternatives) have created political or economic chaos, and in many cases both. Liquid democracy allows for true democracy based on individualized trust relations and hence sets a framework in which individuals will regain the perspective to understand their polities as their own and hence develop the norms to respect the other and the guts to be responsible for that. Responsible coaching on the other hand develops the much-needed individual skills to convert a stable political framework into growth and development.

The necessity of action

But will these developments emerge by themselves? Eventually, we may just expect them, sit by the side, and observe how they will happen. But this is rather improbable. In comparison to the 1940s, this time coordination between many actors is necessary to deviate from the current course of escalating violence. The current situation is both more comfortable and more complicated than that of the 1940s. Numbers of victims rise, but are far below former figures—mainly because people, so far, more easily flee where aggression converts into mass murder. But current institutions will not allow a return to stability as in the 1950s or 1980s, and the escalation of problems will continue. The situation is more comfortable only insofar as there is more information available and we can learn, especially from the 1940s. It is however more complicated at the same time: In the 1940s, escalating violence led into an apocalypse, but into catharsis, as well. After the deep cultural crisis of the 1930s, fifty million people were killed, but the surviving populations of Europe and their organizations
learned some necessary lessons, and with this foundation during and after World War II a few politicians were able to create the institutional constraints that allowed for the stability of Western societies for the rest of the century.

Today, however, more people will be necessary than just the “few politicians” of the 1940s to define the new institutional constraints. The micro and meso levels of individuals and organizations on the one hand, and the macro level of institutional change have to be linked much more intensely. Both in politics and work, organizational responsibility and the interaction of individuals and organizations have to emerge at the same time as institutional systems that use, link, and nurture responsibility.

Actors who do not want to sit by the side but see individualized responsibility and information efficiency as a possible and perhaps the only good and realistic way to newly sustainable institutions, will have to unite with strategy and organization. Strategically, we talk about starting a social movement, with emergence, coalescence, structuration, and institutionalization as the usual steps over time (Tilly 1978).

The appropriate organizational form will be three-dimensionally differentiated, with the first dimension between the institutional fields of politics and of skills and work, the second between understanding and communicating with other actors and answering the many remaining questions of institutional design, and the third between further research and practical action.

**Research needed**

The necessary research will study new findings that are derived from its argumentation, the mechanisms that can have been derived from the parallel as above, the relations that are necessary for a sustainable implementation, actor expectations along the way, and the social and political dynamics of the implementation processes. Questions that have to be answered by different scientific disciplines include (but are by far not limited to) the following:

1. Political theory: How exactly can the problem of inter-issue linkage be solved under IRIE democracy? If a minority becomes outvoted on several issues, it has to be compensated to keep social peace (“tyranny of the majority”). With stored information about individual opinions, this can be done. But given that not all issues are equally important, how can they be weighed against each other? And how is “being outvoted” counted and compensated?
2. Empirical social research: What are determinants of contemporary welfare balance; i.e., the balance of individuals vis-à-vis their current welfare state regimes, with regard to qualifications and with regard to observable influences?
3. Social movement research: Which existing advocacy organizations are too structurally accustomed to the current situation in which they have no real re-
sponsibility and can keep to individual optimum positions, which would be interested in taking up the challenge of providing responsible guidance for decision making, and which internal discourses inhibit the former from joining the latter?

4. Social network research: Which social relations, and which actors within these relations, already support decision making either on public or on private issues? How are these actors motivated, how do they receive trust, and which of them are willing to bear responsibility for the tips they give?

5. Political systems design: How can the problem of voting manipulation be solved? The values and system-inherent logic of democracy demands that votes are not traded for private goods, let alone influenced by brute force, while the idea of information efficiency demands that voters have quick access to inputting their trust decisions. It can be safely assumed on one hand that there are societies in which voters have the means and the awareness to secure their voting decisions against inappropriate influences, and on the other hand that there are societies in which this is not the case. But where is the boundary between these, how can it be determined, and what requirements with regard to user interface design follow?

6. Preventive criminology: Which combination of intrinsically motivated network partners and regulated, financially responsible organized actors is best suited to keep boys (and girls) with problematic backgrounds away from drugs and crime to help them into a stable future?

7. Comparative federalism research: Most existing democratic societies do not literally apply the rule of electoral equality (“one man, one vote”) but place a larger weight on voters in smaller sub-units. Apart from the historical peculiarities of their formation, do the different constitutions that do so follow a common scheme that can be applied generally for the institutionalization of individualized responsibility in the supra-national realm?

8. Religious studies: What institutional innovations did the church fathers invent and how did these institutional innovations receive positive feedback to establish Christianity as the religion that supported autonomous organizations under common institutional roofs and hence prepared for the Eurocentric form of the organization-based industrial society? What institutional innovations did the founding generations or centuries of other religions invent and how did they receive positive feedback from their respective environments to establish stable institutions that last to this day? What are the beliefs that for all faiths go beyond their own establishment and can be made productive for cooperation in a connected and institutionally integrated world?

In a matrix derived from the structural considerations described above, these eight practical research questions can be inserted as shown in Table 1. The upper left cell indicates that every one of these research questions is only an example; in
every cell, more research questions are possible and will come up, of course also in the cells that had to be left empty here due to space restrictions.

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**Conclusion**

In the first transition in the first half of the twentieth century, social problems escalated until at least the Western core societies that were suitably equipped through their Christian heritage had learned their lessons. It is very likely that the current escalation of social problems at the beginning of the twenty-first century will continue as well, as long as the established industrial institutions prevail.

But it is very probable that when those generations come to social power that have accepted that the industrial agreements have to be replaced by new ones, the new long generation of problems and violence will end, with individualized responsibility and information efficiency established in IRIE support and IRIE democracy.

Until then, there is a lot of research to do to understand the framework, and a long political process to decide the details. Despite the high death toll of terrorism, civil war, and even migration, the current transition has so far not been as bloody as its predecessor. The inherent complexity of new institutions makes their introduction more complicated compared to their earlier predecessors. Hence, in the attempt to avoid more victims on the way to a next sustainable institutional setting, social science is and will be able to make a difference.

**Note**

The argumentation in this chapter has been developed in more detail in Scholtz 2016a and 2016b.

**References**


11. How the Past Shapes Struggles for Equality: Contrasting Legacies of Reform and Revolution

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RC18 Political Sociology

At the heart of my contribution to the thematic discussions in the 2016 Forum of the International Sociological Association lies the simple proposition that the legacies of past struggles strongly condition how actors imagine possible futures and interact with others in the present. More specifically, I seek to identify and draw out contrasting legacies of two large macro-historical experiences: revolution and consensus-oriented reform. My contribution builds on major lines of analysis in the sociological literature and in my own research. I focus empirically on a strategically-designed paired comparison (Tarrow, 2010) of Portugal and Spain, two long similar neighboring countries which moved from antidemocratic to democratic rule during the mid-1970s through nearly polar opposite pathways of change. In my analysis of the sharply dissimilar experiences of these two cases I seek to draw out general theoretical and practical implications of broadly comparative relevance.

Sociological analyses of struggles for equality and inclusion have been of at least three distinct types: those dealing with outcomes, those centered on determinants of those outcomes and those that focus on the processes which characterize struggles over such ends. Yet all of these themes are clearly interrelated. My work seeks to show how the past shapes ongoing forms of political process with strong implications for a wide range of outcomes. How the future is imagined and conceptualized in the political arena—a crucial theme of the 2016 ISA Forum—is, I argue, strongly conditioned by the past. The historical approach to political sociology has often focused on developmental trajectories and critical junctures but I suggest that it should also identify and analyze cultural, institutional and economic legacies of the past. This approach can serve as a way of examining how ‘pasts’ shape ‘futures,’ a question on which many scholars are currently working.

My primary emphasis centers on legacies of democratization pathways during the ultimately worldwide Third Wave of democratic transition and on the implications of those legacies for socio-political inclusion. The worldwide turn to democracy which began in 1974 with Portugal’s Carnation Revolution was characterized by a wide range of variation in the pathway of political change that was
followed by countries that experienced regime transitions (Stepan, 1986; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, 1986; Linz and Stepan, 1996). The range of variation in pathways of transition extended from revolutions that overturned not only the political order but also existing social relations, to episodes of reform in which incumbent power-holders were able to at least partially contain and circumscribe the process of change. The nature and magnitude of transformation varied a great deal from case to case during the Third Wave of democratization. I argue that this variation in pathways to democracy also generated enduring cross-case contrasts in political inclusion especially with regard to low-income and socially marginal sectors.

I understand cross-case differences in political inclusion to be reflective of contrasts in what I call ‘democratic practice’ which is to say the predominant ‘ways in which political actors—including ordinary citizens, groups that are organized or spontaneous, and institutional office holders—make use of the rights and possibilities for action provided by democracy and deal with others who are similarly engaged.’ (Fishman, 2011: 236) A major component of democratic practice concerns the protester—power-holder nexus and the relative openness of political elites to pressures from below. Whereas it is quite routine in some democracies for elected officials to afford protesters with a hearing and to recognize their legitimacy, in other democracies elected officials tend to search for ways to isolate themselves from the pressures exerted by protesters and others who mobilize ‘from below.’

The paired comparison of the Iberian Peninsula’s neighboring countries, Portugal and Spain, provides us with a highly useful vantage point to study causes and consequences of cross-case variation in the nature of democratic practice. Indeed the two cases can be seen to constitute a near ‘natural experiment.’ The two countries have a long history of multiple structural similarities and of political parallelism extending backward in historical time for several centuries. A number of scholars (Bermeo, 1987; Durán Muñoz, 2000; Fernandes, 2015) have found theoretical value in this comparison; it allows social scientists to focus on one or two explanatory factors differentiating these two otherwise remarkably similar cases. As I have developed in a series of publications (Fishman, 2005; 2010; 2011; Fishman and Lizardo, 2013) the virtually polar opposite pathways to democracy of Portugal and Spain in the mid-1970s in effect ended their history of close parallelism and initiated a significant divergence between the neighboring cases. Whereas Portugal experienced a major social revolution in the context of regime change Spain underwent a process of political transformation largely limited to political regime change and carried out through a consensus-oriented process of reform (Linz and Stepan, 1996). In the Portuguese case political change was accompanied by state crisis, a partial inversion of hierarchies in numerous political and social institutions and a broad-ranging process of cultural transformation. Crucially, mass-mobilization
in the streets played a central role in the Portuguese transformation and came to be seen as a fully normal component of democratic political life.

In a published interview carried out many years after the revolution, the economist Mario Murteira, a Minister in one of the revolutionary era governments, remarked that ‘Several times when I was engaged in important conversations with [Prime Minister] Vasco Goncalves, in his office, we would go to the window to see those who were passing by in demonstrations. In the end and to a great extent we [in the government] were more spectators in a grand popular movement than actors.’ (Silva, Manuela et.al. 2006: 105). The relative weight of public demonstrations in political life tended to decline with the waning of revolutionary mobilization and the institutionalization of representative democracy beginning in 1976 but in a very real sense that ‘trip to the windows’ has lived on in the mindset of political leaders and others as a constitutive feature of Portugal’s post-revolutionary understanding of democracy. In 2006 the official exhibit commemorating the 30th anniversary of the democratic constitution approved in 1976, an exposition organized by the country’s parliamentary body, the Assembly of the Republic, prominently featured photographs of demonstrations protesting policies enacted by that very body, Portugal’s parliament. Protest demonstrations continue to play a prominent role in how the political system celebrates itself. In contrast in Spain, political elites have tended to isolate themselves from the pressures from below reflected in popular demonstrations in the streets.

This major contrast between the cases was already clearly visible at the time of their polar opposite pathways to democracy in the 1970s (Durán Muñoz, 2000) but crucially it has lived on, thereby conditioning the ability of protest movements to reshape collective outcomes in these two cases. Whereas protests often end in front of the national parliament in Portugal, sometimes winning a hearing from all of the parties represented there, in Spain it is illegal for protesters to take their causes to the steps of the country’s parliament in Madrid. As a result I argue that a wide range of public policy outcomes and political practices under democracy have taken substantially different forms in the neighboring countries of the Iberian Peninsula. The relative openness of Portuguese elites to pressures from below and the tendency of Spanish political elites to insulate themselves from the effects of such pressure have tended to produce many points of divergence between the two cases (Fishman, 2010; Fishman, 2011; Fishman and Lizardo, 2013). In Portugal, protest movements speaking on behalf of socially marginal sectors have often been able to engage in a form of ‘conversation’ with political elites in positions of power (Fishman and Everson, 2016). In this fashion, in Portugal protesters and power holders have accorded both legitimacy and significance to one another’s voices and views, whereas in Spain the voices of protest in the streets and the doings of official governmental institutions have tended to develop in isolation from one another (Fishman 2012a). In Portugal both the movements
struggling to remake the world, and established political elites, have been able to imagine futures in which their dialogue and efforts lead to reduced inequality and enhanced inclusion. The Carnation Revolution of 1974 has, in that sense, tended to live on—albeit in altered form—in their democratic practice.

One of the issue arenas in which the cross-border Iberian divide has been most consistently visible has been that of employment policies and labor market outcomes (Fishman, 2010). As the data reported in the graph in Figure 1 show, Spanish unemployment has been consistently far higher than that of Portugal—except for a brief period of time prior to the financial crisis of 2007–8 when Spain’s construction and real estate bubble briefly eliminated the endemic cross-border contrast in employment levels. That brief moment of convergence temporarily masked the underlying contrast but quickly proved not to be sustainable (Fishman 2012b). With the arrival of the crisis, unemployment rose rapidly in Spain and soon reached a level far higher than that of Portugal. I argue that the relative openness of Portuguese political leaders to pressures from below, juxtaposed with the tendency of Spanish political leaders to isolate themselves from such pressures, generated a long series of differences in policy-making and other institutional parameters that strongly influenced employment levels. The openness of Portuguese policy-makers to pressures from below coupled with institutional and cultural legacies of the revolution led them to implement more employment-friendly policies than their counterparts across the border in Spain. Cross-case differences in the finance system, the design and size of the welfare state and in the relative degree of incorporation of women into the labor force contributed to this broader pattern of difference (Fishman, 2010).

Figure 1. Unemployment rates as a percentage of the civilian labor force. Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain (1999–2014). Source: OECD.
Another major point of contrast between Portugal and Spain concerns public investment in education. Spending on education can serve as a telling indicator of the extent of public commitment to pursuing egalitarian outcomes (Huber and Stephens, 2012). Portugal was a latecomer in this arena: universal access to education was introduced in the mid-1950s, roughly three decades after the imposition of right-wing authoritarian rule and two decades before the democratizing revolution of 1974. The long-lasting legacy of the country’s historically late introduction of universal education continued to exert effects on aggregate indicators of literacy and income distribution long after the Carnation Revolution, thus generating higher levels of income inequality than would have otherwise been expected (Fishman, 2013). However, a number of factors including not only the obvious fact of generational replacement but also, under democracy, comparatively high levels of governmental expenditure on both education and welfare state measures, have led to a reduction in the level of inequality. Public expenditures on education as a percentage of GDP have continued to remain well above the levels found in other south European countries, reflecting the commitment of Portuguese governments to the progressive goals associated with such expenditures. As the data reported in the graph in Figure 2 show, although the magnitude of Portugal’s advantage has fluctuated somewhat over time, the difference between this national case and the others of southern Europe has remained consistently evident under changing economic circumstances.

A major marker of the impact of pressures from below on public policy outcomes is found in data on poverty after government transfers. In the ten-year period from 2005 through 2015, with the exception of a few months, the two Iberian countries were consistently governed by more or less equivalent parties or coalitions. Socialists won power in 2004 in Spain and in 2005 in Portugal and then lost power to right-wing oppositions in 2011 in both countries. Thus during the period of time from 2005 through 2015 left–right differences in the makeup of national governments should not be expected to generate any significant cross-border difference in distributional outcomes. Nonetheless, as the data reported in the graph in Figure 3 show, such differences clearly emerged. Portugal managed to achieve the lowest level of poverty in southern Europe, and Portugal’s relative advantage over Spain remained firmly in place during the economic crisis and under the unfortunate circumstance of austerity promoted by large supranational actors and institutions.

This outcome, like the others mentioned above, can be seen to reflect the historical legacies emphasized here. But how are those legacies actually manifested in historically concrete political conflicts? The effects of the economic crisis and of external pressures to adopt austerity policies provide
us with an important opportunity to evaluate the staying power of these historical legacies. The most rigorous and complete analysis to date of the actual effects of economic crisis and austerity on distributional outcomes shows that Portugal experienced the most egalitarian results in the region and that Spanish policies were significantly more inclined to accentuate inequality (Matsaganis and Leventi, 2014). A major episode of political conflict over austerity policies helps to explain why the Portuguese case produced more egalitarian outcomes. In September 2012 the pro-austerity government of Portugal attempted to implement a major redistribution of income from labor to capital. The government proposed a change in the TSU payroll tax which would have essentially cut all wages and salaries by 7% while decreasing payroll taxes paid by employers. This initiative was motivated in part by an earlier decision of the country’s Constitutional Court which had ruled unconstitutional a governmental effort to cut costs at the expense of public employees. The new initiative was directed in equal measure at all employees—those working in both the private and public sectors. This time it was crowds in the streets rather than the country’s Constitutional Court that played the key role in defeating the proposed measure. Large protests quickly swept the country, focusing in the end on the presidential palace in Lisbon where center-right President Cavaco Silva was meeting with a council of advisers to recommend a course of action to Prime Minister Passos Coelho, also located politically on the center-right.

Figure 2. Governmental expenditures on education as a percentage of GDP. Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain (1999–2014). Source: Eurostat; World Bank for Greece 1999–2006.
The demonstrators urged Cavaco and those assembled to listen and apparently they did. Both Cavaco and Passos Coelho issued statements indicating that it was important to hear the country’s concerns as articulated by the demonstrators. The proposed policy change was withdrawn by the government. A large transfer of resources from workers to employers was avoided due to the efforts of demonstrators and the willingness of office holders to pay them heed. At roughly the same time Spanish social movements also carried out massive demonstrations aimed at reversing austerity policies of their country’s right-wing government. In the Spanish case the demonstrations made no impact on government policy. Instead of issuing statements acknowledging the importance of the concerns of demonstrators, Spanish office holders often sought to delegitimize the voices of protest. Indeed, the government introduced new criminal penalties for certain types of protest activity in a new law that quickly came to be called the Ley Modaza, roughly the “Gag Law.” Cultural legacies of large historical episodes of change—revolution in Portugal and consensus-oriented reform in Spain—had generated very different forms of democratic practice in the neighboring countries with major consequences for both public protest and distributional outcomes.

Limitations of space make it impossible to take up other issue arenas in which this fundamental contrast is manifested but it remains important to briefly address the implications of this paired comparison for countries outside the Iberian Peninsula. The comparison of Portugal and Spain offers two theoretically useful lessons for our general understanding of how pasts can shape struggles
for better futures. The first one concerns what we may think of as an intervening variable—historically rooted understandings of democracy and forms of democratic practice. The comparison of the Iberian Peninsula neighbors shows that this cultural variable strongly shapes the capacity of social movements and large-scale protest to reorient economic and social policy. That capacity, in the spirit of much scholarship presented in the Vienna Forum, surely reflects in part the ability of protesters to imagine future change. The cultural legacy of the Carnation Revolution encourages actors to see such futures as attainable.

But to what degree can we expect to find instances of inclusionary democratic practice in country cases that lack Portugal’s history of democratic social revolution? That large question cannot be satisfactorily resolved without much additional space and work but it is possible to briefly suggest two lines of analysis that are likely to prove fruitful for scholarly research and, for that reason, hopeful for those who wish to see opportunities outside the Iberian Peninsula for outcomes similar to those of Portugal. The first point to be made is that social movements themselves may in some contexts succeed in generating cultural change—including change in the way actors think of democracy and inclusion (della Porta, 1999; Tarrow, 1993). It is not easy for movements to accomplish cultural change as broad in nature as that brought about by the Carnation Revolution but to one degree or another they do influence cultural repertoires and structures. Secondly, the mechanisms of change put in place by Portugal’s democratizing social revolution—namely a partial inversion of social hierarchies accompanied by political and cultural change—may also be possible in cases of genuinely inclusionary social reform such as the project of change developed by Nordic social democracy in its classic days of success (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The comparative significance of the contrast analyzed here is of potential relevance well beyond the edges of the Iberian Peninsula, at the western end of continental Europe.

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References


IV. CLIMATE, ENVIRONMENT, AND FOOD
Global climate change presents global humanity with the most profound dilemma of its 125,000 year career—become much more collectively rational and cooperative or over the coming decades and centuries face increasingly serious disasters, potentially even extinction. Our best scientific evidence shows that the current rapid rise in global temperatures is due to human activity—an increase in greenhouse gasses (GHG) released into the atmosphere largely from burning fossil fuels to obtain energy. These gasses form an increasingly dense “blanket” around the earth that traps more of the sun’s radiant energy, thereby warming the atmosphere, seas and land and changing the patterns of climate and weather. This process and its consequences have been well reviewed in many studies, such as the Reports issues by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), so need not be reviewed in detail here.

The important point in this essay concerns the implications of this anthropogenic climate change (ACC) for global sociology, its many subfields, and for its contribution to building the futures we want. Climate change represents an unprecedented stimulus to human society. Sociology, if it tackles the challenge, can help us find the path toward an adequate response. Sociology is the study of patterns of consciousness and behavior generated by groups of any size, from pairs of individuals to world systems composed of national and international formations. By studying the patterns that do exist, we can also begin to grasp, or theorize about, why they exist and how they could be otherwise. Since climate change results from some of our existing social patterns, sociologists can help us identify, think and theorize in this way about the patterns responsible for greenhouse gas emissions. Anthropogenic climate change calls for such sociological study, in order to identify its causes and by revealing them, to open them up for change. We know that the physical cause of ACC lies in the burning of fossil fuels. But the social causes of this behavior—and the difficulty in refraining from it—lie much deeper in the patterns of social life. While this brief essay offers a general overview of some of the opportunities for sociology, many of these themes have been pursued in depth in the recent volume Climate Change and Society: Sociological Perspectives (Riley Dunlap & Brulle, 2015).
Current human industrial and post-industrial civilization in virtually all its aspects is based upon the use of cheap and abundant energy offered by fossil fuels. To the extent that the intense usage of fossil fuel energy has allowed a society to become complex and highly differentiated, the effects of this energy dependence penetrate and manifest in all levels and forms of the society. The abundance and relative cheapness of goods allows consumption to expand from meeting basic needs through adequacy and sufficiency to levels of hyper-consumerism. In this last stage, new products are purchased largely for display of status rather than physical need (Ehrhardt-Martinez & Schor, 2015). The high energy lifestyle has spread increasingly around the planet, including in the crowded cities of the global south. India reputedly now has the largest numbers of middle class in the world (due to its vast population). The availability of this abundant energy transforms the process of production, bringing about the Industrial Revolution. This change sparks further changes in almost every social institution. The panic that begins to ensue at the sudden removal of electric power for a few days alone illustrates this dependence, and the multi-level fragility of this complex social pattern.

The extent of social change implied by the end of fossil fuel usage depends upon the solutions it forces upon us, in the balance between conservation and availability of non-polluting substitutes. If to reduce fossil fuel usage we have to reduce our total use of energy, this implies introducing massive amounts of energy conservation. This would bring considerable change in all institutions, especially in the countries with the highest per capita usage of such energy. Such a change would affect all the aspects of society, and to that extent, would also generate considerable resistance to the switch in energy sources.

If, however, humanity can rapidly obtain equivalent amounts of energy from non-GHG producing technologies, such as wind, solar, nuclear or successful CCS (carbon capture and storage), the change may generate less resistance. Society may be able to “decouple” growth and carbon pollution. That is, it may continue on at a current energy levels while still reducing the causes of anthropogenic climate change. In this case, the solutions to climate change will carry fewer implications for deep change in current social institutions.

However, as the cheapest source of energy for developing countries like China and India remains coal, and as the switch to renewable energies must be global if we are to avert ever-worsening climate change, spreading renewables to a global scale will still require profound changes in international support. The required level of cooperation would require a change in effective political culture and goals from nationalism to a global cosmopolitanism (Beck, 2010b).

Eventually, the energy solution is going to require both the preceding pathways—some mixture of strict conservation to reduce total energy consumption and a change of sources to non-GHG emitting technology in the high energy intensive countries. This model will have to spread around the world to bring
global parity in sustainable energy per capita both between countries and within countries, providing an adequate distribution of energy. In other words, the only feasible solution to global climate change is to move rapidly toward “zero carbon, zero poverty” at a global scale (Kartha & Baer, 2015). Without approaching this goal, international conflicts will intensify, worsening the situation in all countries. Our dire situation leaves this idealistic dream as the only realistic option. Sociologists, each within their own specialization and global location, can help think through the implications of this overarching visionary goal for real changes in the whole range of institutions, values, discourses and practices. Solving climate change will require considerable social and cultural transformation in our habits of government, business, work, production, consumption, settlement and transport, as well as in our values of cooperation, respect for science and gender-equality.

The barrier to this kind of transformation lies in the well-known public goods or commons problem (Dietz, Dolsak, Ostrom, & Stern, 2002). Collectively as global humanity we face a tremendous risk from global climate change (Beck, 2010a), but to each individual and group and nation, other issues take precedence. This inward orientation blocks the cooperation needed to attain collective welfare such as reduction of climate change. People face much more immediate risks, to personal and family welfare, that demand their full immediate attention. Depending on their situation, the specific risks that demand attention differ. They range from, at the extreme poverty end of the scale, finding enough food to eat this very day, to, at the most prosperous extreme, worries if one’s already plentiful investment portfolio will gain or lose value. In other words, along this whole scale from poverty to plentitude lie existential threats to individuals and groups much more immediate than climate change. Many people are so seized by their personal threats that they do not feel the latitude to worry about a risk so enormous and vague as climate change. Furthermore, in developing countries, many people have not even heard of climate change (Shwom, McCright, & Brechin, 2015: 272).

Social psychology casts light on these difficulties. As moral beings, it is hard for many people to acknowledge the threat posed by climate change and yet do nothing about it. The result is that, as a measure of self-protection, many people rule it out of their minds, or go even further and deny the possibility altogether (Norgaard, 2006). Taking the case of the United States, such extreme denial occupies only a small percentage of the population, as the “Six Americas” shows (Leiserowitz, 2015). But it is enough of the population, when mobilized by populist leaders, to prevent decisive government action on the problem. And of course, even an openness to or acceptance of the overwhelming scientific consensus still does not mean giving political priority to the issue. Many people live with the cognitive dissonance of acknowledging the issue but not taking personal action or putting it at the top of their list of important collective issues.
Despite the tendency to denial in some quarters, if policies to direct society toward solutions became politically feasible, many people would asset or follow along. In the US, the conservative bloc of politicians and think tanks supported by fossil fuel corporations has blocked solutions for decades (Riley Dunlap & McCright, 2015). As the country most historically responsible for creating climate change (by emitting greenhouse gases), the US has a pivotal global role in determining the future of the biosphere. If the US were to take leadership in carrying out a strong program in building a green economy, this would provide inspiration and incentive to the world. But in the absence of US leadership, other countries have much less incentive to embark on their own vigorous promotion of the green economy.

Global, transnational and world-systems schools of sociology have important tasks ahead to continue and deepen their studies of the international dynamics of climate change. The distribution of climate harms and benefits will change decade by decade. Situation within this global system affects the national and regional orientations towards climate change and its solutions. Four main conflicting dimensions of interpretive difference fracture the global field of climate change opinion (based on newspaper content analysis): validity of climate science, scale of ecological risk, scale of climate politics, and support for mitigation policy. (Broadbent et al 2016). Therefore, sociologists around the world will need to be acutely aware of the particular qualities of their own systemic location in this field and its geophysical realities. The effects of climate change are currently beginning most severely in the agricultural global south with intensifying drought and stress. This is adding to pressures for migration and for civil war. At the global scale, these stresses may continue to increase in a linear way or there may be tipping points at which the distribution of harms rapidly expands. The global pressures will increase the need for global coordination in meeting disasters as well as reducing emissions. This will make global institutions such as the UN into more important functional meeting and decision forums.

At the same time, the weakness of international agreements to elicit the needed responses has turned the spotlight of inquiry upon the dynamics of national socio-political response to global climate change. The solution must be global, but to craft workable global agreements, there exists a critical need to understand the societal and cultural bases of national responses to global climate change. One social scientific goal is to explain the variation in national response to global climate change under the emerging international regime.

Perhaps the most obvious sociological subfield to apply to climate change is political sociology. This subfield concerns the interaction of society and politics as an encompassing system or configuration. Two opposing theories on the political process, persuasion theory versus conflict theory, give rise to different hypotheses about how the scientific information is framed and processed. Persuasion theory implies that societies can learn to adopt the necessary new ways through
discussion and education. In contrast, conflict theory indicates that the scientific consensus will provoke intense political, and possibly violent, conflicts over the required social reforms that can only be resolved through imposed regulation. In the former, venues for egalitarian stakeholder participation and dialogue will be crucial interaction nodes for networks of the acceptance of climate change science and its political empowerment. Within the political system, the rise of movements and interest groups that push for mitigation is sometimes a crucial factor (Caniglia, Brulle, & Szasz, 2015). However, it is possible for the state to take autonomous action, even in the absence of a strong civil society, as in China.

This view gives rise to the hypothesis that: “The more the political system provides venues for broadly representative and egalitarian stakeholder participation, the more the nation will mitigate CC” (Broadbent, 2010). But under the assumptions of conflict theory, change will require the formation of opposed coalitions advocating different interpretations of and solutions for the issue. A conflict-oriented hypothesis argues, “The more that national interest groups defend fossil fuel consumption, the less the nation will mitigate CC.” Social conditions, including cultural values, existing institutions, distribution of power, orientation of political parties, dominant ideologies, will affect both these processes.

The sociology of science and cultural sociology and the sociology of knowledge and communication all have great applicability to the study of climate change. Acceptance of the dominant climate change scientific consensus—that climate change is anthropogenic, dangerous and intensifying—is the *sine qua non* for taking action to mitigate GCC. Accordingly, a primary hypothesis concerns the conditions under which that scientific consensus (for one prominent source, from the IPCC) is accepted or rejected in national (or area) cases at the popular and political levels, and how it becomes empowered or weakened in its effect upon practical measures to reduce GHG outputs and protect GHG sinks (forests). The ultimate outcome variable per case is the trend in net national GHG outputs.

Bringing in these perspectives, a resultant hypothesis states that “The more implicit the cultural acceptance of a rational-scientific worldview, the more the nation will mitigate CC.” Combining cultural and persuasion theory yields “The more centrality CC scientists have in policy communications networks, the more the nation will mitigate CC.” In more authoritarian societies, such participatory venues will not exist. Even in more democratic societies, consensual circles may need to toughen into advocacy coalitions and engage in political contention to attain effective outcomes.

The few examples reviewed here just suggest the wide range of topics that sociology can delve into to help resolve the climate change issue. The international research project—Comparing Climate Change Policy Networks (Compon)—is designed to clarify the complexities of these perceptions and processes, and to investigate what causes them (www.compon.org). Better knowledge
here will not only help negotiators, but also contribute to social scientific progress. Since inception in 2007, the Compon project has developed a common policy network survey instrument for use in multiple societies, including major emitters and significant cases. The Compon project produces highly comparable data about the political processes. The policy network survey captures networks of influence that are acted out around a given issue among engaged organizations (from state and society). This data about issue fields enables the research teams to study and compare the flow of scientific knowledge, how it gets framed, and the advocacy coalitions that bear it into the policy-formation process. Started in 2007, the Compon project now has teams in over 25 societies and invites the participation of new researchers and new cases.

References

The Future of the Agrifood System: Competing Visions and Contested Discourses

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Agrifood Studies and Feeding the World

The industrial agrifood system is in crisis regarding its negative ecological, economic, and social externalities (Constance et al., 2014a; Magdoff et al., 2000). This legitimation crisis has accelerated steadily over the past 30 years, but has reached a tipping point recently based on the generalized realization that the current system is the major contributor to global climate change. To complicate the scenario, by the year 2050 the world population is predicted to be 9 billion people who need to be fed without expanding the agricultural land base, while reducing negative environmental impacts such as greenhouse gas emissions (Gardner, 2009). In response to this realization, two competing visions have emerged as the path forward: the sustainable intensification approach and the agro-ecology approach (Levidow, 2015). These two transitions are the outcome of a history of competing visions and contested discourses regarding the preferred model of the agrifood system. This Common Sessions paper provides a contribution from Research Committee 40 on Agriculture and Food of the International Sociological Association to interpret the historical progression and current status of this critical discourse. I begin the paper with some historical context on the role of the discipline of Rural Sociology in the United States, then move to a summary of the critical components of the discourse, and end with a philosophical interpretation of the competing visions.

Agrifood Studies and Rural Sociology

The subject matter of Rural Sociology can be traced to the late 1900s with the works of United States Department of Labor sociologist W.E.B. DuBois (1898) on the post-bellum crop- lien system of plantation sharecropping in the US South (Constance, 2014). Populist unrest leading to agrarian social movements in the late 1800s and early 1900s brought the plight of farmers facing agricultural and industrial market power into the public and scientific venue. Early rural social scientists argued the specialness of rural societies regarding com-
Community ties, moral superiority, and quality of life. Rural Sociology as an institution in the United States is part of a suite of rural social science disciplines created as part of the Land Grant University system: Rural Sociology, Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Education, and Agricultural Communication. The Land Grant University system was created by federal land grants to modernize agricultural production across the entire country through a teaching, research, and extension program to develop modern agricultural practices, test them on university experiment station plots, and diffuse the new technologies to progressive farmers through the Cooperative Extension Service (Danbom, 1979). Prior to and during World War II the Land Grant University system consisted of two competing discourses regarding the proposed structure and function of the agricultural sciences. One path was informed by the agrarian ethic, the other by the industrial ethic (Thompson, 2010a). The agrarian ethic viewed agriculture as a special social structure with associated norms that created virtuous citizens with substantive values resulting in enhanced quality of life. This path was supported by Rural Sociologists and Institutional Agricultural Economists who advanced social democratic agendas which were embedded in national agricultural policy. The industrial ethic viewed agriculture as just another commodity sector whose role was to efficiently produce food and inputs for the modern industrial world. This path was supported by neo-classical economists and urban elites who advanced a productivist agenda to the detriment of rural social issues. After World War II, and especially during the Cold War, the productivist approach dominated the social democratic approach and progressive elements within the USDA were suppressed and eliminated. The adoption-diffusion model of agricultural modernization based on technology improvements linked to modern farmers was spread to the world. Beginning in the 1970s this model was criticized as a system whereby the United States Department of Agriculture and Land Grant University system were coopted by agribusiness, serving the special interests of powerful corporations over farmers and rural peoples (Buttel and Newby, 1980; Constance, 2014; Thompson, 2010b).

As the legitimation crisis of industrial agriculture intensified through the 1970s, a New Rural Sociology emerged which countered the dominant productivist paradigm (Buttel and Newby, 1980). This approach departed from the structural functional theoretical frames and positivist, quantitative methodologies that underpinned the adoption/diffusion paradigm. Critical theories were rediscovered regarding the relationship between the structure of agriculture and the quality of life for rural peoples. These theories combined with a commodity systems analysis (Friedland, 1984) revealed the collusion between agribusiness, government, and universities to advance industrial agriculture at the expense of farm labor, farmers, and rural social movements. Environmental sociology frameworks highlighted the extractive and unsustainable ecology of conventional agriculture (Buttel, 1987).
The Farm Crisis of the 1980s illustrated that US agriculture was part of a global agrifood system dominated by powerful agrifood transnational corporations (Bonanno et al., 1994; McMichael, 1994). Populist rural social movements again called on the government to protect farmers and rural peoples from the market power of agrifood corporations (Constance et al., 2014b). The international dimension of the New Rural Sociology replaced the ostensibly value-neutral modernization project framework with the value-laden dependista framework focusing on neocolonialism orchestrated by the powerful nation-states and agribusiness corporations of the global North and imposed on the global South (McMichael 1996). By the 1990s the Sociology of Agriculture was the dominant discourse and research interest group in the Rural Sociological Society. Since the 1990s, the literature has trended from a globalization of economy and society focus toward an alternative agrifood initiatives and governance focus (Busch, 2011; Constance, 2014).

Agrifood Studies: The Four Questions

The trajectory of the Sociology of Agrifood studies discourse and literature can be organized around four key questions: The Environmental Question, The Agrarian Question, The Food Question, and The Emancipatory Question (Constance, 2008; Constance et al., 2014a). The four questions progress chronologically as different aspects of the legitimation crisis generate social movement responses, but overlap in time as different aspects of the unsustainability persist. Buttel (2006) refers to this as sustaining the unsustainable.

The “Environmental Question” asks, “What is the relationship between industrial agriculture and the quality of the rural environment?” The answer is that chemical-intensive, monoculture agriculture has a negative relationship with the environment, which it extracts wealth from and externalizes costs to in the forms of soil, water, air, and species degradation. The social movement response is soil conservation programs, chemical regulation of agriculture by the government, and the rise of organic and agro-ecological agriculture. Environmental Sociology emerged as a critical alternative to the dominant natural resource management perspectives (Buttel, 1987). The previously contested but now generally accepted realization that the industrial agrifood system is the primary contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and global warming is damning evidence of this relationship.

The “Agrarian Question” asks, “What is the relationship between industrial agriculture and the quality of life for farmers and rural communities?” The answer is that as the industrial aspects of agriculture increase, including large scale operations relying on hired labor and advancing market concentration, the quality of life in rural areas goes down (Lobao and Stofferahn, 2008; Magdoff et al., 2000). The globalization of the agrifood exacerbates the situation as transnational corpo-
rations search the planet for the lowest cost factors of production (Bonanno et al., 1994; Burch and Lawrence, 2007; Fold and Pritchard, 2005; Friedland et al., 1991; Goodman and Watts, 1997; McMichael, 1994). The social movement response to this includes calls to the government to protect farmers from market power, and a suite of local and regional foods initiatives to create an alternative system. In response to the legitimation crisis of the Corporate Food Regime characterized as “Food from Nowhere” conventional agrifood system, a broad-based alternative agriculture social movement is creating a “Food from Somewhere” system (McMichael, 2005; Campbell, 2009). The “Food from Somewhere” agrifood system re-embeds agro-ecological agriculture in local and regional relationships, often referred to as “Civic Agriculture” (Lyson, 2004). Reflexive localism reminds us to be wary of uncritically reifying the local as a panacea to the global agrifood system (Goodman et al., 2011; Hinrichs, 2000; Morgan et al., 2006). At the global level fair trade initiatives attempt to shift the balance of profit in the value chain toward producers in the global South and away from the transnational corporations (Raynolds et al., 2007).

The “Food Question” asks, “What is the relationship between the conventional agrifood system and quality of food we eat?” The “Quality Turn” captured the growing interest in the multi-dimensional aspects of quality in production, processing and consumption (Goodman, 2003). The answer is that the dominant food system is characterized by an industrial diet of unhealthy “pseudo-food” commodity chains centered on fats, sugars, starches, salt, empty carbohydrates (Winson, 2013). This system leads to heart disease, diabetes, obesity, e-coli contamination, Mad Cow disease, salmonella outbreaks, and burgeoning public health crises. It also includes moral economy concerns about the quality of life of food animals produced in confinement facilities. Similarly, this question deals with the quality of life of agricultural workers on the farms and in the processing plants. Importantly, the Food Question brings consumers into the discourse who are demanding a healthier agrifood system with quality control mechanisms to certify the health and safety of the food we eat (Busch, 2011; Wright and Middendorf, 2008). The global controversy over the use and safety of genetically modified organisms in our foods is a prominent example of this contested discourse.

The “Emancipatory Question” asks, “What is the relationship between the conventional agrifood system and civil rights and social justice for all actors in the system?” The answer is that the Corporate Food Regime privileges the market over civil society, which marginalizes the rights of the majority of the people, cultures, and animals on the planet (Allen, 2008; Constance et al. 2014a; McMichael, 2009). There are disturbing race, class and gender dimensions to the agrifood precariat (Gertel and Sipple, 2014). The ascending corporate rights framework of neoliberal free trade coordinated by global governance organizations such as the World Trade Organization and imposed by nation-states privileges the rich and punishes the rest of humanity. The conventionalization of
organics, fair trade, and local foods grounded in market-base solutions reveals the hegemonic power of capitalism to coopt the emerging “Food from Somewhere” model and tilt it back toward neoliberal accommodations. The discourse on collective rights and entitlements of citizens protected by the state is replaced by neoliberal arguments about individual responsibility and choice in the market (Allen, 2008; Bonanno and Wolf, 2016; Fairbairn, 2012; Guthman, 2008; Jaffee and Howard, 2010). Social movement organizations such as La Via Campesina are challenging the hegemony of the Corporate Food Regime with a rights-based discourse that honors indigenous knowledge and human rights over corporate privilege and intellectual property rights (Desmarais, 2007).

The Emancipatory Question asks, “What would a fair, just, equitable, and sustainable agrifood system look like?” How can we transform the agrifood system to be socially, economically, and environmentally just and sustainable for all, including universal human rights? Does such a system include a right to safe and nutritious food for all? Does it include peasant and farmer rights to access to the land, to the means of production? Does it include social justice for undocumented farm and food workers? Does it include cultural rights to self-preservation, as well as animal rights and environmental rights? These discourses comprise the Emancipatory Question.

The food security versus food sovereignty discourse captures well the current state of competing visions. The food security discourse begins in the 1940s when the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which treated food as an essential of life rather than a commodity. This rights-based definition was replaced in 1986 when the World Bank redefined food security as the ability to buy food. In 1994, the WTO institutionalized the global free trade regime vision of food security and strengthened it with the Agreement on Agriculture in 2008 by defining agriculture as system of global entrepreneurial farmers employing sustainable intensification practices linked to transnational corporations in flexible arrangements governed by sustainability standards (McMichael, 2014).

The food sovereignty movement was created by La Via Campesina, a broad-based social movement made up of peasants, farmers, fisher peoples, farm workers, women, environmentalists, and indigenous peoples committed to social justice and human rights, La Via directly challenges the globalization project through protests at WTO meetings and other venues. It denies the validity of the WTO food security development framework based on free trade and corporate rights. Instead, La Via builds coalitions to create agrifood self-sufficiency using indigenous knowledge and agro-ecological principles through land reform (Constance et al., 2014a; Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011; Wittman et al., 2010).

The food security and food sovereignty frames are separated by non-reconcilable ontological chasms (McMichael, 2014). Food security advances a
land commodification ontology which assumes that the problem of food supply be solved through sustainable intensification, which is a high-tech repackaging of the modernist adoption and diffusion approaches. The food sovereignty ontology views land through an ecological, cultural, and multifunctional lens whereby domestic-based production is the better path to food security than global commodity chains (De Schutter, 2008). Rights are defined in collective terms rather than the liberal conception of individual rights (McMichael, 2014). The intellectual property rights/copy right framework of food security advanced by the World Trade Organization is countered by a copy left/open source framework. The battle between the GMO seed companies and La Via Campesina over seed sovereignty is a good example of the ontological chasm (Kloppenburg, 2010). Social justice, codified as rights protected by law, is the crucial fault line in agrifood studies (Allen, 2008).

Agrifood Studies: The Two Paths Forward

The tension between the food security and the sovereign visions aligns with the transition paths. The food security path is based on neo-productivist, high-tech solutions using all available tools and technologies, including intellectual property, as the new paradigm to meet the challenge of feeding the world with sustainable intensification. The food sovereignty path is based on agro-ecology and a social justice framework. The food security path is patterned on consequentialist philosophy grounded in utilitarian assumptions about agrifood science and rurality. The agro-ecology path employs rights-based rhetoric to support its social justice agenda (Thompson, 2010b). The food security path is incremental with reforms to green to the existing system, while the food sovereignty path pushes for transformative change to the system (Constance et al., 2014a; Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck, 2011). Where the current system promises to sustainably intensify, the agroecologists prefer to intensify sustainable. The agroecologists warn that sustainable intensification is an oxymoron at least, and more probably a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing.’ The neo-productivists promise their green solution can feed the world, while the low-tech agro-ecology approach cannot. The ontological chasm is at least 100 years old now; it seems alive and well.

References


14. The Power of Risk Perception: The discord between public and scientific perception of risks around food

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TG04 Sociology of Risk and Uncertainty

Introduction

The paper focuses on perception of risk around food consumption, the gap between scientific knowledge, expert advice and people’s choice in foods to consume. The “everyday” use of the risk concept gives the impression that we live in a more dangerous world than our ancestors; this is hardly true in relation to access to quality food. Food availability, which was a central survival issue for our ancestors, is not a predicament in our contemporary global society. It is rather the unequal distribution of affordable healthy food.

The inequitable food distribution together with dwindling knowledge about food cultivation and processing, as well as the circumstance that many urban and metropolitan based people nearly exclusively come in contact with food through the supermarket environment or fast food establishments contribute to unhealthy food habits. Furthermore, risks around food consumption are compounded by people’s social and cultural beliefs, knowledge about food, ability and time to prepare basic food dishes.

The paper analyses food risks from three sociological risks discourses; the socio-cultural, the risk society and the governmentality risk discourse. The discourses are briefly presented in relation to food production, processing and consumption to highlight their different perspectives of the gap between scientific findings, official guidelines and the public’s perception of risk in relation to,

- global obesity problems, grounded within the socio-cultural discourse and an issue affecting all societies;
- controversies around Genetically Modified Organisms analysed through the risk society discourse; and
- the gap between “unachievable” scientific, public health guidelines and people’s eating habits of fruit and vegetables—a governmentality risk discourse dilemma.
Sociological risk discourse perspective

The socio-cultural risk discourse is concerned with the basic principles that determine how people see themselves, understand themselves, and how this self-perception influences their behaviour and actions (Douglas 1969, 1985, 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). The central position of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) is that danger and risk are social constructions (Dake 1992).

Selective attention to risk, and preferences among different types of risk taking (or avoiding), correspond to cultural biases—that is, to worldviews or ideologies entailing deeply held values and beliefs defending different patterns of social relations. (Wildavsky and Dake 1990:43)

The socio-cultural risk discourse is based on the notion that risks are part of shared cultural understandings and practices (Douglas 1985), where risk perceptions are developed within the community environment, a setting that creates an ambience in influencing people’s habitus in food preferences (Bourdieu 1984). The social expectations and responsibilities originate from pre-established cultural beliefs and those beliefs frame how people behave and how they are expected to react towards potential internal and/or external risks.

The socio-cultural risk discourse emphasises that we need to recognise the social, cultural and religious environment to understand the rationale behind the classification of risks around food (Douglas 1969:36). The notions of risk are therefore not individualistic, but shared within a community. It is the community as a whole that identifies the risks and decides the potential threat the risk might impose on the community’s social cohesion. The community represents the residents, but the community also represents the social and cultural environment that keeps all of them together (Durkheim 1933, 1951).

Douglas’s socio-cultural risk perspective is grounded in habitus and traditions. They are developed into moral and ethical norms, but the risk discourse also has a political purpose to maintain the community’s unity and stability. The discourse might be dated, but concerning food habitus, it has an overshadowing influence on food selection (Lupton 2006; Renn 2005; Rohrmann 1999).

The socio-cultural discourse and obesity

The socio-cultural risk discourse pertains to an increasingly overweight and obese global population. The scientific community has long warned people about the health risks around excessive body weight, but the trend has not yet plateaued as new societies are added to the obesity list and none is leaving it.

People’s individual wellbeing and health might not be considered an area of societal risk, but rather a personal issue. However, public policy, urban planning, social and cultural traditions influence the overall health of populations, as
societal settings have implications for residents, the work force, transport, health services and the sustainability of the society. The socio-cultural risk discourse provides a framework to untangle the cause to the increase in overweight and obese individuals and its impact on all societal levels. Obesity is a socio-cultural risk issue. It cannot easily be reversed by government intervention or experts’ advice, as demonstrated by history (Lindsay 2010).

It is within this food area that the diversity in approach and understanding between public policy and advocacy and individual behaviour show the widest gaps. The discrepancy is concerning, as obesity is linked to various social, physical and medical problems, including hypertension, high cholesterol, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, asthma, arthritis, and some forms of cancer. Mortality also increases sharply once the threshold of being overweight is crossed (Sassi 2010).

Public health campaigns have long warned against carrying excess body fat and promoted the importance of healthy eating and regular exercise, but health messages compete with strong and aggressive advertising campaigns for a range of convenient energy dense food products. Marketing messages promote “lifestyle choices” for good looking, healthy and active young adults who enjoy outdoor life and sport. Food products that are presented to fit hectic public and private life styles (Budd and Peterson 2014).

This positive and encouraging atmosphere is often far from the reality, with time-poor people increasingly adopting a sedentary lifestyle. Few consumers manage to practice an “ideal healthy living paradigm,” but they still embrace the promoted energy dense food products. The basic tenet for the accumulation of body fat is excessive energy intake exceeding energy expenditure, although additional factors are at play.

The food industry has acknowledged the increasingly serious health situation and has responded by introducing “lite” food alternatives and conveying the risk of overeating by giving serving size suggestions (Gasparro and Jargon 2014). Although “lite” products might be low in fat, they are not necessarily low in total energy. Furthermore, one-person food containers often contain a slightly larger amount than the recommended serving size. This forces the consumer “on the run” to either eat more than intended or reluctantly throw away part of the food (Rolls et al. 2004).

Building on the socio-cultural risk discourse perspective, attitudes to food consumption need an overall system change to,

- rethink the way cities and workplaces are designed to make them conducive to a healthy lifestyle;
- promote a healthcare system that focuses on prevention and primary care;
- reconnect with the food we eat and teach food skills to all people;
create safe residential and recreational environments; and
- take responsibility for how advertising space is used to promote unhealthy food choices.

Without decisive action, being overweight and obese might become the new normal.

**Risk society discourse**

The socio-cultural risk perspective and the risk society discourse of modern industrialisation demonstrate similarities in that they both focus on actual threats and not on perceptions of risk, although from different standpoints.

The risk society discourse has its foundation in the risk concept of dangers and hazards that have proliferated throughout progressive modern industrialisation, urbanisation, globalisation of trade and commerce, and technological advances in communication within the networked society (Castells 2000, 2001; Castells et al. 2009). The risk society is synonymous with the writings of Ülrich Beck (1992) and Anthony Giddens (2002).

Beck was influenced by Michael Foucault (1991) and François Ewald (1991:288), who labelled the modern society as an ‘insurance society’ —the core of the modern society. Beck emphasises in *Risk Society* (1992) the increasing complexity of the contemporary society and the influence of multinational corporations on local and global food production. Innovation in processing technologies create new risk environments that will influence producers and consumers alike. Furthermore, the globalisation in sourcing raw materials and food processing undertaken at a multitude of diverse geographical places make tracing of a product’s origin almost impossible. A circumstance that underscores the difficulties in identifying and to single out production responsibilities within multifaceted food chains. Modern food production has taken away people’s feeling of control and ability to influence their food choices (Beck 1992:35–6).

*The risk society discourse on GM food*

Genetically modified (GM) foods are products of advanced manufacturing processes of late modernity. They are developed out of a perception that conventional food production cannot feed the world’s growing population. This perception has created a demand for new plants that are genetically modified to grow faster, be less labour intensive, be time and cost efficient, be able to tolerate long transports, keep its freshness and have the ability to withstand diseases.

Genetically modified foods are examples of what Beck (1992) refers to as creating new risk uncertainties and fundamental disagreements over knowledge
and values, especially where new technology and consumption products have not been exposed to rigorous testing over a sufficient time period and still been allowed to be released into the human and animal food chains.

Genetically modified foods are products derived from organisms whose genetic material (deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA]) has been deliberately altered by human intervention through the forced introduction of genes from a non-related organism, in a way that does not usually occur naturally. The potential threat to public health and the environment posed by GM technologies is a hotly contested topic between scientists and the public, as well as between scientists. Genetically modified foods are considered an unacceptable risk to the environment and to people in parts of both the developing and developed world.

Proponents claim that using the technology is a necessity if we want to be able to feed the world’s growing population (Raven 2014). Detractors claim that short term gains are soon to be reversed by eroding biodiversity of traditional cultivars and the evolution of herbicide resistant ‘superweeds,’ which can jeopardise future agricultural sustainability (Mortensen et al. 2012).

What could have been a public relations triumph for biotechnology with a promise to provide the world with more nutritious and less expensive food using fewer resources has become a serious conflict driven by dislike of corporate power, especially multinational company control and lack of transparency. It has created fears of uncontrolled environmental and health effects (Beck 1992, 1999; Douglas 1992; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).

The introduction of GM food products is a classic example where the risk society discourse highlights discrepancies between science and public perception together with the limited knowledge about the product’s long term influence on eco-systems.

**Governmentality risk discourse**

The governmentality risk discourse draws initially from the work of Michel Foucault (1991). Foucault’s central position is that socio-cultural assumptions and the direct exertion of institutional authority or physical compulsion are part of the apparatus by which power is exerted within a society (Rose 1990: ix). The society’s culturally based power structure entails citizens’ faith, gendered perceptions, employment relations, the rule of law, democratic traditions and political institutions. These cultural structures include citizens’ position in society and the nation state’s authority over its residents.

The governmentality risk perspective persuades citizens to voluntarily adopt practices that are classified as ‘good citizen’ conduct. Citizens are encouraged to accept the government’s laws and norms and through self-regulation, they will become good citizens. Expert knowledge becomes ‘central
to neoliberal government, providing the guidelines whereby citizens are assessed, compared against norms and rendered productive’ (Lupton 2006:13).

Nonetheless, it can be a major apparatus to encourage people within the neoliberal risk discourse to engage in self-regulation, thus, it becomes a necessity that risk perceptions are shared within the social group. It becomes the person’s responsibility to take note of and to understand risk warnings and to act on them in the “right” precautionary manner (Lentzos and Rose 2009; O’Malley 2010).

The governmentality risk discourse on eating guidelines

The governmentality risk discourse contributes to explain why people disregard scientific findings and guidelines. Science clearly points to the health benefits of eating a balanced diet including fruits and vegetables to reduce the risk of developing several maladies. Public advice to eat a balanced diet and particularly to increase the fruit and vegetable consumption (World Health Organization 2004) can be unachievable for people within low socio-economic population groups. Furthermore, food preferences are influenced by social, cultural, religious and economic circumstances. Ultimately, they are about people’s ability to afford a variety of healthy food, low in sugar, fat and salt. Bridging gaps between public preferences, scientists’ recommendations and governments’ attempt to influence consumer eating habits have been less successful, especially concerning vegetables, but also regarding fruit.

However, there is a strong positive association between household income and fruit and vegetable consumption (Johansson et al. 1999; Giskes et al. 2002; Laaksonen et al. 2003). People living on a low household budget or living in a disadvantaged area consume fewer fruits and vegetables, as they pay a relatively higher premium for healthy food compared with less healthy foods. Additionally, fruit and vegetables are comparably more expensive than fast food alternatives (Mooney 1990; Sooman et al. 1993; Kamphuis et al. 2007). Fruit and vegetables have a shorter shelf life and are sometimes more difficult to store in the home (Giskes et al. 2002).

Consequently, people negotiate and prioritise food based on their social and cultural environment, financial circumstances, faith and personal likes and dislikes. Food consumption also depends on time and knowledge of how to prepare food, eating occasion and eating partners (Connors et al. 2001).

Conclusion

The significance of healthy food for overall societal and individual health is a contemporary discussion issue and for many people, health is an important consideration when choosing what food to eat. Nonetheless, people often demon-
strate an ‘optimism bias’ in that they habitually believe they are less at risk to suffer lifestyle illnesses than what other people in the society might be (Fabiansson and Fabiansson 2016).

Exacerbating the situation is the circumstance that people often rate their own intake of healthy food as much higher than their estimated objective intake (Lechner et al. 1997).

Food is an ingrained part of an individual’s social and cultural heritage and gives the person her/his social identity. Therefore, social, cultural and faith perceptions of food and traditions around dishes are difficult to change.

The presented risk discourses and examples highlight the considerable gap between how risk assessment experts motivate, define and evaluate risks in contrast to members of the public.

Risks around food are complex, as multiple factors contribute to explain consumers’ reluctance to accept experts’ risk assessments.

Information becomes irrelevant and useless for consumers, if it fails to target particular needs or interests. Thus, the inability by experts to explain and to communicate risk analysis to lay people is a significant constraint in bridging the gap in risk perception.

References


V. INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND VIOLENCE
15. From Citizenship to Cit(y)zenship: Social policies and the new role of cities

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Introduction

The territorial dimension of social citizenship and the role of cities as building blocks of social inclusion strategies have long been neglected in comparative social policy analysis. Conversely in urban studies the importance of national regulatory systems has been underplayed and the nested nature of cities has been disregarded. This is surprising given the fact that etymologically and historically citizenship is correlated to cities, the places where citizens as bearers of rights and duties were forged (Weber [1921] 1972; Häsüssermann and Haila 2005). Many scholars took for granted that citizenship systems were tied to the national level. The inclusion in redistributive communities defining the borders of social citizenship developed mainly through nationally regulated social insurance programmes, which still absorb most resources for social policies.

Especially since the 1990s, social policies have undergone important changes, redrawning the boundaries of “social citizenship” and giving a more prominent role to cities. Intense reform activity changed on the one hand the territorial dimension at which social policies are designed, managed, funded, and implemented; and on the other hand, it increased the number and type of actors involved in these activities (Kazepov 2010). The joint effect of these two processes brought about a decentralization of regulatory powers and an increased role for non-governmental actors. The aim of this contribution is to explore the potential impact of these changes on the boundaries of citizenship, considering the relevance gained by cities and subnational scales. This will be done by considering the existing differences among citizenship systems as pre-structuring and enabling contexts in which specific outcomes might be favoured. More specifically, in the first section, the relationship between citizenship, social policies, and the production of scale will be addressed, showing how changing regulatory boundaries define redistributive communities with different spatial configurations. In the second section, four scalar regimes will be presented. They complement a nationalization with a more territorialized view of citizenship models. The third section provides a synthetic overview of the opportunities and challenges of these processes. The assumption is that these are unevenly distributed across countries and that they
bring about diverging outcomes. In the conclusion, a plea for a new research agenda is made for disentangling the effects of policies at different territorial levels and the way they influence the role of cities, their resources, and their capacities for social innovation.

1. Shifting boundaries of citizenship, drivers of change, scales, and ambiguities

For decades, within the framework of a Fordist and Keynesian welfare state (Jessop 2008), regulative power pertained to the national level. However, in the last three decades different scales have been gaining relevance, going beyond the mere role of executors of social policy and starting to erode this national prerogative: cities in particular (Kazepov 2005; Ranci et al. 2014), due also to the spread of localized social services. The debate over the concept of scale can help us to interpret such a transformation. Scales are “the result of marking territories . . . through boundaries and enclosures, documents and rules, enforcing agents and their authoritative resources” (Marston et al. 2005, p. 420).

The debate over the drivers of these changes is difficult to disentangle, as it relates to complex processes that can be interpreted in very different ways. We will establish some links among different literature strains to enhance our understanding of the increasing relevance of cities in the territorial organisation of social policies and the implications of this.

The scale debate started in the 1990s in geography and in disciplines attentive to the “spatial” dimensions of social phenomena. Political economy explanations argue that rescaling processes are driven by the need to create conditions favourable to capital accumulation (Somerville 2004). In particular, rescaling is seen as the attempt to find a new territorial fix to the development of capitalism (Peck and Tickell 1994; Brenner 2004); i.e., new scales at which regulatory settings favour the development of a neoliberal frame for economic activities.

When we add a citizenship perspective to the concept of scale we become aware of the important role welfare policies play in drawing boundaries. Defining access criteria to specific benefits includes or excludes individuals and groups. Social policies structured national redistributive communities thanks to the state power to define regulative frames, allocating rights and redistributing resources (Kazepov 2010). The rescaling of citizenship implies that the territorial bond of political (redistributive) communities is changing scale both upwards to supranational bodies (e.g., the EU) and downwards to subnational bodies (regions and cities) (Ferrera 2005).

The processes of change are multifaceted, and labelling them as all-encompassing processes of neoliberalisation might be stretching a good concept too far (Le Galès 2016). Drivers of change might be demographic (e.g., ageing,
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migration), economic (women’s participation in the labour market), or related to the internal working logic of specific policies like old age pensions, which rely on actuarial calculations of risk factors. Not all changes are related to the neoliberalization of social policies—even though they have similar consequences; i.e., a critique of (national) welfare states and a praise for “going local.”

Examples of the complexity of the processes at stake and their ambiguity can be found in several policy areas and their reforms. Labour market activation measures are a good example: on the one hand, they might be justified by a growing stigmatisation of welfare dependency and fear of the related costs (Serrano Pascual and Magnusson 2007), but on the other hand, they might be based on the awareness that passive measures alone may contribute to the consolidation of disadvantage. The focus can be either on recipients’ duties and on conditionality, or on the development of capabilities and being seen as a right (Lødemel and Trickey 2001). What is crucial for our argument is that—notwithstanding the differences—both perspectives share the decentralized design of activation measures and the involvement of new actors at the local level.

The outcome of their interplay differs from context to context, and pre-existing institutional structures and actors influence their differentiated implementation, impact, and scalar configurations.

2. Towards a territorialized citizenship regimes perspective

In order to describe how citizenship regimes are territorially organized through specific social policy arrangements, I will briefly provide an illustration of the main characteristics of the following four scalar frames, which emerged from previous research (Kazepov 2010): 1) Countries in which a strong local autonomy is centrally framed; 2) Countries with a strong national/central frame; 3) Countries with a strong regional (or federal) frame; 4) Countries with mixed and hybrid configurations. These scalar configurations have been identified considering regulatory power, funding, and implementation responsibilities, and they intersect with the horizontal dimension of subsidiarity. The role played by profit and nonprofit actors varies at the different territorial levels as the type of partnership.

2.1. Local autonomy centrally framed countries

In “local autonomy centrally framed” countries the regulative responsibility belongs to the central state, while management and funding of social welfare policy is in general up to municipalities, which enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Institutional stakeholders play a role in national bargaining, while private providers have a contracted role in the delivery of some local measures. Finland, Norway, and Sweden are characterized at different degrees by this scalar frame (Sellers and Lidström 2007). The vertical dimension usually involves just two tiers (often
national and municipal), with a division by function between the legislative and planning powers on the one side (state), and the management and delivery responsibility on the other side (local tiers). National coordination is legally enforced so that local governments cannot deny benefits and services for eligible claimants (Minas and Øverbaye 2010). As far as the horizontal dimension is concerned, social partners are important actors at the national level, with formal and informal coordination arenas, while at the local level the scope of private actors is usually contractualized and targeted to the provision of individualized measures (from activation on the labour market to home care). The primacy of public actors remains relevant, although in some cases it is complemented with quasi-market delivery patterns. Territorial variations are relevant, especially along an urban/rural divide; e.g., in terms of employability or the provision of services for specific disadvantaged groups.

2.2. Centrally framed countries

In “centrally framed” countries the legislative power and relevant funding and management responsibilities are up to the central state, and the room for manoeuvre available to sub-national units is comparatively low. Civil society organizations do have a bargaining role at the national level, and are involved in the development of national measures. France stands out as an example of this regime type. Notwithstanding a process of decentralization of financing and delivery (e.g., in activation policies), benefits and criteria are still heavily regulated by national norms (e.g., access criteria to last-resort benefits, RSA) (Künzel 2012). However, this is not enough to limit local unevenness, given the plurality of needs, socio-economic conditions, and mixes of measures that can be found at the local level. Despite that formal entitlements are guaranteed in a standard way across the country, an unequal outcome in terms of accessibility and protection might emerge from contextual differences.

2.3. Regionally framed countries

In “regionally framed” countries the regulative responsibility belongs predominantly to a mid-level subnational tier (e.g., Swiss Kantons, Italian regioni, German Länder, Spanish comunidades autónomas), which can have exclusive legislative responsibility in some policy areas (e.g., social assistance and labour market policies). Managing and funding responsibilities are allocated at different subnational tiers, even though the real divide concerns the type of subsidiarity; i.e., active when they receive also the resources needed to meet their responsibilities, or passive, when meeting the responsibilities is not backed up by adequate resources. Many measures in Mediterranean regionalist countries (Spain and Italy) show that low coverage and a lack of generosity go hand in hand with a local definition of criteria characterized by poor national entitle-
ments and no legally enforceable social rights (Eardley et al. 1996, p. 170). High territorial disparities are reinforced by a lack of coordination and further decentralisation processes. In active subsidiarity countries (e.g., Germany, Switzerland), private—mostly non-profit—partners not only retain social responsibilities but also receive resources to meet them. In passive subsidiarity countries (e.g., Italy), they retain social responsibilities, but compensate for missing public services without having adequate resources.

2.4. Countries with mixed and hybrid frames

Countries with “mixed and hybrid frames” are less consolidated than other territorial regimes, and are usually characterized by relevant path-changes that occurred in the last few decades. As a path-dependent outcome from previous socialist regimes, regulative responsibility usually belongs to the national state. In some countries (e.g., Poland) decentralization processes gained momentum as part of democratization processes, with a neoliberal turn targeting efficiency and performance. Institutional isomorphism—e.g., through the role of European institutions defining specific access criteria inspired by the subsidiarity principle (Ferry and McMaster 2005)—might also have played a role. Private actors usually play a broad and increasing role at the local level—following a process both of democratization and of marketization that boosts for-profit and non-profit actors. This frame fits most Central and Eastern European countries, even though many of them did not prioritize the establishment and empowerment of subnational authorities but just decentralized some policy areas, such as health (see Saltman et al. 2007). Poland was an exception when in 1990 it began public administration reforms (Kulesza 2002), changing the sub-national organization of powers and the scalar arrangements in social policies, thus undermining the steering role of the national government (Cerami 2006). Unclear directions of change are mirrored by a fragmentation of citizenship rights at the local level.

2.5. Changing scales, path dependency, and the subsidiarisation process

The magnitude and the direction of scalar changes might vary and should not be taken for granted, given decentralization is not a homogeneous trend.

Figure 1 shows the main changes in the territorial configurations in four countries (Italy, Finland, France, and Poland), considered as exemplars of the territorial regimes described above, for three policies: social assistance, elderly care, and active labour market policies. These are usually service intensive and maximize territorialisation effects, especially if compared to cash-based measures (e.g., pension schemes) that are managed at the central level.
Since the mid-1990s these policies have undergone reforms affecting both their regulating principles and their multilevel governance networks. It shows that some countries display a stronger resilience to change than others, and that even where changes take place, the role of different scales can diverge. In Finland local authorities have gained momentum since the mid-1990s, but with more recent reforms the state has regained a more prominent and steering role (Kröger 2011). The French case shows that decentralization processes only marginally touched the general power balance among scales. Italian welfare reforms paved the way for a major scalar regime shift from a centralist state towards a regionalist configuration, challenged now by recent austerity measures. In Poland, the political regime shift and EU access were accompanied by the construction of new scalar configurations (Kazepov 2010). The only common trend across the four countries is the increasing role for lower tiers of government and their local welfare systems in the actual accessibility of social rights.

3. The challenges of subsidiarity: Between scale changes and new governance arrangements

The rescaling of social policies has often gone hand in hand with organizational reforms at the horizontal level and the implication of a redefinition of the role of profit and non-profit actors at the local urban level through outsourcing, partner-
ing, and quasi-market reforms. Both have brought about opportunities and challenges for localized governance networks and the delivery of social welfare in all citizenship systems.

In general, the opportunities emerging are mainly related to the new roles that local actors (both public and private) are gaining, which allows a better decoding of needs (Moulaert et al. 2010) and the pooling of resources, including voluntary work by civil society, considered able to overcome the deficits of public institutions thanks to its innovative practices (Oosterlynk et al. 2013). This makes cities again laboratories for social policy innovation (Gerometta et al. 2005), not just for implementing measures defined at other territorial levels.

Several challenges also emerge. A first challenge relates to the coordination of the multitude of actors—both private and public—acting at different territorial levels. This increases the number of spaces of discretion, as well as conflicts and potential policy implosion (vetoes, policy stagnation) (Øverbye et al. 2010). A second challenge derives from the institutionalization of territorial socio-economic disparities consolidating differentiated practices in differentiated rights (Musterd and Ostendorf 1998; McEven and Moreno 2005). This becomes particularly problematic when no equalization measures exist to rebalance uneven distribution of resources, and it leaves cities alone in managing social problems that are usually the result of supra-local socio-economic transformations. A third challenge pertains to the multiplication of actors and their territorial fragmentation, which tends to weaken the democratic control over actors’ responsibilities and their accountability (Crouch 2004; Bovens 2007; Brodkin 2008). This brings about multilevel conflicts and the spread of blame-avoiding strategies of nation-states passing the buck of retrenchment to cities or non-public actors, thus fostering passive subsidiarity. A fourth challenge relates to the ambiguities of civil society’s role, which does not necessarily “represent” the “excluded” and produces rather unstable innovative practices (Oosterlynck et al. 2013).

The mix and extent of these opportunities and challenges is highly context sensitive and depends on the interplay between intra-national structural socio-economic divides, the state’s redistributive capacities, and socio-political specificities and reforms.

**Disentangling the impact of trends: Towards a new research agenda**

In order to investigate the complex processes of subsidiarisation and their implications in different contexts, we need to consider the autonomy and resources that territorialized citizenship systems have. Despite the recent devolution and decentralization processes, most welfare systems still rely on regulations existing at the national level. Citizenship systems have evolved towards complex multiple governance arrangements in which passive contributory-based policies (e.g., unemployment benefits) are still defined at the national level in most countries, while
activation policies, in-kind provisions, and innovative experimental projects are defined predominantly at the local level. It is for this very reason that the national states’ influence on urban and sub-national policies is still relevant in all European cities, and local welfare systems are more coherent with national welfare systems than one might expect (Kazepov 2005, 2010). These contextual opportunity structures (Hay 2002) might favour some developments rather than others, and some countries might be institutionally or economically better equipped than others. Some might favour and upscale innovation more easily or be more flexible to change. The ability to contrast the challenges is also not equally distributed.

One of the major challenges for new research will be to disentangle the interplay between the different contextual conditions, the types of social innovation which emerge at the local level, and their chances to be up-scaled. It is their interplay that defines who will included and who will be excluded at different territorial levels, and the way in which rescaling and the new governance arrangements will affect the outcome. In this respect, a territorialized view of citizenship systems will help our understanding of the role played by cities and local welfare systems in the processes of inclusion and exclusion, and may help in developing research hypotheses. Synergies among public institutions, private organizations, and civil society, as well as the conditions to realize them, are intrinsically different. To explore how this develops in the different contexts and investigating what kinds of impacts it may give rise to, is not an easy task but one worth pursuing.

Note

This contribution is a revised and shortened version of “The territorial dimension of social policies and the new role of cities,” written with E. Barberis and forthcoming in Kennett, P. & Lendvai, N. (eds.) (2017) Handbook of European Social Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.

References


16. Racism and Everyday Bordering

*Nira Yuval-Davis*

RC05 Racism, Nationalism, and Ethnic Relations

The majority vote of the British people to leave the European Union in summer 2016 (“Brexit”) caught almost everyone by surprise—the stock market that bet on the UK remaining in the EU, the British government which did not even bother to prepare contingency plans in case of Brexit, and even the leaders of the Brexit camp, like Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson, had prepared speeches for defeat rather than for their unforeseen success.

Analysis of Brexit—the reasons the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, decided to go ahead with it in the first place, the ways the campaign developed and the role the British media played in it, as well as the effect this referendum is going to have on European and global politics, economy, and society, will no doubt occupy social scientists and especially sociologists for a long time to come. However, in this paper, I am going to examine some of the reasons different sections of British society voted for Brexit and link these with recent developments with the ways people and governments are being engaged in racialised political projects of belonging. My overall argument is that Brexit should be analysed in the context of people’s and governments’ reactions to what I’ve called elsewhere (2012) “the double crisis of governability and governmentality.” Particularly significant here are the turning of many traditional Labour voters, especially in the north of the UK, to vote UKIP (the party that called for Britain to leave the EU), and the fact that among those who voted for the UK to leave the EU have been quite a few members of racialised minorities of settled immigrants, mostly from countries that used to be part of the British Empire. These two populist responses need to be seen on the background of the British 2014 & 2016 Immigration Acts which, as my colleagues and I have argued elsewhere (2016, forthcoming), have established the technology of “everyday bordering” as the primary technology for controlling diversity and discourses on diversity, which is aimed to undermine convivial pluralist multicultural social relations which were the aim of previous technologies of control of British governments in previous decades.

The structure of the paper, therefore, will be the following:

Firstly, I shall explain briefly the double crisis which I see as the overall context to contemporary forms of racialisation. I shall then turn to everyday bordering as a reactive government technology of control which in its turn is contributing, as well as being affected by, autochthonic political projects of
belonging which I see as the predominant form of contemporary racialisations. In the conclusion of the paper I shall draw together the issues examined in the paper and the social and political dynamics of Brexit, and link them to our understating of racism and racialisation, pointing out the crucial role of intersectional analysis in the understanding of contemporary forms of racialisation discourses.

The double crisis

Neoliberal globalisation emerged in a period of global optimism after the fall of the Soviet Union and the supposed victory (“end of history,” to quote Fukuyama, 1992) of democracy, freedom, and a cosmopolitan world in which social, national, and state borders were on the wane.

A quarter of a century later, we find ourselves in a world in which deregulation and globalisation have been used to enhance global social inequalities, within as well as between societies, and deepening systemic signs of neoliberalism’s multifaceted systemic global political and economic crisis, a crisis that is central to relationships between states and societies and to constructions of subjectivity and thus needs to be seen as a double related crisis of both governability and governmentality (Yuval-Davis, 2012).

As the recent economic crisis has shown, the growing entanglement and dependency not only of local and global markets but also of local private and public institutions has meant that various states have been forced to bail out banks and large corporations for fear of total economic collapse—even though the capacity of state agencies to enforce regulation on that same private sector is extremely limited. As Richard Murphy (RE2011) and others have pointed out, as a result of state policies of deregulation, and the increasing privatisation of the state (including the many forms of so-called public-private partnership), in many cases it is no longer easy to draw a clear differentiation between the public and the private. Whole locations and domains which used to be part of public space—from schools to shopping areas—are no longer public, but are rather owned by or leased for a very long period to a private company or consortium of companies. Moreover, since the 1990s, the proportion of global assets that are in foreign ownership continues to rise. Furthermore, the sphere that is regarded as part of “national security,” and thus as off limits for foreign ownership, is also continuously shrinking. A French company now owns a British energy company, the Chinese are building a British nuclear power station, and British airports are owned by a Spanish company. As Will Hutton (2012) pointed out in a Guardian public debate, states are becoming small fry in comparison with international markets. The GDPs of all the states in the globe when added together total about 70 trillion dollars, while the total amount of money circulating in the global financial markets is between 600 and 700 trillion.
But this is not simply a quantitative question. Or, rather, this quantitative phenomenon is simply one aspect—though a very significant one—of the problems that result from the basic legal relationship that pertains between corporations and states, whereby companies have the status of fictional citizens, which enables the people who run them—through their “Ltd” affix—to escape responsibility for the results of their corporations’ actions, while retaining their ability to control the funds. In this era of increasing globalisation, the ability on the part of companies—and the people who run them—to change locations, base themselves in tax havens, and escape having to bear the social, economic, environmental, and other consequences of their actions, is becoming ever clearer—in the Global North as well as the Global South; and the rhetoric of governments on budget days has very little impact on their activities. Moreover, while states have been forced to bail out banks to avoid major economic collapse (given the growing lack of differentiation between private and public financial sectors), states themselves—such as Greece, Ireland, and others—have found themselves forced to cut their own budgets severely, against the interests of their citizens.

Thus, the crisis of governability is a result of the fact that in the time of neoliberal globalisation, governments cannot anymore primarily represent the interests of their citizens. The crisis of governmentality follows this crisis of governability, because when people feel that their interests are not pursued by their governments—even the most radical ones, like in Greece—they feel disempowered and deprived. After a while they also stop buying the neoliberal ideology which tells them that it is their responsibility if they fail to be healthy and wealthy, to provide for their families and become part of the incredibly rich and famous. Saskia Sassen (2015) has argued that, as a result of neoliberal globalisation, rather than experiencing an overall weakening, the liberal state has changed internally: executive powers have strengthened at the expense of legislative branches. This is partly as a direct result of the privatisation of the state, whereby a substantial number of the regulative tasks of the legislature have been lost; and it is partly because it is the executive branch that virtually exclusively negotiates with other national and supranational governance executives (such as the EU, the UN, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation), and with private, national, and especially transnational corporations.

This is an important observation, which offers some explanation of the governmentality crisis: because of the increasing power of the executive, there is growing disenchantment and alienation from the state on the part of citizens, who accordingly begin to refrain from internalising and complying with the neoliberal state’s technologies of governance. This disenchantment is particularly important in countries where voting in national elections is solely for the election of members of parliament, rather than also for the head of the executive (although, as the recent local elections in the UK and Germany have shown, it can be evident there as well). At the same time, in parliamentary democracies
the right to rule the state is dependent on formal endorsement by the electorate of particular parties; this is what gives the state legitimacy. Hence the growing worry of governments at the lack of involvement of the electorate in these processes.

The growing securitisation and militarisation of the liberal state is directly related to the fear within ruling elites that arises from this crisis of governmentality. The forms of resistance to this crisis, however, vary widely—depending on people’s intersected positionings, identifications, and normative values: they can be more or less violent, more or less radical, more or less guided by primordial as opposed to cosmopolitan value systems.

This is the time in which it becomes very easy to shift responsibility to those who “do not belong”—the migrants or anyone else who has a different look, accent, culture, and religion.

On this background, those of us who have been working on issues of racism, nationalism, and ethnic relations find ourselves with new challenges, with the combined emergence of everyday bordering as a technology of control of diversity and discourses on diversity and autochthonic populist politics of belonging in a growing number of places on the globe, to produce new forms of intersectional racist practices.

**Everyday bordering**

Barth (1998) and others following him have argued that it is the existence of ethnic (and racial) boundaries, rather than of any specific “essence” around which these boundaries are constructed, that is crucial in processes of ethnocisation and racialisation. Any physical or social signifier can be used to construct the boundaries which differentiate between “us” and “them.” State borders are but one of the technologies used to construct and maintain these boundaries. It is for this reason that contemporary border studies largely refer to “borderings,” rather than to borders, seeing them more as dynamic, shifting, and contested social and political spatial processes linked to particular political projects rather than just as territorial lines (Houtum et al., 2005). However, these borders and boundaries are not just top-down macro social and state policies, but are present in everyday discourses and practices of different social agents, from state functionaries to the media to all other differentially positioned members of society (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, & Cassidy, forthcoming).

Everyday bordering has been developing as the technology of control of diversity by governments which have been seeking to supposedly reassert control over the composition and security of the population. Instead of borders being at the point of moving from one state to another, borders have now spread to be everywhere. All citizens are required to become untrained unpaid border guards, and more and more of us are becoming suspects as illegal, or at least
illegitimate, border crossers. This has been a tendency that has been developing for quite a few years, probably since 9/11 if not before, but the 2014 and 2016 UK Immigration Acts have clinched this. Now, every landlord, every employer, every teacher, every doctor is responsible to verify that her or his tenants, employees, students, patients are legally in the country, and if they don’t, they are legally responsible and might even go to prison for failing to do so (unlike those who are trained and paid to do this job). Thus, from a convivial, multicultural, diverse society, this technology of control is breeding suspicion, fear, and sensitisation of the boundaries between those who belong and those who do not. Brexit has only enhanced this sense of differentiation and hierarchisation among people.

**Autochthonic politics of belonging**

Peter Geschiere (2009) defined autochthonic politics as the global return to the local. It relates to a kind of racialisation that has gained new impetus under globalisation and mass immigration and can be seen as a form of temporal-territorial racialisation, of exclusion and inferiorisation that are the outcome of the relatively new presence of particular people and collectivities in particular places (neighbourhood, region, country). The Greek word “autochthony” (= to be of the soil) is used in the Netherlands and in the Francophone world, where the crucial difference is between the “autochthones” who belong and the “allochthones” who do not.

Geschiere (ibid: 21–2) rightly claims that “autochthony” can be seen as a new phase of ethnicity, although in some sense it even surpasses ethnicity (see also Yuval-Davis, 2011). While ethnicity is highly constructed and relationally and situationally circumscribed, there are limits to these reconstructions regarding name and history. Autochthony is a much more “empty” and thus elastic notion. It states no more than “I was here before you,” and, as such, can be applied in any situation and can be constantly redefined and applied to different groupings in different ways. It combines elements of naturalisation of belonging with vagueness as to what constitutes the essence of belonging, and thus can be pursued also by groups which would not necessarily be thought to be autochthone by others.

The notion of autochthonic politics of belonging is very important when we come to understand contemporary populist extreme-right politics in Europe and elsewhere. The people who follow these politics continuously argue that they are “not racist,” although they are very much against all those who “do not belong.” In some cases, such as in the case of the English Defence League, the organisation has formally both Jewish and gay sections, as well as Hindu, Sikh, and Afro-Carribean supporters, something unimaginable in the older kind of extreme-right organisations with neo-Nazi ideologies. In France, Marine Le
Pen, who is the current leader of Front National, originally led by her father, goes to great lengths to deny that her party is racist, anti-Semitic, or homophobic. She claims that “the right-left divide makes no sense anymore. Now the real division is between nationalism and globalization.” Thus she warns of the “dilution” and “wiping out” of the French nation and civilisation, under threat from “never-ending queues of foreigners” (2011).

Autochthonic politics of belonging can take very different forms in different countries and can be reconfigured constantly also in the same places. Nevertheless, like any other forms of racialisation and other boundary constructions, their discourses always appear to express self-evident or even “natural” emotions and desires: the protection of ancestral heritage, the fear of being contaminated by foreign influences, and so on, although they often hide very different notions of ancestry and contamination.

**Racism, everyday bordering, and autochthonic politics of belonging**

As described above, both everyday bordering and autochthonic populist politics can be seen as forms of racialisation. The process of racialisation involves discourses and practices which construct immutable boundaries between homogenised and reified collectivities. These boundaries are used to naturalise fixed hierarchical power relations between these collectivities. Any signifier of boundaries can be used to construct these boundaries, from the colour of the skin to the shape of the elbow, to accent or mode of dress. (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Murji & Solomos, 2005).

Racialisations have ultimately two logics—that of exclusion, the ultimate form of which is genocide, and that of exploitation, the ultimate logic of which is slavery. However, in most concrete historical situations these two logics are practiced in a complementary way. Since the 1980s there has been a lot of discussion on the rise of what Barker (1982) called “the new racism” and Balibar (2005) “racisme differentialiste.” Unlike the “old” racism, these kinds of racialisation discourses focused not on notions of “races” or of other kinds of different ethnic origins, but on different cultures, religions, and traditions which were seen as threatening to “contaminate” or “overwhelm” the cultural “essence” of “the nation.”

Everyday bordering links racialisation formally to citizenship status, but underlying this is a mythical nostalgic imaginary in which all citizens are members of the nation, and the boundaries of civil society overlap the boundaries of the nation as well as the state. This is the same logic as that of autochthonic populism, in which only those who “belong” should have access to state and other social, economic, and political resources. In this sense they encompass the logic of “racisme differentialiste.” However, these forms of racialisation exist in the context of neoliberal globalisation and “the age of migration” (2003), in
which a variety of ethnic and racial communities have migrated and settled, constructing pluralist multicultural societies and citizenships. It is for this reason that many contemporary populist imaginaries, as we have seen above, have incorporated some of this social heterogeneity as long as that social heterogeneity does not threaten hegemonic political projects of belonging, and thus they can claim of “not being racist.” Indeed, David Goldberg (2015), has linked the spread of the “postracial society” notion as the logic and condition that enables racism to persist and proliferate.

It is for this reason that some members of racialised minorities who have settled in the UK—especially those who arrived before the 1981 Nationality Act and were, as coming from countries that used to be part of the British Empire, entitled to an automatic right to settle and gain UK citizenship—have voted for Brexit, feeling that in the Brexit political project of belonging they can belong more than in the EU political project, in which they saw themselves as racialised outsiders. They could thus join the Brexit autochthonic political project of belonging.

The motivation of members of settled racialised minorities in the UK to vote for Brexit is just one particular situated motivation that brought people to vote for Brexit from different sections of British society. This is why a situated intersectional analysis (Yuval-Davis, 2015; but see also Crenshaw, 1991; Lutz et al., 2011, Hill-Collins & Bilge, 2016) is so central in examining social, political, cultural, and economic relations. Homogenisations and reifications of collectivities are essential parts of racialisation processes. Any deconstruction and opposition to such racialised imaginaries need to recognise that different people belong in different ways to their collectivities and have different power positionings, different emotional attachments, and different normative evaluations of them. They are even racist in different ways!

References


17. The Reflexive Turn in the Sociological Study of the Military

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Introduction

The idea of reflexivity as a surveillance tool in research has been flourishing in the social sciences over the past four decades. But this has not been the case in the social scientific study of the military, where a relative absence of reflexivity in research practices and processes has been identified (Higate and Cameron, 2006). However, recent work in the field reveals a different trend, which can trigger a reflexive turn in the sociological study of the military.

The paper aims to uncover the meaning and importance of reflexivity for the social scientific study of the military, both in terms of past practices—through a selective report on the state of the field—and in terms of the futures we want for this research area.

It argues that far from being a constraint, reflexivity is the very condition for the production of social scientific knowledge and for asserting the validity and reliability of research results. As such, it is a path to be followed and strengthened by those who study the military and its relationship with the broader society.

What is reflexivity?

In the specialized literature, reflexivity is usually associated with three referents: agency, society, and science (Archer, 2003; Giddens, 2004). It can refer to the general ability of all individuals to reflect upon themselves in the world; to having institutions and social structures as a referent, in particular with regard to their norms, values, conduct, and the effects of their actions; and it can also refer to scientific practice and be understood as an epistemological surveillance tool.

With regard to this last dimension—the one at stake in this paper—the focus of reflexivity is mainly directed at four different domains: external dimensions, scientific field, research processes, and research effects (Berger, 2015; Bourdieu, 2004; Gouldner, 1970; Mauthner and Doucet, 2003; Wasserfall, 1993; May and Perry, 2011). External dimensions refers to the impact that
structural factors, exterior to the scientific field, can have on the production of knowledge. These factors include the researchers’ social origins, social class, gender, race, sexual orientation, as well as their social trajectories, values, and identities. The scientific field dimension concerns the location of the discipline in the social sciences field, as well as the position that researchers occupy within this disciplinary field and in the narrower subfield of the institution where they develop their work. The research process focus is on reflexivity as a tool to make explicit the effect of research contexts and positions on aspects such as the choice of research topics, theoretical frameworks, methodological approaches, access to the field, relationship with the participants, and the way the data are collected and interpreted (Adkins, 2009; Berger, 2015; Day, 2012; Finlay, 2002; Mauthner and Doucet, 2003; Pillow, 2003). Effects of social research refers to the internal and external impacts of research. The process of data collection and the dissemination of results can both affect research contexts—such as the stimulus of participants’ reflexivity (individual and/or collective), disruption of contextual dynamics, and changes in perceptions, routines, and practices—and produce a number of social consequences and impacts, raising explicit ethical and deontological questions (Brannen, 1988, 1993; Caetano, 2015; Finlay, 2002; Wasserfall, 1993).

In all these senses, reflexivity can be mobilized as a critical instrument, more or less oriented towards social change, and simultaneously as a means for epistemological, methodological, and ethical surveillance, which enables the researcher to anticipate and thus guide and exercise a certain degree of control over the social effects of the knowledge that is produced.

The field of armed forces and society: How reflexive has it been?

In one of the few articles where the question of reflexivity in the social scientific study of the military is explicitly addressed, Higate and Cameron argue that, unlike what happens in social science in general, the effect of the reflexivity concept on military studies has remained marginal (Higate and Cameron, 2006). In their view, this surprising neglect is mainly the result of two factors: the dominant positivist epistemological foundation of the discipline, which assumes the possibility of neutralizing the so-called researcher bias, and the impact of research on explicit military agendas oriented towards making the armed forces more efficient and effective, thus promoting an engineering rather than an enlightenment model of social research. While appraising the interdisciplinary diversity and the intellectual vibrancy of the field, the authors point to the fact that “rarely, if ever, have military sociologists explicitly treated reflexivity as both a resource and a topic in their work” (Higate and Cameron, 2006: 219).

This is an accurate diagnosis if one thinks of the external and research process dimensions of reflexivity, and especially if one focuses on the research-
er’s role and positionality (as the authors do). In this sense, even a quick literature review in the field of armed forces and society reveals a general absence of concern regarding this domain of reflexivity.

However, a broader vision of the concept—encompassing other dimensions scrutinized above, namely the scientific field dimension—allows for a somewhat different understanding. Even if there has been limited use of the concept, it is nonetheless important to acknowledge a variety of works where reflexivity has been practiced, even if not explicitly framed as such or used in the above sense of a tool for enlightenment.

Attempts at framing the identity of military sociology, or the broader area of armed forces and society, have been overwhelmingly directed towards mapping theoretical and methodological frameworks and identifying core concepts, models, and tools used by the researchers. These efforts have focused on 1) identifying the object and shifts in attention in the study of war and the military, mainly, but not exclusively, through state of the art accounts (Lang, 1972; Harries-Jenkins and Moskos, 1981; Edmonds, 1988; Kurtz, 1992; Kümmel and Prüfert, 2000; Callaghan and Kernic, 2003; Caforio, 2006; Kestnbaum, 2009); 2) understanding the social, institutional, and intellectual factors that explain the visibility, salience, or neglect of war and the military as research objects (Dandeker, 2000; Ender and Gibson 2005; Malesevic, 2010); and 3) examining the position of military sociology within the scientific discipline of sociology as a whole or its interdisciplinary configuration (Caforio, 2007). The reflexive practice in the field has thus developed firmly around the cognitive dimension, with a focus on the evolution of research topics and paradigms. Without attempting a complete review, it is nonetheless illuminating to identify some of these efforts in greater detail, for illustrative purposes.

One of the first systematic efforts at reflexivity, simultaneously aiming at enhancing a comparative and international approach, is the volume Military Sociology: The Richness of a Discipline, edited by Gerhard Kummel and Andreas Prufert in 2000 (Kümmel and Prüfert, 2000). It collects a variety of contributions on the development and state of military sociology in various countries, as well as a selective mapping of research topics. As in previous works that offered an overview of the military domain in the social sciences (Lang 1972; Harries-Jenkins and Moskos, 1981; Kuhlmann, 1989; Edmonds, 1988), the starting point for this volume is the recognition of the interdisciplinary status of military sociology, considered to be a rich and multi-faceted discipline and not just a mere “hyphen-sociology”; that is, a sub-discipline of sociology.

During the following decade, various other publications followed a similar reflexive path. In Armed Forces and International Security: Global Trends and Issues, Callaghan and Kernic assembled a large collection of articles that trace major trends in the development of the study of the armed forces and society since World War II, as well as recent trends and issues in military sociology and
civil–military relations, in what the editors called *an encyclopedic overview* (Callaghan and Kernic, 2003). Two years later, Eric Ouellet brought together military sociologists from eight countries to discuss and illustrate new directions for military sociology in *New Directions in Military Sociology* (Ouellet, 2005). Besides examining the foundations of military sociology, the book aimed to elucidate the potential contributions of interpretative sociology and allied approaches to the study of military affairs. In 2006, Caforio’s edited *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* consolidated the trend towards deepening the cognitive scrutiny. One year later, another edited volume by the same author, *Social Sciences and the Military: An Interdisciplinary Overview*, elucidated the need to develop interdisciplinary and cross-national studies of the military, underlining the “superiority of an examination of the subject of investigation from different vantage points” (Caforio, 2007: 15). Still another example of this reflexive mode is Kestnbaum’s overview of the “Sociology of War and the Military,” where distinct historical patterns of transformation and development of scholarship domains in the field are examined. (Kestnbaum, 2009: 238).

In the same cognitive vein but with a more specific focus, a variety of works have attempted to define the scope and borders of the field by collecting contributions considered to be representative, such as readers, or by reflecting on reproduction and dissemination mechanisms, as in the case of teaching and publication. Examples of the first category can be found in the reader *The Sociology of the Military* (Caforio, 1998), a collection of essays, including some of the discipline’s most significant studies, on topics from the founding fathers to the most recent writings in the contemporary sociology of the military. A more recent publication is Burk and Segal’s *Military Sociology* (Burk and Segal, 2012). In this four-volume collection, the authors survey the field around four major themes: organization, civil–military relations, direct or mediated experience of war, and the use and control of force.

Examples of the second category—the focus on teaching and dissemination—include articles that present a twofold inquiry: on the one hand, the place of topics related to war and military sociology in sociology textbooks (Ender and Gibson, 2005), and on the other, the way these are included in military curricula. Worth mentioning here is a special issue of *Armed Forces & Society* on teaching sociology at military academies around the globe, aimed at providing “depth and breadth to the understanding of sociology in military officer education” (Segal, 2008: 11).

Among the variety of contributions to this *scientific field* domain of reflexivity it is possible to already detect efforts to address aspects pertaining to the *external* and *research effects* dimensions, such as the use or publication of sociological findings, the characteristics of researchers, the relation to institutional frameworks, and the diverse paths that research configurations take in different parts of the world.
However, it was only in the second decade of the twenty-first century that greater attention came to be directed towards the research process dimension of reflexivity and systematic explorations of methodological questions developed. The scope and rhythm of such explorations seem to justify the identification of a new trend, one we may call a reflexive turn in the sociological study of the military.

The reflexive turn in the sociology of the military

During the second decade of the twenty-first century, interest in the research process dynamics in military studies received a sudden boost. Different works raised questions from the point of view of the positionality of researchers (Henry, Higate and Sanghera, 2009) or their engagement with the military (Ben-Ari, 2011). Following the organization of panels and debates in major conferences, two other volumes were published that represent a turning point in terms of reflexivity in the study of the military. The first was Qualitative Methods in Military Studies (Carreiras and Castro, 2013), which was soon followed by The Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies (Soeters, Shields and Ritjens, 2014).

In Qualitative Methods in Military Studies, Carreiras and Castro bring together researchers with different disciplinary, geographic, and intellectual backgrounds to reflect on the conditions under which qualitative research methods are used and how they are carried out in military-related contexts. The book is explicitly presented as an exercise in reflexivity and presents it as a way to improve the quality of, and accountability in, the research process (Carreiras and Castro, 2013: 3).

The volume Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military Studies, organized by Soeters, Shields, and Ritjens, examines a full range of methodological approaches and is one of the most comprehensive and pragmatically oriented efforts in addressing research methodologies in military studies. While it is mainly concerned with the examination of applied methodological strategies and tools, it also explicitly addresses reflexivity (Soeters, Shields and Ritjens, 2014).

In 2016, two new books were released that reinforce the orientation toward strengthening the reflexive focus, bringing new questions and perspectives into the debate. Researching the Military, edited by Carreiras, Castro, and Frederic, examines the conditions under which research takes place, not only through mapping transformations in the dynamics of the scientific field, but also through looking closely at the research process and the positionality of the researcher. A second volume, The Routledge Companion to Military Research Methods, edited by Williams, Jenkins, Rech, and Woodward, provides an overview of methodological approaches to critical studies of military personnel and institu-
tions, engaging in particular with the growth in qualitative approaches to research on military topics conducted outside military institutions.

All these developments are a promising avenue for the sociological study of the military. By enabling a better understanding of the interplay between social, scientific, and policy dynamics, such enhanced reflexivity leads to greater awareness and conscious choices regarding the future of this field of study, strengthening both its appeal to younger scholars and its ability to help us understand a complex and fascinating research object.

**Concluding remarks**

This paper examined the extent to which reflexivity has been mobilized as a tool in the social scientific study of the military, through a selective and illustrative review of the existing literature. This scrutiny revealed a dearth of explicit reference to reflexivity, a dominant focus on the *scientific field* dimension, and the emergence, in recent years, of a renewed emphasis on reflexivity more related to the *research process* domain. We considered this a promising avenue for the future. However, a note of caution is also needed with regard to the supposed virtues of reflexivity.

Reflexivity is an ongoing and unfinished process that has its own limitations. Although indispensible for the self-monitoring and self-critique of social research, reflexivity should not, on the other hand, be seen as a cognitive tool capable of solving all research obstacles (Day, 2012; Lynch, 2000; Pels, 2000). Its exercise requires particular cautiousness at two levels: it should not become a rhetorical strategy to support the credibility of the results produced, but rather an actual practice of scientific validation; and it should not be a narcissistic exercise in which the researcher gets lost in infinite processes of intellectual deconstruction (Finlay, 2002). Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that there are different degrees of reflexivity depending on the distance of the researcher from the research undertaken (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003). Certain types of reflection can only be feasible with some physical and temporal distance from the research context. Reflexivity, as a “sensitising device” that gives visibility to research components that would remain hidden if they were not the object of an inquisitive look, should focus not only on the grounds and procedures in which the production of knowledge on social reality is anchored, but also on the limitations that these elements introduce into the knowledge itself (May and Perry, 2011). This constitutes both a challenge and an agenda for future research in military studies, while at the same time enhancing cooperation and articulation with other sociological fields.
Note

This paper builds on previous work and debates on the topic of reflexivity and on the sociological study of the military, namely the contribution by Carreiras and Caetano to the volume *Researching the Military* (Carreiras, Castro and Frederic, 2016).

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VI. WORK AND PROFESSIONS
18. Shaping the Future of Work

Helen Sampson
RC30 Sociology of Work

Introduction

Paid work, Dagongzai (Lee, 1998) or “working for the boss,” is indisputably one of the central elements of contemporary life. Working conditions and the organization and management of waged work directly affect health and well-being, and for most individuals such work determines income, social class, and status. Furthermore, employment can optimistically be seen as a source of fulfilment, identity, structure, and sociality. Paid work is also fluid, however, and subject to significant transformation (positive and negative), as relations between states, capital, and labour are constantly reconfigured. Workplaces are therefore important sites for the range of historical and comparative investigations carried out under the International Sociological Association’s RC30 group.

In the old industrial world of the “North” the last 200 years have seen working conditions improve and decline like the ebb and flow of the tide. The late nineteenth century saw early regulation (e.g., the UK Factory Acts) improve appalling industrial working conditions, while mechanisation and technology brought some benefits as tasks were made easier and in some cases safer. In the early twentieth century the pendulum swung back as Taylorism, initially practiced in the factories of the United States, provided a new “assault” on the workforce. Taylor himself characterised workers as in constant conflict with employers and suggested that the “working man” devoted a considerable amount of time to seeing “just how slow he can go and still convince his employer that he is going at a good pace” (Taylor, 1998: 7). His principles of scientific management were designed to return the upper hand to employers in arming them with new techniques for measuring performance. Thus the nascent regulatory protection of workers was rapidly followed by management strategies aimed at maximizing the effort that could be extracted from them. The response to these developments by trade unions and labour movements ushered in a new period (sometimes identified as “Fordism”) with a realignment of labour relations and greater state regulation of working conditions, wages, and employment rights (Silver, 2003).

These arrangements began to break down in the 1980s and were associated with a number of political and technological changes that produced changes in work and workplace regimes. (Harvey, 2005, 2006; Munck, 2002). In a period
of “Turbo” (Luttwak, 1988) or “Casino” (Strange, 1986) capitalism, capital was released to roam the globe and jobs were moved “off shore” as multinational corporations engaged in regulatory flight (Urry, 2014). Shipping could be seen to be at the forefront of this process (Sampson, 2013), which soon became widespread in manufacturing and services. What started in clothing and textiles (Froebel et al., 1981) was expanded with automobiles (Zhang, 2015), electronics, data processing (Freeman, 1998), call centres, even diamond cutting (Cross, 2014), as new sites of “production” became established in the “South,” China, and India. Within a couple of decades the era of “globalization” was well and truly “upon us” (Friedman, 2000). For some authors this “post-Fordist” period was seen as one of great promise (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Lipietz, 1992), with the possibility of rewarding work and a new economic order. However these hopes were short-lived, and empirical investigations over the past ten years have painted a gloomier picture (Beynon, 2015).

In the old industrial North, researchers have identified how neoliberal policies have led to the erosion of workers’ rights, falling incomes, and more “precarious” occupations (Standing, 2011). Meanwhile, in the industrializing South, workers have been pressured to trade rights and standards for jobs in order to first gain a foothold in, and then remain competitive within, the global labor market. This is particularly apparent in the cargo shipping sector, where there are few significant capital costs associated with shifts by employers in and out of markets (Sampson, 2013), and it is now evident in relation to the outsourcing facilitated by Internet-based platforms, such as Upwork and Mechanical Turk, which serve as global marketplaces for IT workers engaged in so-called “digital labor.”

Increased competition for work and the pursuit by states of neoliberal economic policies have combined to ensure that wages and labour standards face considerable downward pressure. However, in something of a “perfect storm,” new technology has further increased competitive pressures on employees (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). Not only do they metaphorically joust with each other for the same jobs across vast expanses of space, and in different socioeconomic contexts, workers are now required to compete with automation as employers incorporate robots in their processes and systems. This has impacted relatively quickly on regions which have only recently received copious new investment (such as China) and is transforming both established and emerging economies. It is also influential in sectors where robotics have previously been unused, such as fast food, medicine, and law.

To add to this, we have seen new technology reinforce the capacity for employee monitoring by management (Head, 2014). New computer software systems have allowed Taylorism to “escape” to locations well beyond the factory gates, as unprecedented surveillance and monitoring have “travelled” to new workplaces as diverse as warehouses and medical centres. In universities, for
example, computerised systems allow managers to see, at the click of a mouse, which staff have completed, or failed to complete, paperwork relating to student assessment and feedback. Such “corporate panoptics” (Head, 2014: 10) have reduced the degree of autonomy that many in professional occupations previously took for granted and are generally perceived as both de-skilling and stressful.

In the context of globalization, this paper will focus on the ways in which contemporary work is being transformed as a consequence of ongoing technological change. In doing so it will reflect on the role for sociologists in documenting and analysing changes in contemporary work and the future consequences for workers and wider society.

**Competitive pressures in the global labor market: The case of digital labour**

The rise of digital labour has been dramatic and widespread (Scholtz, 2013). Tasks which might previously have been assigned to regularly employed office staff (e.g., transcribing, copy editing, data entry, legal work) have been outsourced to workers scattered across the globe via “auction” platforms hosted on websites such as Mechanical Turk (whose workers have been termed “turkers” by some) and Upwork. For some, such work is liberating in that it can be done from home and even while “at work” in another job. However, for many it is far less attractive, as workers offer their services for very low hourly rates of pay in order to undercut competitors, and then work additional, unpaid, hours to complete their assigned tasks as a result of the unrealistic pace of work which is assumed by outsourcers (often termed “requesters”) in reaching agreements.

Having interviewed approximately 150 digital workers in Africa and Asia, Graham (2016) highlighted the extent to which such “contractors” were aware of the competition that they faced for work and the tendency for this to produce a classic “race to the bottom.” He explains how “many workers had stories about the invisible ‘other’—a worker on the other side of the world who could easily take their place if they aren’t competitive... The net result is the same: a downward pressure on wages” (Graham, 2016).

Compounding the problems of low wages and strong competition for assignments, workers using outsourcing platforms encounter a range of other difficulties. They may find that wage rates are suddenly cut mid-task and/or that work is stopped with little warning, that discrimination is practised by advertisers (excluding workers from particular countries, for example), and that the only way into work is via other workers with high ratings who capture work on line and then “farm it out” in a form of labour arbitrage. Turkers and their ilk are classified as independent contractors and as such are not entitled to any employee protection such as a minimum wage (Marvit, 2014).
There are similarities between the employment status of Turkers, and/or analogous auction site workers, and those who are linked to “concierge” sites such as Uber and Task Rabbit. Here customers request a service and are then “connected” with a service provider who arrives and drives them to their destination, assembles their flat pack furniture, or runs their errands as agreed. The concierge platform takes a percentage of the fees charged, and customers rate the service they receive, thereby placing pressure on “taskers” to please the clients in order to secure future work.

In many respects these kinds of “crowdwork” are no more than “piecework for the digital age” (Marvit, 2014). The exploitation facilitated by platforms with the global reach to encourage workers from one side of the world to compete on wage terms with workers from another is largely unparalleled, however. As Marvit (2014) observes, “Inside the machine, there is an overabundance of labour, extreme competition among workers, monotonous and repetitive work, exceedingly low pay and a great deal of scamming. In this virtual world the disparities of power in employment relationships are magnified many times over” (Marvit, 2014). Such platforms therefore represent one set of significant challenges associated with technological innovation relating to paid employment, and there are yet more.

**Competing with machines: Robots at work**

Automation represents a second area where innovation has been considered by some to represent a threat to both paid jobs and to wages and conditions. Historically automation has been seen as a temporary challenge soon remedied as new forms of occupation are found for displaced workers. For those of an optimistic disposition, the real problem posed by automation is seen to be the question of how humans freed from labour by machines, and at liberty to enjoy a life of leisure, might occupy themselves (Keynes, 1963). However, in the contemporary period, as automation reaches a new phase with the development of increasingly cheap and sophisticated robotics, the evidence is less persuasive. To date automation has not delivered on the promise of freedom from work, and rising levels of inequality suggest that we are a long way from having “larger and larger classes of people from whom problems of economic necessity have been practically removed” (Keynes, 1963). On the contrary, robots are undermining very recently attained improvements in living standards for workers. In China, for example, the Taiwanese electronics giant Foxconn has recently been reported to have made 60,000 workers redundant at its Kunshan factory, reducing its local workforce by more than 50% as a result of the introduction of robots (Dean 2016: 25). In Europe and the United States, workers are equally vulnerable, with robots now capable of replacing service sector workers as readily as they replace those in manufacturing. As Ed Rensi (formerly of McDonalds...
alds) recently told the Fox Business Programme, “It’s cheaper to buy a $35,000 robotic arm than it is to hire an employee who is inefficient, making $15 an hour bagging French fries” (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-36376966).

Robotics are well established in many areas of manufacturing, and in the contemporary US auto industry it is easy to see how labour struggles to compete with machines. Here a human spot welder paid $25 per hour can be readily replaced by a robot costing the equivalent of just $8 an hour (Halpern, 2015). What is less expected however is how recent developments in robotics are allowing for the automation of very different kinds of jobs. Many medical procedures are now “robot assisted,” robots can mow your lawn, drive your car/ship/lorry, and even cook your dinner. Moreover, the kinds of tasks in which humans were once considered to hold the upper hand (e.g., translation and medical diagnosis) no longer seem invulnerable to the robot revolution. A recently published study by Frey and Osborne (2013) concludes that in as little as two decades 47% of jobs may be replaced by automated systems. The evidence of such trends has led some commentators to suggest it may well be that “humanity is on the cusp of a revolution, in which humans themselves are at risk of being made redundant” (Whipple, 2015: 13).

It seems likely, therefore, that the downward pressure on wages facilitated by capital’s relatively unfettered access to global labour markets will be exacerbated in the future by competition from increasingly skilled, deft, and versatile machines, inevitably accelerating the “race to the bottom.” However, technological innovations are not just displacing workers and placing pressure on wages, they are also transforming the experience of paid employment for many of those who remain in waged work.

**New technology and management: ‘Corporate panoptics’**

Computer-based systems developed by software manufacturers such as IBM and Oracle have not just transmuted the tasks that people are required to undertake while at work, they have also transformed their management, facilitating a new kind of Taylorism referred to by Head (2014) as “corporate panoptics.” Thus individuals who work in sectors as diverse as wholesale, retail, finance, and health care have nevertheless come to share in the experience of additional surveillance, monitoring, and target setting. Machines measure the performance of packers and shelf-stackers employed by Amazon, while at Walmart computerized “task managers” direct workers to the tasks that must be done next and state the time allocated for their completion. On the concrete aprons of the docks, “reach stacker” drivers are directed by hand-held units to the next container to be shifted while being monitored by yard managers, sited overhead in glass-fronted towers. Even in the remote setting of a cargo vessel, ploughing the central Pacific, performance is measured and managed against key performance
indicators (KPIs) relating to fuel consumption, speed, and maintenance schedules. Such surveillance and micromanagement often result in stress and low morale. Employees are made aware that those failing to meet targets will be sacked. Simultaneously, the quality of work is measured, and workers with public-facing jobs may be expected to achieve “the impossible” in terms of facilitating the increasingly rapid throughput of “clients” while achieving high satisfaction ratings. As a consequence, studies of contemporary work report that many employees are experiencing the degradation of work with very little intrinsic job satisfaction, fewer opportunities for sociability, and a high degree of pressure.

Such changes can be expected to produce poorer health outcomes for employees as autonomy is eroded and stress exacerbated (Carter et al., 2013). Notoriously, Foxconn was recently forced to erect nets at its site in Shenzhen to prevent workers committing suicide from the tops of the buildings. In trying to understand this phenomenon the technology blogger Joel Johnson observed with apparently unintended irony that “the work itself isn’t inhumane—unless you consider a repetitive, exhausting, and alienating workplace over which you have no influence or authority to be inhumane” (Johnson, 2011).

Responses to the challenges from contemporary innovations in the realm of paid labour

The rapid changes in the experiences of work which are being brought about as a result of technological innovation in combination with globalisation provide fertile ground for sociologists. In this field there has been a long-standing tradition of ethnography serving to highlight the experiences of work from the perspective of the wage labourer. Today we can build on the accumulated insights of ethnographers such as Roy (1959), Beynon (1973), Burawoy (1979), Delbridge (1998), Lee (1998), Salzinger (2003) to understand not just how work is experienced in the present day (e.g., Elliott and Long 2016; Cross 2014), but to what extent this represents change and/or continuity. At the 2016 ISA forum in Vienna, a focus on the principles of decent work (e.g., Altreiter and Ziegler) incorporated papers which highlighted the continuing importance of ethnography in the scrutiny of the experiences of work and delineated what counts as work and what kinds of work we might, as societies, aspire to. In contrast, the current sociological interest in the digital platforms which facilitate crowdworking (e.g., Bergvall-Kareborn and Howcroft, 2014) starkly reveal areas of work where innovation has outpaced regulation with largely negative consequences for contractors. In this sense we come to understand the kinds of work we might “get” as opposed to the kinds of work we might “want” in the future. These are major areas of interest for the sociology of work, but they link inexorably with
broader disciplinary interests in relation to leisure, health, inequalities, labour, and social movements. In considering desirable futures it is essential that work in these areas continues, in order to expose the consequences of workplace transformation and the associated need for policy adaptation and innovation.

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19. Professions, Governance, and Citizenship through the Global Looking Glass

Ellen Kuhlmann, Tuba I. Agartan, Debby Bonnin, Tiago Correia, Javier Pablo Hermo, Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova, Monika Lengauer, Emmanuele Pavolini, Shaun Ruggunan and Virendra P. Singh

RC52 Sociology of Professional Groups

Introduction

The state-professions relationship and the role of professionalism as facilitator of public sector services are key issues of the professions studies. This makes the study of professions an important source of understanding how to create a “better world,” with more efficient public sectors and accessible services for all citizens. Currently, the relationships between professions and the state face a number of fundamental transformations involving different governance reforms, stakeholders, and professional groups. First, state regulation expands towards “governance” with plural actors and market logics; second, globalization and new economies add new forms of “state” and “citizenship”; and third, austerity politics curb prospering markets and public funding for professional services.

This contribution maps the (re-)making of the bonds between professions, governance, and citizens from an international perspective. Historically, the rise of professionalism and the emergence of professional projects are characteristic of civic societies (Bertilsson, 1990). “From the public’s perspective, these services offered by the professions became a yardstick for the success of welfare states to translate the concept of social citizenship into the practice of social services” (Kuhlmann et al., 2016, p.33). Also important is the capacity of professions to “buffer social conflict, acting as mediators between states and citizens, while professionalism furnishes hegemonic claims of nations, governments, organizations and social groups with legitimacy and authority of scientific knowledge” (Kuhlmann et al., 2016, p. 33). As Larson has shown, professionalism also serves as an ideological model for “justifying inequality of status and closure of access in the occupational order” (Larson, 1977, p. xviii).

Globalization and new emergent economies have expanded the scope and practice of the professions. Rapidly developing markets in the BRICS countries
and some other middle-income countries have created new demands for professional expertise and services in public and private sectors (Ballakrishnen, 2016; Bonnin and Ruggunan, 2016; Iarskaia-Smirnova and Abramov, 2016). This happens at a time when the neoliberal turn in the Western world has brought into question the concept of the “welfare state.” Austerity politics and structural adjustment programmes have curbed prospering markets and public funding for professional services, hitting some countries harder than others.

These developments provide unique opportunities for researching changing professions in different social contexts, but this is not without challenges. Viewing professions through the global looking glass calls for a critical reflection of the concepts of professions and professionalism, which essentially built on the political and economic conditions of the twentieth-century welfare states in the Western world. Despite the centrality of the state in the study of professions (Johnson, 1995; Thorstendahl and Burrage, 1990), research and theories have largely failed to adequately reflect on the geopolitical contexts of specific concepts of “state” and “citizenship.”

Recently, research into professions has been paying greater attention, firstly, to globalization and transnational governance (Ballakrishnen, 2016; Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2012) and to international comparison (Bourgeault et al., 2009), and secondly, to the role of organisations and markets, and the connections between managerialism and professionalism (Leicht, 2016; Dent et al., 2016; Kirkpatrick et al., 2016). However, studies primarily look at Western countries, while little is known of the professions in the Global South and in Eastern countries. We seek to further an international dialogue by referring to developments in South Africa, India, Argentina, Russia, Turkey, and the Arab countries (for details, see http://www.isa-sociology.org/pdfs/rc52_professions_in_world_perspective.pdf), and in southern European Union (EU) member states (Italy and Portugal), which faced austerity measures and the politics of New Public Management (NPM).

We apply an explorative case study approach comprising eight country cases. The material was gathered using secondary sources and research carried out by the authors; data were analysed using thematic analysis. Currently, no comparative methodology and no indicators for comparison exist that would allow for a systematic comparison of professions across countries, sectors, and occupations. Most challenging is the lack of a common “reference unit” beyond the concept of welfare state professions that would allow us to create a coherent story of the changing role of the professions. Instead, the examples below take snapshots of professional development using the state-professions relationship as the connecting tie among the case studies.
The results: Different directions of travel in the professions

To begin with, the development of the professions in Arab countries refers to “professionalism” as a universal concept and goal. Arab professionals (e.g., university professors) propose professional values that strikingly resemble those known from functionalist and trait approaches in 1960s and 1970s debates. At the same time, a few traits are missing that have been key issues in the Western functional approaches, like the bonding of professionals in associations and the goals of control and monopoly. This example reveals that universal approaches to professionalism may be mobilized and transformed to create strategic responses to the challenges of building a professional field, while lacking the full hegemonic power of scientific evidence and mature mechanisms of public control and state support.

Looking at the professions in Turkey and Russia, in both countries centralized state/political power has constrained the scope of action of professional groups and the concept of professionalism. Hence, policy changes in both countries transform the state-professions relationship and create new connections, albeit in different ways. Turkey is a middle-income country with strong emergent market logics, including consumerism, which create demand for public sector services. At the same time, the implementation of policies from the realm of new public management attempts to control professional interests. The case of the medical profession brings transformations into view that combine different strategies. New managerial controls cause worries in the medical profession and resistance against a loss of autonomy and professional values, and at the same time, both the government and the medical profession respond with creating new bonds. Policy reform has introduced a number of new clinical management positions for doctors and new methods of managing professional performance and remuneration, while the medical profession tries to retain and even expand its role in setting standards of medical specialty training through associations of medical specialists. Here, the state-profession relationships are transformed in ways where both sides share some aspects of governance, while at the same time the interventionist state keeps a monopoly on control.

Russia, as an example of a transformation country in the BRICS group, has historical linkages with continental European concepts of professions and “intelligence”/knowledge workers. The new emergent profession of social work in the 1990s illustrates that different value systems combine to create a professional field and training/education systems. While inadequate wage policies of the government together with gendered cultures of social work as unpaid/cheap women’s labour constrained professional development, new access systems introduced by market-driven social policy furthered professionalization; social workers need to validate access and claims to social rights. Consequently, social work is becoming integrated in the public sector and benefits from market expansion. However, social workers lack the power of defining the concepts and
their position in the new marketized policy arrangements, and this may also transform the relationships with clients.

Our next cases comprise professional development in India and South Africa. Next to economic growth and emergent global power as BRICS countries, both countries have also established more plural governance arrangements, which may create new spaces for the professions to flourish. Professional development is shaped by globalization and colonial history. Linkages with the Anglo-Saxon model of the liberal welfare state professions with strong self-governing capacities and control of access to the professions may therefore be embedded in professional development.

In India, the development of the legal profession provides an interesting case because of its position in a matrix of strong globalization and transnational forces, and national regulatory orders that include a number of constraints for market completion of Indian law firms as well as restrictions for foreign lawyers. In this situation, both Indian and foreign companies have developed strategies of market expansion through new forms of corporate investigation. For instance, India is well on the way to become a major centre for legal process outsourcing, a strategy which is also known from the IT and publication sectors. Such transformations foster the development of a small elitist professional segment, while other legal professionals may face a loss of market power, as they are not able to compete in a globalizing environment. This case highlights transformations in state-professions arrangements: first, state interventions have only limited power to target re-stratification of the legal professions because of emergent global corporate market politics; second, the model of a strong self-regulatory profession may further new forms of strategic market closure without strong state support to build a small elitist segment.

The South African case also illustrates rapid growth and relevance of a public professionalism in recent years and integration in public sector policies. As part of the post-apartheid politics there is a strong demand for more inclusive professional development. However, the professions remain structured by gendered and racial/ethnic patterns of inequality. In this case, it seems that the professions are able to mobilize strong self-governing capacities, as separated from the state, to preserve occupational monopolies for some social groups and control access to professional fields through exclusionary strategies. Thus, re-stratification and other transformations in the professions, like marketization and management, may further create gender and racial inequalities, despite a lack of (formal) legal and state support and even in contrast to new legal requirements of inclusion. Recently, more concerted attempts by the state to regulate professions in line with the state transformation agenda might turn the wheels and constrain attempts to preserve the occupational monopolies for some social groups.

Argentina provides an example of a Latin American country with a growing economy and social services, increasingly plural governance tiers, and hist-
historically strong socio-cultural connections with Europe (especially the Latin countries), which might further the emergence of public sector professionalism. Here, technological changes and new developments in information and communication technologies have fostered the development of transnational offers from higher education institutions, especially in professional education and postgraduate studies. So professional groups respond to transnational markets by creating both new career chances for individual professionals and a process of knowledge production of a professional group. This example highlights how globalization and transnationalism may strengthen the role of the professions as change agents and policy players not only nationally, but (at least in future) also on the international floor.

Finally, developments in southern European Union (EU) member states strongly affected by the politics of austerity and new forms of public sector governance and management give proof of transformations in EU welfare states. Changes in governance of the public sector may constrain the decision-making powers of professional groups, but at the same time, they open up new opportunities. This can be shown for instance in medicine in Portugal, where doctors are involved more closely in management and taking over new roles (Correia and Denis, 2016). More generally, workforce trends in the EU over the last two decades show a robust increase in the health and social care professions and their share of the total employment (Pavolini and Kuhlmann, 2016).

**Conclusion and outlook**

These country cases have taken us on a journey around the globe and told the stories of a range of professional fields, from higher education, law, and media to social work and medicine. At present, these are selective, unfinished stories coming into view as part of an emergent global approach to the professions and professionalism. Yet there are some important trends to identify.

Firstly, the developments illustrate the importance of professional groups forming the backbone of knowledge societies and public sector services, and providing the expertise for governance and policy reform (Burau, 2016). The changing public policies and the new concepts of governance as well as the austerity measures may transform the scope of action and practice of professions and professionalism, yet they also embody new opportunities for professional groups to shape the direction of progression. This is what Bertilsson (1990) described years ago as the double role of the professions as “officers” and “servants” of the public (Kuhlmann, 2006).

Secondly, there are important differences in the directions professional groups across the globe pursue in their development, innovation, re stratification, and contestation. In the Arab countries, universal approaches to professionalism are used strategically to build a professional field and expertise, while mature
mechanisms of public control and state support are lacking. Russia and Turkey show strong centralized, hierarchical state interventions to constrain professional self-governance coupled with increasing involvement of professionals in management that may target professions-users relationships. In Argentina, India, and South Africa, globalization and a self-governing professional model may promote the building of new professional fields, but also create different opportunities towards inclusive professionalism and equality. Italy and Portugal respond with a mix of inclusive strategies (involving professionals in organising/managing public services), market-based incentives, and interventionist states to control the behaviour of professionals.

In summary, the context-dependency and co-existence of various paths of professional development challenge previous theorising of the professions as more uniform (Western-based) groups, experiencing similar forms of “jurisdiction” (Abbott, 1988) of professional knowledge and powers, or as Freidson (2001) put it, they share a “third logic” of professionalism as opposed to market logics and bureaucracy. Fresh approaches are therefore called for which expand on the range of governance and citizenship concepts, the professional groups and models of professionalism involved in research and theorising. Here, our comparative case study research has made a first step towards exploring how the study of professions from a global perspective may contribute to better understanding transformations in public sector policy and services.

We have set the focus on the state-professions relationship and the institutional conditions to open the box of global research into the professions. Yet the institutional approach did not adequately grasp the actor-centred changes, including in the gender arrangements, as observed in both the most male-centred areas like the military (Carreiras, 2006) and female-centred groups like nursing (Wrede, 2008), and in the ethnic/racial/cultural composition of the professions (Bonnin and Ruggunan, 2013). Professions in a twenty-first-century globalising world are no longer populated solely by white male actors, although inequality still persists. The developments may transform the concepts of “citizenship” and “the public” from inside the professions, and therefore need greater attention.

Note

A first, shorter version of this contribution has been published in Global Dialogue (Kuhlmann et al., 2015; http://isa-global-dialogue.net/professions-in-an-international-perspective-opening-the-box/) and did not include the EU case. We wish to thank the participants in the sessions at the ISA Forum for an inspiring discussion, and the new RC52 President Helena Serra for enthusiastically pushing forward the global dialogue.
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VII. CULTURE:
MEDIA, ART, SPORT, AND RELIGION
20. Communication, Media, and Politics: Contradictions and Pretensions in the Discourse about Human Destiny

Christiana Constantopoulou
RC14 Sociology of Communication, Knowledge and Culture

The notion of “communication” could almost be synonymous with the notion of “society,” as living together depends on given cultural frames defining social reality; so speaking about communication, media, and politics normally requires a complex approach taking into consideration more than one topic. In the brief analysis that follows, we try to describe some essential points defining contemporary society, and the eventual role of a science like sociology in it. Thus, we divide our text into three parts: (1) The social frame (the role of communication), (2) the narration of society by the media discourse, and (3) contemporary politics and sociological analysis; we will afterwards attempt a synthesis of these three parts of contemporary society, where the sociological discourse seems to be largely ineffectual or out of context.¹

1. The Global Social “Frame” (the Contemporary Communication System)

Contemporary (globalized) society is characterized on the cognitive level by profound contradictions; these contradictions are mainly due to the absence of adequacy between social representations, which are essentially conveyed by media discourse, and the changing social reality. This means firstly that the “ideas” supposed to inspire political (human) action do not correspond at all to relevant social phenomena. We can give two opportune examples: (a) Western interventions in Syria are justified (to the Western-world public opinion) by the “obligation” to preserve “democracy” and “human rights” in Syrian territory; (b) the new conditions of work turn upside down the workers’ rights gained after the Second World War: the “right to work” often becomes a kind of “permission to slavery”; of course, these kinds of examples can be multiplied if one considers the everyday “agenda,” so that there is not really need to drive the point home.

In other words, we can say that principles born together with the sovereign national states (or the so-called “welfare state”) guaranteeing elementary “human rights” are still given as conductive lights of the contemporary world, although the world “governance” seems nowadays intimately attached to the de-
mands of economic interests worldwide (conducive to the abolition of many rights in the “labor market”), where the nation-state (at least the “Southern” nation-state) seems unable to intervene. An example can be given by the case of the Greek crisis: in the frame of this issue, an analyst can detect (1) the problems of a union (in this case the European Union) administrated first of all in financial terms, (2) the unequal standing of nation-states in international negotiations, (3) the maintenance of inequalities between North and South. Yet, the narration of this crisis was made in humiliating terms against “lazy Southern Europeans” living on the assistance of the Northern states; it was narrated as a national and not an international capitalist problem.

Social inequalities are increasing on the local as well as the global level. When the global level is involved, in practical terms the problems include wars, economic crisis, immigration (from South to North and from East to West). It is quite understandable why the “immigration” (or refugee) phenomenon becomes the key issue of contemporary problems (summarizing the cruelty of the globalized political system and the contemporary myths concerning identity and otherness mainly diffused by the media).

We understand that the social framing (the context) is one of the most essential elements of communication: nowadays this context is hypothetically based on “democracy” and on declarations of human dignity and guaranteed minimal rights (this forms the frame for the social discourse), which are impossible to ensure (at least, if we put the dividing line between North and South, the guarantee of minimal rights is impossible for the peripheral countries of the South—including the European South).

2. Media Narratives

The above framing which shapes the communication possibilities (understanding and justifying the world as well as providing tools for communication among humans, including the issues of identifying “us” and the “others”) is conveyed by the media: on this point we should better explain the role of the media and the contemporary division of the world.

Although an abundance of information can possibly be given by the media (including mass media and social networks), the “global citizen” is captured by:

(a) the modern myths: these myths consider as “irrational” any discourse that differs from the technocratic point of view (which monopolizes “correct” knowledge). The technocratic narrative takes the dominant discourse as the only “scientifically based” one. Many sociologists and analysts, such as Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault (1969), Edgar Morin (1990), or Lucien Sfez (1993), have already analyzed in detail this point concerning the reference to “correct” knowledge (either monopolized by the dominant political organization or the impact of new technologies). Other analysts focusing on the media dis-
course, like Pierre Bourdieu (1996), explain how this discourse is based on a dominant way of thinking taken as unquestionable. We can give examples of the media analysis following the everyday agenda that indicates this way of understanding reality for the mass audience of the “civilized world” on essential definitions of “right” and “wrong,” of “good” or “evil”; our world is given as modern and rational.

Nevertheless, if an analyst objectively views the political statements making media headlines, he or she can easily understand the part played by mythology and irrational belief in generating the wrong definitions of the social existence generated by the “official social discourse.” For example, when “we” are involved, the horror of the injustice towards “innocent victims” is projected, such as in the media coverage of the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. Yet, when it comes to the “other,” the horror and slaughter are omitted from the dominant discourse that frames it as a “war for democracy and human rights.”

(b) the dominant figurative rather than discursive way of signifying the world. This means two things:

First, emotion becomes dominant. In his famous and now classic analysis of mass culture, Edgar Morin (1956, 1962) explains that many social expressions become purely iconic (implying “armchair adventures”—by watching fictional stories on TV—and emotions unattached to real everyday problems: thus the planet may cry about the loss of a child shown on TV and not care about the child abuse in the neighborhood). This “virtual social link” followed by “virtual solidarity” somehow characterizes contemporary globalized society. Because as Jean Duvignaud (1970) explained, human beings are “dramatic” beings—i.e., they need emotion—and the emotional need should be satisfied by spectacle (as the real feelings are supposed to follow the dominant way of analysis). Spectacles sell better if they can provoke emotion and tears, and because our world is mostly narrated by televisual discourse, emotion often plays the dominant role (implying anger against the “bad other,” fear of “invasion of savages,” etc.): in other words, old myths continue to be dominant in the frame of our “rational era.”

Second, cultural industries contribute to this everyday “prosperity” based on the Western way of life; this way of life apparently cannot include any political thought related to the criticism of contemporary inequalities (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno 1944; Marcuse 1955). We can easily understand the impact of this lifestyle, not only in the narration of famous serials, but also in the aspiration they create in different cultures worldwide.

The media narrate the world. To illustrate this claim with examples, we can look at the mass media’s top stories, like the following, from a recent day:

- An airport terminal in New York has re-opened after being evacuated over reports that a man parked a truck outside and ran off. Authorities told passengers to leave Terminal B at about 11pm local time as they investigated a car that was left with its
doors opened outside, several media outlets reported. The airport confirmed in a statement that Terminal B was closed and passengers evacuated to investigate an abandoned vehicle parked near the terminal.

- Angelina Jolie rumored to leave US to join House of Lords in London. FBI considers Brad Pitt allegations on private flight. Several media outlets, using anonymous sources, report that the actor is now under investigation by a child welfare agency.

- Video shows black victim “had hands by side.” Crowds turn out for a third night of protests following the shooting of Keith Scott in Charlotte, North Carolina. Tulsa officer charged over shooting death. Betty Shelby said that she “was in fear for her life” when she shot Terence Crutcher but she is accused of “acting unreasonably.”

- Yahoo admits 500 million users had data stolen in 2014 attack. The hack happened late in 2014 but the company says it was only recently found as part of an internal investigation.

- No one held out much hope for the ceasefire in Syria brokered by the United States and Russia. There are 57,000 refugees in Greece. We have been to see what life was like in the camp aid agencies call “the worst.”

This is an example of the narration of the world. In this narration are reported events of the agenda, judged to be very important for the social being and expressing current ideas of the conception of our world: the top stories—or events—are about a security scare (in the airports, for instance); celebrities (the couple “Brangelina” appears emblematic with its “star humanitarian” profile); the police abuses of power (where social protest is reported, its results often do not appear to be material; maybe because they hardly exist); instances of internet fraud (as big criminal case); and finally, the Syrian problem (as geopolitical theme) and the living conditions of the refugees who are obliged to remain in Greece, as other European countries refuse to “open their borders”!

As news frames (which are disseminated by major press agencies worldwide), these seem to characterize contemporary (global) society: in fact, if we abstract the concrete events we get the following themes that concern our society:

1. **security** (it is a major concern to be able to stay in a “secure” zone and be protected in it; the “danger” comes from elsewhere—the others in a war zone or some other insecure zone);
2. **lifestyle** (the stars—we are reminded of E. Morin’s theory of the stars\(^6\)—continue to be deified by a mass audience and often come to play the role that social policy should play);
3. **police terrorism** (sending a clear message: do not protest; your “rights” are not ensured and your life is in danger);
4. **electronic crime** (there again, the message that it’s everybody’s duty to “keep secure”—otherwise, personal data and fortune are in danger—is primordial);
5. **geopolitical problems and war** (the “others” elsewhere: the Western audience is asked to recognize them, to be aware of the “problem,” and to be
happy as long as “those people” stay “where they belong”: in the war zone or in a refugee camp at the borders of the “civilized world”…); postmodern identities are thus shaped between “us” living our life according to the civil standards and the “others” (the image of evil referred to in US presidential rhetoric)

The topic of the media and their role in shaping the limits of current life (security and insecurity, identities, values, etc., according to the “agenda”) is important but not the real object of this analysis. We should only keep as conclusion the role of the media in the world’s narration: they provide the “official” narration of the current world, which everyday people take as given, without even thinking of doubting its “truth.” In this frame of modern mythology, the “right” and “wrong” decisions shape societies. We can invoke here the Thomas (1928) theorem: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”

3. A Role for Sociology?

The European Enlightenment created sociology (among other “human” sciences), first in order to understand society “scientifically” (at the time this was synonymous with “positively” and “objectively”), and secondly in order to help make it “better.” In some countries, sociology was understood as a subversive discipline; others did not allow its existence at all.

Moreover, as was noted by Albert Brimo (1972), many studies commanded and financed (often by governments or organizations) to consider real social problems, bringing results and invitations to change, were kept only on library shelves, without provoking the necessary political change. In this sense, sociology was used as an alibi of political interest, where theory never passed into action! Of course, here is the problem of the relation between science and political action: if something becomes “political” it is considered “not scientific” and thus “not objective” (thus “wrong”), according to “common sense” (or the current dominant classification or categorization).

If sociology could provide, as Robert Park suggested, high-quality “reportages” (Park and Burgess, 1921), it could help to redefine the constitutive myths of our time that exclude “different” thought. This attempt is complicated: (1) mentalities are difficult to change, as some ideas are anchored almost archetypically in current narrations; (2) family (as the immediate “patterner” of behavior) and educational institutions (as the vehicle of the dominant theory on society) in conjunction with media discourse compose what is most effective and most important in the creation of the frame in which everyone is supposed to “act”—and media discourse is very much involved in forming current myths, which are difficult to narrate differently. In this sense, Thomas’ theorem is also
valid: it depends on how sociology can contribute to changing the dominant definitions and mythology. If one must be pragmatic, in contemporary society, the human sciences (and sociology) become more and more “surficial” (in order to follow the dominant scientific discourse) and thus more and more excluded (as useless) from the university programs,\textsuperscript{11} which get better financed if they “produce” knowledge of technology. This situation reflects what Jacques Ellul (2012) described as the “technological bluff,” where the disequilibrium among society and technology nowadays is huge—associating technological discourse with economic interests, and trapping in this discourse social actors.

Nevertheless, there remains valid a sociological theorem that is to be kept as a guideline (taking it either way): if persons define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.

Notes

1. Too often, sociology’s critical edge is replaced by expectations to prove utility in the management of “human resources.”

2. Markus S. Schulz (2016) summarizes the Greek crisis as follows: The crisis originated in the US but quickly spread around the globe. As it turned out, investors from around the world had been lured by the supposedly safe real-estate-backed investments. The sudden stop of cash flow and demand hit manufacturers worldwide, who then laid off workers and thus drove large parts of the global economy fully into recession mode. As the US financial crisis spread to Europe, Greece turned out to be particularly vulnerable. The European Union (EU) had collaborated over the years with a series of Greek governments in allowing low effective tax rates at the top without generating the resources needed for long-term investments in education, infrastructure, and broad-based asset building, thus creating the conditions that led to the current crisis. The EU framework permitted a situation in which Greek oligarchs were virtually tax exempt, pocketing extra profits without contributing to the country’s economic well-being. When it became clear in October 2009 that budget and debt figures were worse than previously stated, Greece found it virtually impossible to obtain financing for its debt. The troika of IMF, ECB, and EC authorized a total of 240 billion euro to let Greece make payments to its lenders while staying within the Eurozone (IMF, 2015). This helped private lenders to cut their losses and transfer risks to taxpayers. The troika’s bailout came with conditions: Instead of reigniting its economy with bold new investments, Greece was forced, as part of the packages, to cut government spending since 2010 by 28 billion euro, i.e., 15\% of its gross domestic product (GDP).

3. Bruno Péquignot (2016) explains that the “crisis” is a problem “inherent” in the capitalist system of economic organization.

4. Meaning is brought about through \textit{systems} of signs working together. Jean Baudrillard (1968, 1970, 1973, 1981, 1987) argued that the excess of signs and of meaning in late-20th-century “global” society had caused (quite paradoxically) an effacement of reality. In this world, neither liberal nor Marxist utopias are any longer believed in. We live, he argued, not in a “global village,” to use Marshall McLuhan’s phrase, but rather in a world that is ever more easily petrified by even the smallest event. Because the “global” world operates at the level of the exchange of signs and commodities, it becomes ever more blind to \textit{symbolic} acts such as, for example, terrorism. He characterized the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City as the “absolute event,” seeking to understand them as a reaction to the technological and political expansion of capitalist globalization, rather than as a war of religiously
based or civilization-based warfare. For Baudrillard, the end of the Cold War did not represent an ideological victory; rather, it signaled the disappearance of utopian visions shared between both the political Right and Left. Giving further evidence of his opposition toward Marxist visions of global communism and liberal visions of global civil society, Baudrillard contended that the ends they hoped for had always been illusions; indeed, as *The Illusion of the End* argues, he thought the idea of an end itself was nothing more than a misguided dream: if there are no more dustbins of history, this is because history itself has become a dustbin. It has become its own dustbin, just as the planet itself is becoming its own dustbin.

5. See for instance the lifestyle promoted in a famous American TV serial *Sex and the City*, but also the influence of this lifestyle on other cultures, as for example even on the style of dresses and hijabs for sale in luxurious malls of the Middle East.

6. Edgar Morin (1972) investigates the star system from its evolution when Chaplin, Garbo, and Valentino lived at a distance from their fans, to stars like Humphrey Bogart and Marilyn Monroe who became more approachable, and concludes with an analysis of the adulation surrounding James Dean. Ultimately, Morin finds, stars serve as intermediaries between the real and the imaginary.

7. There are numerous and well-known publications to which one can refer, including Sfez (1993).

8. Compare Cornelius Castoriadis’s (1975) analysis of the unique character of the social-historical world and its relations to the individual, to language, and to nature. He argues that most traditional conceptions of society and history overlook the essential feature of the social-historical world; namely, that this world is not articulated but is in each case the creation of the society concerned. In emphasizing the element of creativity, Castoriadis opens the way for rethinking political theory and practice in terms of the autonomous and explicit self-institution of society.

9. We can even cite the big American studies on “Middletown” or the “American dilemma,” which even become sociological “best sellers” with no or little real effect on social organization.

10. An interesting approach of contemporary “femininity” is given by Jean-Claude Kaufman (1999) who explains how ages of subordination myths of women have been influential without being expressed and how they are still subconsciously important to the contemporary otherwise “dynamic” and “independent” females.

11. A simple reading of university programs and ways of evaluating research can very easily explain this issue.

**References**


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In the past few years some social scientists have been increasingly interested by research on images, admitting their rising importance in the configuration of the social world, legitimizing them as an academic subject of investigation.

Studying the production and reception of images and the meaning that they acquire in contemporary society is essential to understanding its functioning. Thus, image and social context are closely intertwined, stimulating social scientists to relate these two elements in their research. Cinema and audio-visual are privileged subjects in this area, as they pervade the daily life of our social existence.

Traditionally, social scientists remained relatively far from direct analysis of images and concentrated more on the analysis of the social context of image production and reception. This is a legitimate approach and has its own trajectory within the social sciences. We understand, however, that is also possible, and even desirable, that the social scientist attempt to uncover values, intuitions, beliefs, and ideologies that cinematographic work disseminates through its images and that are not often reducible to the social context of its production.

Recurrently, we have the impression that, in the attempt to capture “reality,” the social sciences often neglects to put in question the interpretation of this record, these data, the processes that constitute the image as a language, full of codes and conventions, not only mediating “reality” with the researcher’s perspective, but also producing “realities” that effectively contribute to constituting the imagery of their potential viewers, making “all the possibilities of symbolization conceivable at any given time” (Sorlin, 1977: 200). All this presupposes a culturally learned way of looking at the world, to select “fragments of reality” and realities of images, and to establish between them significant relations in Weberian terms.

In this direction, the aim of this article, departing from traditional Sociology of Arts researches, is to investigate the symbolic constitution of the social instead of the social and material constitution of the symbolic.

Let’s take a concrete case to elucidate this perspective.

In 2000, the Bilan du Film Ethnographique of Paris screened a documentary that was very special and very different from other films in that year’s exhibition. That documentary, called Retour à Plozévet, by Ariel Nathan, filmed in the com-
mune of St. Démet on the coast of Brittany, aimed to retrace the steps of the re-
search and ethnographic film made by Edgar Morin in the first half of the 1960s.

To that date, Morin’s film had been considered one of the most carefully
documented records of a way of life on the verge of disappearing but still pre-
served in that distant and relatively isolated community. One of the core points
in that ethnographic film concerned the care given by the women of that com-
monity to their own appearance: from their own garments, adorned with ruffles
and laces, to the peculiar treatment given to their hairdos, regarded as a funda-
mental element of their own identities. Those hairdos—which rose above the
head in a kind of high bun that spread in a fan-shaped style, lofty and proud,
rigid in its configuration—were worn by women in the most diverse situations,
from preparing breakfast to cooking lunch, from everyday work in a small fac-
tory to the Sunday mass. The film, at least so it seemed, constituted an ethno-
graphic document of high value as a register.

In the documentary more recently made by Ariel Nathan, another “reality”
persistently crept in. What this brought to light was that, differently from what
people had imagined, those clothes and hairdos had never been in daily use for
those women, had at no time been worn at breakfast and, least of all, in the
course of the strenuous work in the sweatshops of the small factory. In hind-
sight, the “factuality” of wearing such elaborate hairdos and garments for
household chores and factory work seems absolutely odd. However, it was ta-
ken for granted as “fact,” due to the mere existence of a documentary film: no
question was raised over the practicalities of doing such hairdos in time to still
be able to prepare breakfast, or over the possibilities of maintaining them
through the whole working day in a factory, not to mention doing this day after
day. What was realized in 2000 was that it had all been staged for the cameras,
under the supervision of the filmmaker/researcher, who transposed to ordinary
life some practices whose concreteness and meaning were exclusively related to
the non-working hours of the weekends.

The reasons for this were of two kinds. The first one, of a practical kind,
related to the time needed to shape such “hair sculptures,” which, according to
the women interviewed, would take from two to three hours. The second reason,
at once more trivial and meaningful, was that, in the 1960s, the women’s hus-
bands did not want them to appear in the film without being duly ornamented.
These hairdos and dresses were specifically what distinguished that community
from others in its relation to tradition, something from which the community
members derived their own dignity and deference.

Squeezed between the needs of the “research,” on the one hand, and by the
matrimonial and familial demands, on the other hand, the women of Plozévet
started cooking and working as they had never done before. Constrained by
circumstances, these women created, in a sense, a second-order “reality” for the
cameras. A “reality” whose truthfulness can be effective only as filmic truth,
and which is distant, then, from the same traditions that it would, theoretically, convey and reaffirm.¹

In that same Bilan, another film ended up accomplishing something similar in essence. Chris Owen filmed a fertility ritual in honor of the goddess Amb Kor, of the Kawelka tribe, in Papua New Guinea.² The ritual was performed specially for the cameras and explained, fourteen years afterwards, by the tribe’s current leader, Ru, and by an anthropologist, Andrew Strathern. As the majority of Kawelka converted to another religion, that expensive and complex ritual would never be performed again.

And why not mention the film by Leni Riefenstahl, Triumph of the Will (1935), a “documentary” made at Hitler’s request to immortalize the 1934 National Socialist Party meeting, organized and specially choreographed for the cameras by the Reich’s favorite architect, Albert Speer, and promptly enacted in some moments by its “figurant” members of the army, the SA and SS; a film in which the “introductions” to the speeches of Nazi officials in glowing signs acted like the intertitles of silent films, a trick used to condense in only one block the innumerable and never-ending speeches, so undesirable in films.

Carrière long ago warned us about the countless historic “fictions,” in which the moments of an official history—in themselves full of inventions and lies—are reconstructed, as well as about the moments when the very presence of the camera could bring about a kind of “acting.”³ We shall also call to mind, as Barnouw (1993) stated, that the introduction of that “poetic licence”—used as a way of constructing a documentary discourse—goes back to the very emergence both of the documentary as genre and of the cinema as invention.⁴ From creating performances for the camera, as did the former president of the United States Theodore Roosevelt, who during speeches “noted any cameraman and gave him the full benefit of vigorous grins and gestures, sometimes walking to the side of the platform to do so” (Barnouw, 1993, p. 23), to the insertion of “reconstructions” of events, like in the Boer war, when the filmmaker Albert Smith, needing some shots of the Boer in action, had no problem requesting that “British soldiers were put in Boer uniforms to provide a few skirmishes” (Idem, ibidem). Thus, “along with colonialist tendencies, documentary film was infected with increasing fakery” (Idem, p. 24).

Although, in a sense, this is no novelty—since it has been present from the beginnings of cinema—today we cannot avoid questioning this kind of image in its epistemological meanings. More specifically, we cannot avoid asking, on the one hand, what would be the relation between these “enactments” and knowledge, once they play the part of a “register” of a social group. On the other hand, what would be the criterion to think of the kind of image and information that those films put forth for investigation and thought.

Testing these propositions means inquiring as to the foundations of the relation between the image and the real. More to the point, it means enquiring
about the kind of knowledge—in terms of the formations of sciences—proposed by images, particularly those images based on the documentary illusion that what we see on the screen is the real.

Let us get some distance from the recent debates. From the beginning of sociology, its founders proposed three completely diverse concepts of the real: In none of them was the real capable of being directly apprehended by the eyes, not even by positivist eyes. It’s worth reminding that, for Durkheim, if social facts are inscribed in the real, it is only through the method, which establishes with it a relation of objectivity, that one is able to filter out the undesirably biased personal views that hinder us from uncovering the true causes of the social phenomena.5

For Weber and for Marx, method is the only possibility of constituting the real that can be apprehended through knowledge. To Weber, the world presents itself as chaos, consisting of innumerable phenomena that incessantly follow and overlap one another. It is not, therefore, susceptible to being known and, least of all, understood without intentional criteria-guided selection. A researcher selects in order to understand the world, which always presents itself as a myriad of possibilities.6 To Marx, the visible is nothing but manifested forms, which in their unremitting appearance and disappearance, in their constant mutation, conceal the processes that cause them to appear as such. The visible precludes direct apprehension of the processes of reproduction of capital, and the exploitation processes in them. They are comprehensible solely through thinking.7

If for these three authors there is no immediate reality, then why do we look directly with our eyes? For Durkheim, we look to the pre-notions, the assumptions, for Weber, chaos, and for Marx, ideology and fetishes.

Benjamin, in his “Short History of Photograph” (2005), warns that “it is another nature which speaks to the camera rather than to the eye.”8 With this, he intended to stress the difference between what we see in the world and what we can see in images. Being images of a diverse nature, they are swept by our gaze in different ways. Benjamin emphasizes what to him would be the great peculiarity of photographic images, that rather than being the outcome of pure mechanic reproduction, in Bazin’s terms,9 they would be fundamental vehicles to help us see precisely what our eyes cannot distinguish: the movement of hands, the components of steps, the reflex of objects, etc. With its capability to displace our gaze from the commonly seen, the photographic image would place us before a strangely new world, immersed and dispersed in the one we, apparently, have always seen. Contrary to commonsense perception, a photograph would never be a reproduction of the real, or a “representation” of it.10 For what it presents is always different from what is presented to the eyes. “Insight into the realms of the ‘similar’ is of fundamental significance for the illumination of major sectors of occult knowledge. Such insight, however, is gained less by
demonstrating found similarities than by replicating the processes which generate such similarities” (Benjamin, 2005, p. 694).

Benjamin proposes to disconnect the so-called “similar” in the film from its immediate relation between image and the object photographed towards the constructive character of the same image. In the words of Francastel, an image “exists in itself, it essentially exists in our spirit, it is the reference point of culture rather than a point of reference within reality” (1983, p. 193). Thus, Francastel emphasizes that the prime dialogue of any image is not, as one would suppose, a “dialogue” with the physical “reality” that brought it into being. In this direction, we can draw an analytical alternative to the investigation of images, dislocating them from their reality as image—and from an exterior “real” that would act as its “model” or stimulus—to the values and perspectives that guide its own constitution as image.

It is not surprising, then, that the cinema, invented in the late nineteenth century, ended up mirroring this twofold dilemma, and adding a third problem, related to the matter of Truth. On those grounds, how may we throw a light on the matter of Truth in images, on the relation between the Image and the Real?

Guy Gauthier gives us an emblematic answer: documentary, considered as a theoretical object, has, as its defining criterion, the “absence of actors,” the absence of any kind of “staging,” of any detailed script giving “guidance.” Luc de Heusch says that “the authenticity of such a film named ‘documentary’ ultimately depends on the good faith of the filmmaker who, through their work, states: here is what I saw” (1962, p. 36). Gauthier affirms that “the ethics of the documental is, perhaps, what remains, when all is conceded to the rest” (1995, p. 6). In this sense, the problem of Truth is unequivocally transferred from the field of Science to the threads of Moral, which is very problematic, for it transfers the question of credibility from the image to the faith of an intended “individual conscience.” As we have seen, the emergence of documentary is also the emergence of documental fakery, which renders the question proposed in these terms absolutely unsustainable.

Still, looking at it from another angle, would there be any criterion internal to images themselves that could be used as a basis of distinction between these many film classifications? Among the ones we have seen thus far, the criterion of explicit “content”—industrial societies versus unindustrialized ones, factory work, etc.—is extremely weak. Not to speak of the ethical criterion.

Let us return, then, to the polemics over Morin’s film. A documentary is not necessarily the outcome of scientific research even if its ethics is based on “the real.” The confusion between documentaries and “documentaries,” between spectators and documentary makers, eventually blurs the perception of the elements of construction of this discourse as construction, for it is always a construction; hence, it is always partial, guided, and inherently interpretative.
Even if we claim that for the documentary filmmaker, the ethnologist, or the sociologist things do not happen that way, (really, they don’t?), for common sense, for the general audience, it is taken for granted that if fiction shows an imagined construction of the real, documentaries reproduce the real, showing the truth about a theme or phenomenon. Consequently, the presupposition of a “reality” of the film associated with the “reality” of the thing filmed cannot be suppressed by means of a mere intellectual operation, or a simple act of “conscience.”

This can only be based, therefore, and on the contrary, in the rigorous application of a method of interpretation that seeks to understand relationships, hierarchies, and evaluations more than facts and similarities.

Notes
1. “Even worse, we know that, in every war, most of all during battles in the streets, combatants are stimulated by the presence of a camera. They will promptly offer a reporter to run to a corner and shoot a burst of gunfire. So, even some of these films are simulations. Volker Schlöndorf tells that in Beirut, when filming Die fälschung (Circle of Deceit), some soldiers he had hired as figurants offered to shoot from a window and kill—randomly—some passerby in the street” (Carrière, 1995, p. 62).


3. “Even in the official history books, historians are allowed to lie. All the peoples behave in that manner, naively and consciously. About the battle of Poitiers—the famous victory of the Franks over the Arabs in the eighth century, a secular pillar of the French notion of national superiority and of its contempt for other races—a professor of Sorbonne once told me: ‘We know now that the battle of Poitiers didn’t happen. And, if it happened, it was not in Poitiers. And if it happened at another place, we’ve lost it’” (Carrière, 1995, pp. 137–138).

4. Here, we are using the distinction between cinematographer and cinema through the introduction of narrative as language construction and discourse that has been discussed by many authors, such as André Bazin (1985), Edgar Morin (2005), Siegfried Kracauer (1960), Ismail Xavier (1984), among others, without dwelling on their differences in respect to their emphases: while some depart from the meanings created by the montage, others, on the contrary, emphasize the construction of meaning within one-shot sequences.

5. We can recall Durkheim’s book Suicide, in which statistics are used in order to disregard individual causes of one suicide or another so as to identify social causes that, in certain historical moments, could lead to more suicides than normal for the same conditions (Cf. Durkheim, 2002).


11. Here the concept of classification is accurate.
12. It is worth recalling the exemplary discussions, verging on the bizarre, on the part of intellectuals and historians concerning the “(in)fidelity” of a Brazilian TV series called *O quinto dos infernos*, 2001, broadcast by Globo network. Outraged by the manner in which the royal family was constructed, they questioned the authors about the difference between the characters and the “real” people who inspired them. Don John was not like this, Don Peter was not like that, etc. This shows that the confusion between “real” and fiction can steal in through the most unsuspected back doors, even from the most culturally prepared spectators.

**References**


22. Looking Into Futures: Problematizing Socially Engaged Research in Visual Sociology

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WG03 Visual Sociology

**Introduction**

I begin this paper with a photo of one of the largest dumps in Korogocho, an informal settlement in Nairobi. It was taken by a small group of mothers who were “picturing” through photovoice some of the challenges they see in relation to childcare and related issues of economic empowerment.¹ Women and children, the participants emphasize in their captions for the photo, scavenge in the dump, which is full of toxic waste, discarded (and often dangerous) computer hardware along with needles and other dangerous objects. I regard it as a provocative image both for looking into futures in relation to visual research and especially the use of technology, and as being rich in symbolism for thinking about the traces of visual research and what the digital traces might reveal about the gaps and challenges.

![Figure 1 Digital Dump](image-url)
I say this because if someone were to dig up my various PC hard drives, laptops, and no longer functioning USBs from the last decade or more—definitely a digital dumping or e-story—they would find thousands of images from the numerous participatory visual research projects that I have conducted with communities. The majority would be ones like this one, participant-generated images—videos, drawings, digital stories, photos, and photo exhibitions that have been produced in the various projects that I, along with my research colleagues in Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Rwanda, Swaziland, and Canada, have carried out in the context of participatory visual research. The themes have been diverse: What does climate change look like to 14-year-olds living in rural Ethiopia? (Mitchell, 2012) How are young people in rural KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa picturing sexual violence, and what are the solutions as they see them? (Mitchell, 2015a) What would happen if teachers and community health workers came together to “picture” the ways they could address HIV and AIDS? (Mitchell et al., 2005) How can children in Rwanda be engaged in a participatory analysis of their own drawings? And as explored in Figure 1, what do the mothers of young children in Korogocho see as the critical issue facing them in relation to child care? These questions are typically about some type of social transformation.

Sometimes these images are what the Research Ethics Board at my university refers to as “graphic content,” although as Geoffey Batchen and colleagues (2014) note in their book *Picturing Atrocities*, sometimes it is not the actual act of violence that is the atrocity, but rather the depiction of the circumstances around which such acts occur. Indeed, it is the absence of visible violence that can lead the viewer into an imaginative engagement with the nature of atrocity. In either case such a photo may come to haunt the viewer, as Sontag (2003) notes.

Then in that same digital dump would be found hundreds of images—mostly photographs, but also some videos—of what Gillian Rose (2012) would describe as the site of image production, where participants are represented as engaged in taking pictures or producing videos, digital stories, or drawings. My colleagues and I (and sometimes the participants) have taken these pictures as a type of “looking at looking” (Mitchell, 2011; Pithouse & Mitchell, 2007).

In Figure 2 we see two of the women from the Korogocho project working together with the camera as an example of a “looking-at-looking image.” But such images might also be read as indicators or visual evidence or visually verifiable evidence of social engagement, prompting the following question: As social scientists would we recognize social engagement or social transformation or social change if we saw it? This is a question that I think is the one we need to grasp in a futures-oriented sociology and one that is central to social engagement and visual sociology.
Strangely, the same digital dump I have been talking about would reveal far fewer images of audiences engaging with the images (and related images of change and transformation) in spite of the fact that a key aspect of participatory visual work is its potential for reaching audiences. An example of several community members from Korogocho interacting with an exhibition catalogue for the “Through the Eyes of Mothers” exhibition can be seen in Figure 3.

Given the ambitious and hopeful aspects of participatory visual research in producing images that can be seen, it is a critical (but often overlooked) area of investigation. But then I ask, what do we as social scientists know about showing and exhibiting and audiences, and why is a sociology of looking and showing so critical to participatory visual research and to looking into futures?

**Toward a Sociology of Looking and Showing and Doing**

In order to develop the idea of a sociology of looking, showing, and doing, I draw on the French sociologist Robert Escarpit’s work on a sociology of literature and the question of “who reads what, why, how, and with what effect?” It is work that in one way or another has been influencing my research in reading for several decades (Mitchell, 1981), and now I see its relevance to what John Fiske (1994, 2010) and Gillian Rose (2012) refer to as audiencing. The use of Escarpit’s work is particularly relevant, I argue, to the practices of “making public” and community engagement in participatory visual research. As Delgado (2015) highlights in a comprehensive review of photovoice work with urban youth, exhibiting the visual productions is key. As he observes: “Having an exhibition boycotted because of its controversial content, or, even worse, simply ignored, with minimal attendance and no media coverage, can have a long lasting impact on the participants” (99). But he also goes on to include Haw’s (2008) idea that the opposite of having a voice is being silenced. If we as researchers are not able to come up with
a way for photos or other visual images to reach appropriate audiences, then we too are part of that silencing of participants in spite of our intentions.

There is of course a vast body of work on curation and exhibiting in such areas as art history and museum studies, where the politics of representation is critical (see Butler & Lehrer, 2016). This work can have implications for exhibiting and co-curation in community-based research in everything from the technical aspects of mounting and framing photos, through to creating captions and curatorial statements. Various studies have focused on specific exhibitions, such as Edward Steichen’s *Family of Man*, in museums and art galleries of the photos taken by ordinary people (Ribalta & Museu D’Art Contemporani de Barcelona, 2008). Catherine Zuromskis (2013) has termed this work “aestheticizing the vernacular” in her book *Snapshot Photographs: The Lives of Images*. However, as Delgado (2015), Reinikainen and Zetterström Dahlqvist (2016), and others working in participatory visual research are acknowledging, exhibiting in community-based research, regardless of whether in a gallery or community hall, brings with it many complexities. Unlike the image-makers of many family snapshots, including the ones in the *Family of Man*, for example, the participants in photovoice projects typically are interrogating a social issue that is critical to their well-being (safety and security, health, environment, stigma, or sexual violence) and about which they wish to speak, and in relation to various community actors. The images are typically provocative and are meant to disrupt. Thus, unlike Steichen’s *Family of Man* exhibition, where he as the curator had the idea of exploring the “universal language” of photographs, presenting a world, as he observes, “as a global community, a ‘family’ united by the supposedly fundamental experiences of birth, death, work, play, war, marriage, procreation and the like” (Zuromskis, 2013: 124), in a participatory visual project it is typically the image-makers who determine the angle or point of the exhibition.

Unlike the audiences for many of the exhibitions that Zuromskis describes, where the viewers may not be from the local area, in community-based research, the audience members (even local policy makers) may be known, and
viewers may know the image-makers. Indeed, typically the image-makers will be present for the exhibition. This may change the relationship and alter what can be exhibited. Even the spaces themselves may be problematic. Where do community audiences go to look? Art galleries? School halls? The lobby of the Ministry of Agriculture? A petrol station? The middle of the village on pensioner day? As I describe elsewhere (Mitchell, 2011), these community locations bring new issues in terms of managing public spaces and the technology of display in relation to such factors as safety (no glass), durability (exhibiting outside and under various weather conditions), portability (exhibiting over and over again), along with such obvious factors as cost (avoiding ostentatious display in an under-resourced community centre).

Tied to location, viewing practices themselves are not to be taken for granted. What does it mean to look at a collection of photos, especially as part of a community or social group? We know from the work on the sociology of museum practices that the idea of this kind of “leisure looking” is often linked to class and other social factors. In a recent exhibition in Korogocho, the one that contained the image of the digital dump, the images were displayed on a clothesline in a community hall, but they were also featured in an exhibition catalogue that circulated during the exhibition. I was interested in the way that many of the participants preferred to engage with the catalogue at the exhibition more than the hanging images. Finally, the image-makers are likely to expect something to come out of their exhibition besides appreciation and a pat on the back for a job well done. This to me is one of the most critical factors and it is the one that we know the least about. How do images engage communities and how might the study of this engagement contribute to the futures project of “building a better world”?

Circulating the Vernacular

Building on Zuromskis’ idea of naming what it is that we are doing in exhibiting in relation to audiences, I propose that as a community of visual researchers we consider attempting to “name” and study our work with audiences and exhibitions in participatory visual research and social change. The term “circulating the vernacular” (building from “aestheticizing the vernacular”) would be a start, highlighting, first, the ways in which the images produced by ordinary citizens (as opposed to professional artists) are the vernacular, but also second, that if they are to have impact, they need to circulate, and indeed, to be seen “over and over and over again.” Circulating may take place at different sites, and to many different audiences, and as noted above, the circulating can also take place through different modalities, such as exhibition, exhibition catalogue, live screening of a video, or the use of online platforms such as YouTube. Under such conditions we could begin to appreciate an application of Escarpit’s work
Culture: Media, Art, Sport, and Religion

There are various ways that we might take up this work. Elsewhere, for example, I have written about the idea of systematically and reflexively studying the circulation of the same photovoice exhibition in multiple settings and with different audiences (Mitchell, 2015b). In that work I document the multiple showings of one photovoice exhibition, *Our Photos, Our Learning, Our Well-being*. The images in the exhibition were produced by 80 young people in Ethiopia enrolled in Agricultural Technical Vocational Education Training (ATVETs) at four ATVET Colleges on the topic of what it means to be “a male or female student attending an ATVET.” We can use a variety of tools to do this, ranging from surveys to face-to-face interviews. Given the need to consider a range of audiences, we might also consider a range of methods. In the case of policy makers, we might want to ask questions such as the following: Which images have an impact on them and why? How do they feel about the images and the image making? Are there certain images that offer new perspectives? And of course, critically, what do they intend to do (if anything) as a result of seeing an exhibition?

As digital practitioners, we might also want to study how images and captions might become transformed into other productions in order to reach different audiences or for different purposes. Rivard in her photovoice study of how adolescent girls in Rwanda regard physical activity and sport carried out face-to-face interviews with policy makers, making sure that they actually engaged with the photo images (Rivard & Mitchell, 2013). As the researcher she “occupied” the offices of each of the relevant stakeholder groups. Creating photoreports, the term she used to describe the new productions made up of a PowerPoint production and an accompanying printout, she had each policy maker individually look at the photo-reports, and she also left a copy of the photoreport with the policy maker. Images may also become integrated into digital media productions, building on the idea of the ethnographic films that Ruby (2000) describes. I have termed these “digital dialogue tools” (Mitchell et al., 2016), short digital productions (sound and image) that draw together/organize visual data for the purposes of engaging image-makers in participatory analysis, and which could also be used with various audiences (communities, policy makers).

How can participants themselves be involved in creating texts that challenge? In a visual essay, “Seeing How It Works” (De Lange et al., 2015), we highlight the process of participatory visual work in creating policy posters and action briefs. We document through work with the image-makers themselves the changes that occur as a result of an arts-based intervention. In that study, the *Girls Leading Change* project, 14 young women studying at a South African university produce cellphilms, policy posters, and action briefs related to sexual violence on campus. After presenting their findings and action briefs “over and
over and over again” to policy makers on campus and over a period of time, they document visually some of the changes to the campus, such as a posting of new rules about male visitors to their residence, and an image of a stairwell that has now been cleaned up and is better lit.

Conclusion

Overall we might think of these various modalities (exhibitions, multiple screenings, digital dialogue tools, policy posters, and action briefs) and the study of “who what when how and with what effect” as part of an “engaging tactics” process, not unlike a public sociology project at Goldsmiths College. Indeed, can we begin to think of this work alongside the Arab Spring or Occupy Wall Street, and framed as occupy the principal’s office or occupy the deputy minister of education, or as Thompson (2009) writes for a photo exhibit as part of an environmental project in Sierra Leone, occupy the lobby of the Ministry of Agriculture? What difference does it make if we start thinking of this work in terms of “tactics” and “occupying”? As a group of social scientists, I am sure we share an interest in having our work make an impact—on curriculum or policy or teachers’ lives or students’ lives or social conditions—and so it is in that spirit that I have presented this material in the context of socially engaged research. It is a legitimate aspiration given the need to challenge inequities in schools, health care, agriculture, and other community settings, and particularly in relation to such persistent concerns as sexual violence, bullying, safety and security in housing, water and sanitation, food insecurity, climate change, HIV and AIDS, unequal access to education, racism, discrimination, and other health and social issues. The idea of trying to track and study the process—in this case through a sociology of showing, seeing, looking, engaging, and doing—is one that cuts across our interests in a Futures Oriented Sociology.

Notes

The photos in this essay are all part of the photovoice project and reproduced with the participants’ permission.

1. The photovoice project is part of a large project called “Creating better economic opportunities for women in Nairobi slums through improved childcare options,” funded by IDRC through McGill University and the African Population Health Research Centre, Nairobi, Kenya.

2. Engaging Tactics is a Goldsmiths College PhD initiative, which explores “the boundaries between society and life through multi-sensory, multi-site engagement with publics and participants inside and outside the academy.”
References


23. Sport and the Role of Sport Sociology for Alter-globalization

Wolfram Manzenreiter and John Horne

RC27 Sociology of Sport

1. Introduction

The futures that the sociology of sport wants are to a large degree synonymous with the goals of alter-globalization: a globalized world that grants everyone the inalienable human rights of freedoms and capabilities to achieve the kind of life they have good reason to value (Harvey et al., 2014). The futures we want in line with alter-globalization are fully committed to the protection of human dignity and respect cultural diversity and the environment. We share a sustained belief in the opportunities provided by sports involvement for health, agility, and physical well-being as indisputable preconditions of a “Good Life for Everyone.” However, there is little doubt that under the current state of affairs the institutions of sport and physical culture are a far cry from delivering these eminent objectives. Not only are access and opportunities unequally distributed between the Global North and South and across social strata within single countries, there is also much evidence that in practice many sports celebrate aggressive masculinity, implicitly promote homophobia, and lend themselves to xenophobia and social segregation. Even more troublesome is the fact that sport in its highly mediatized form lends itself to the partisan interests of neoliberal globalization, its chief ideology, and its main profiteers. Given that UNESCO started to call for the “fundamental right to physical education, physical activity and sport without discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property or any other basis” (UNESCO, 2015: §1.1) no less than four decades ago, we now must critically reflect on the proven capabilities of the sub-discipline with regard to the practical relevance it has exercised over the years. In our contribution to the topic of the session, we draw collectively on more than 50 years of personal involvement in the field and sources we think to represent the trends we outline. In that regard, a recent collection of statements from notable scholars on the trajectory, challenges, and futures of the sociology of sport, commissioned by the International Sociology of Sport Association

Although the more commonly used term is “sociology of sport” we occasionally use “sport sociology” in this article.
(ISSA), an affiliate of ISA as RC27, on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary in 2015 (Pike, Jackson and Wenner, 2015), has proven to be immensely valuable.

2. The consolidation of a fragile house

To start with the good news: the sociology of sport has never been as productive as in recent times, as the increasing number of specialized academic journals, issues per volume, submissions per journal, and monographs on social issues in sport easily attests. A recent survey of the three leading sport sociology journals revealed an output of more than 1,900 publications over the past 25 years (Dart, 2014: 664); together with a fourth title these journals are churning out 28 issues per year (Andrews, 2015: 369). Sport-related topics increasingly have made their way into cross-sectional and interdisciplinary social sciences journals, either as special issues or as regular submissions. However, this does not necessarily mean that the house of sport sociology rests on completely solid foundations.

The rising visibility of sociological research on sport was first of all triggered by externalities to the academic field. Since the 1980s, the world has witnessed the rise of sport, particularly in its most spectacular staging, to become a, if not the, globally dominant form of mass entertainment. Over the same period, the economic value of the multifaceted sport business has reached heights that were unimaginable in previous times. Images of sport have become pervasive in all mass media, and of insurmountable value for local and global promotional cultures. The associated values of sport, no matter whether real or imagined, are so commonly accepted that many actors from the very fringe of the social field of sport cannot resist the temptation to exploit the appeal of sport or sport itself for their partisan interests.

Another reason why we are reluctant to be overly upbeat is related to the increasing diversity within the discourse. This is not solely due to the exuberant sprawl of sport into domains as distinctive as the arts, politics, and identity and the magnitude sport has assumed. Rather, as the academic world has become much more receptive to the study of mass culture, sport has been adopted by scholars in many other disciplines and neighboring fields as a worthy and legitimate object of investigation. Given the broad spectrum of topics, theoretical foundations, and methodological approaches, which we think does justice to the complex nature of sport, the practical and conceptual emptiness in the centre of a multi-, inter-, trans- and non-disciplinary web of researchers is clearly detrimental to the factual development of a sociology of sport as a discrete area of study and singular entity (Carrington, 2015).

Within general sociology, sport research continues to be belittled and marginalized. The leading sociology journals hardly ever feature a sociology of sport article. Sport sociologists are usually not hired by sociology departments,
but by kinesiology departments or schools of health and sport sciences, which normally places them in an unfavorable position in the contest for resources. While a sociologically informed lens is able to enrich the kinesiological concerns with health outcomes for example, in practice there is not much interest in collaboration. The schism is probably due to the different academic logic and gratification systems of the social and natural sciences, which aggravates the junior or even marginal status of the sociology of sport in the inter-departmental hierarchy.

3. Critical turn: Believers, apologetics, cynics, and heretics

Sport has not always been viewed critically as a conservative institution incorporating the essence of capitalist modernity and neoliberal ideology. It took a long time after its inception phase in close proximity to physical education for the sociology of sport to liberate itself from structural-functionalist theory and its self-image as a value-free, positivist sociology. Structural-functionalism began to lose validity once neo-Marxism, feminist studies, and race and ethnic minority studies initiated the assault on the belief in the positive value of existing social structures in the service of system maintenance and turned it into a sustained criticism of their oppressive nature and conflict potential. Until the “critical turn” of the 1980s started to shift majorities within the field, much sport research embraced a naïve normative belief in the functional good of sport and physical exercise. Cross-fertilization with cultural studies and praxeologist theory and its constructivist methodology contributed to the reconfiguration of the field at large.

Having said that, however, it must be stated that a stubborn belief in the essentially pure and good nature of sport and its physical effects to facilitate individual and community growth among those who play or consume it continues to dominate the view of many outside academia, including policy makers, public administrators, and the powerful international sport organizations. For very practical reasons, based on the proposals likely of interest to funding bodies, much research remains under-theorized and bluntly ignorant of its political significance, thereby ultimately serving the dominant political order.

Even within academia we have seen how the “Great Sport Myth” has had a devastating impact on the development of sport sociology in the periphery of the American-Eurocentric centers and in the Global South (Coakley, 2015). While the practice field of sport offers postcolonial subjects the rare and highly visible opportunity to “strike back” against the former colonizers, the sociology of sport in the Global South also tends to be positioned alongside believers of and apologists for the “Great Sport Myth” and rarely partakes in the subaltern radical criticism of neocolonial structures in sport. In contrast, heretics and cynics that critically explore the mechanisms behind the proliferation of the “Great
Sport Myth” have come to constitute a substantial part of the mainstream among contemporary sport sociologists in the Global North.

But even critical scholars can find themselves as unconscious or involuntary collaborators. What they are able to research is first of all determined by the willingness of funding institutions to support it, and all public sport programs, whether in the service of public health, social inclusion, or community development, are deeply rooted in the “Great Sport Myth” that these institutions take for granted. Second, what sport is and hence what sport sociology is looking at continues to be defined by the mass media and their commercially driven focus on a rather narrow section of highly specialized, professionalized, and spectacularized Olympic sports. Dart’s content analysis of sociology of sport journals demonstrated a skew in attention towards the “Big Four” sports in North America (American football, baseball, basketball, and [ice] hockey) plus soccer and some Olympic sports, in contrast to the extreme rareness of research on indigenous sport. If relevance of research interest is reduced to the proportional share of mediated attention, the sociology of sport is in danger of passing over the rich variety of physical games and contests practiced around the globe at various levels and the possibilities for changing the general conceptualization of “sport” (Blanchard, 1996). It also capitulates all too easily in struggles over agenda setting, which is a crucial prerequisite for effective political activism.

4. The interventionist turn

The struggle for fair representation of women in sport is probably the earliest example of sport sociologists consciously joining sides with social activists to achieve social change (Sage, 2015). It is only in the past two decades that sport—particularly in its highly commercialized and corporatized forms—has become one key field for advocacy networks that resist neoliberal forms of globalization and modernist backlashes against an open and equal society. Critical sport sociologists would have been satisfied with demonstrating how global sport organizations like the IOC or FIFA have transformed into transnational business entities that flourished from the worldwide expansion of the “professional” version of sport and the concomitant increase in market value (Donnelly, 2015). Rooted in the tradition of the critical social sciences, “old school” sport sociology provided important insight into the global asymmetry of production networks in sporting goods (Manzenreiter, 2014), the extraction of sport talent from the Global South for consumption in the Global North (Bale and Maguire, 1994), and the negative impact on public good and the environment caused by the sport mega-event industries (Horne, 2007; Manzenreiter and Spitaler, 2012; Scherer, 2016).

More recently, interventionist sport sociologists, however, who have been concerned with the devastating effects of monopoly capitalism on sport and the
neoliberal Zeitgeist in sport, the society in which it is embedded, or neocolonial relationships emerging in the Global South, have started to collaborate with investigative journalists and to approach the media directly to reach new audiences beyond their peers and students. In many cases, sociologists themselves have become activists that apply investigative and participatory research methods while standing up against social problems that became transparent because of their relationship with sport as an industry or a consumer good. Driven by a sense of social responsibility and ethical engagement and the commitment to a better future, they have come to use sport as a tool to act against some of the social ills of contemporary times. They have engaged in movements resisting housing evictions as a common collateral of hosting sports mega-events (Lenskyj, 2008). They have rallied against the exploitation of Third World labor in the global commodity chains of sporting goods manufacture (Mamic, 2004). The increasing unwillingness of local electorates and media in the Global North to support the ambitions of state and city governments bidding for the flagship events of world sport is also largely due to the impact of interventionist sport sociologists (Lenskyj, 2008; Scherer, 2016). Sport sociologists were also among the founding members of groups such as Football Against Racism in Europe (FARE), a fan-based, bottom-up initiative to tackle racism, xenophobia, and homophobia in soccer. The network was finally acknowledged by UEFA, the European Football Federation, and supported to raise awareness in stadia throughout the continent (Kassimeris, 2009). The uptake of sport as a facilitator in the international peace movement, and the adaptation of sport by NGOs in the field of developmental aid and international cooperation, would not have happened without the intervention of a critical sociology of sport and globalization (Darnell, 2012; Sugden, 2015). Finally, interventionist sport sociology has also reached out to public and private bodies in charge of the supervision of sport at all levels to change regulations and practices within sport to improve the conditions for athletes themselves, no matter whether professional, elite, or amateur (Kidd and Donnelly, 2000).

5. Future challenges

So there is evidence that sport sociology is contributing to sport and society in a meaningful way. While a lot has been achieved, much more remains to be done. If the sociology of sport is to be part of the futures we want, it must do more to prove its relevance to policy makers, academic institutions, general sociology, the world of sport, and society at large. It must take into account that the global sport empire strikes back, luring cash-strapped researchers into its rank and file. By running their own developmental aid in sport programs, often as part of their social responsibility marketing schemes, the international institutions of sport, the multinational sporting goods industry, and other “corporate carpetbags...
(Sugden, 2015: 607) capitalize on the appeal of the “Great Sport Myth” and on the expertise interventionist sociologists have developed.

As has been the case with the exclusionist disproportionate representation of women, the marginalization of social and ethnic minorities, and the unequal distribution of costs and benefits of sports mega-events, interventionist sociology must continue its struggle to get itself heard despite the power of the media to define sport and its relevance in a way that first of all serves their own commercial aspirations and the interests of their advertising clients. By scrutinizing their activities, but also by engaging with a larger spectrum of sport outside the narrow definition of “prolympic” sport, including indigenous games, health-related exercise, action sport, and other forms of non-competitive and non-formalized physical games and mobility, at community and amateur level alike, it may eventually be able to redefine the terms of the debate (Donnelly, 2015).

The big question is: how to develop in a progressive direction? It is impossible to answer in the time available, but first of all sport sociology must sustain its economic autonomy in order to keep a balanced distance from the media sport industrial complex. Otherwise it cannot engage critically with the global sport empire and the role of the media and promotional culture for the commodification of sport, everyday life, experiences, and identities (Jackson, 2015). Second, it may also need to develop a clearer vision of sport beyond the sport we don’t want to have in the future. This may be well served with more ethnographic research carried out by embedded (and embodied) sociologists who can grasp the global diversity of sport; and teaching an applied sociology to its students might help to translate sociological knowledge into public knowledge (Chalip, 2015). Thirdly, contributions to the development of social theory by focusing on the body and its functions within a somatic network of interpersonal relations could also help reposition the acclamation of the sociology of sport among other sociologies.

References


James Spickard
RC22 Sociology of Religion

These Common Sessions are dedicated to exploring “The Futures We Want,” which I presume includes highlighting the roles that our various sociological subdisciplines can play in what the subtitle of the sessions calls “global sociology and the struggles for a better world.”

This puts the sociology of religion in a bit of a predicament: sociologists once expected religion to disappear. They expected religion to retreat from public life as societies industrialize, rationalize, and globalize. Some thought religion would retain its role in optional private meaning-systems, yet all agreed that religion had lost its former cultural hegemony. Institutional differentiation, rationalization, societalization, and pluralism were supposed to sap religion’s organizational and conceptual strength. The result was a secular society and a privatized religion, meaningful to many but without the influence it had in former eras.

Not so fast, you say. What about North America’s politicized fundamentalism? What about Latin American and African prosperity-Pentecostals? What about radical Islam? To scan the newspapers, religion does not seem to be fading away, at least beyond the failing European state churches and the American mainline.

The fact is, the claim that religion is disappearing was a narrative, not a description of the real world. The sociology of religion missed the discursive turn, which noted that humans chiefly comprehend the world through talk. Talk simultaneously describes and constructs the world, the latter by identifying which parts of the world are relevant and which parts are not for any particular undertaking. This is as true for sociology as it is for anything else: how we talk about things shapes how we treat them.

The story about disappearing religion is but one of six stories about religion’s future that underpin the last century of sociological writing. In those stories, religion is either vanishing or growing stronger, individualizing or creating local communities, shaped by markets, or going global. Each of these six narratives presents a different view of religion and calls on different data to interpret religions’ current social significance.
For example, the story of vanishing religion cites the demographic collapse of European state churches and of the American Protestant Mainline and their concomitant loss of public influence. The story of religious resurgence, by contrast, focuses on the growth of self-proclaimed “conservative” religion, whose vibrancy it interprets as a distorted response to social disadvantage. The story of religious individualization points to the growth of such things as “cafeteria Catholicism,” spiritual self-help groups, 12-step programs, and a New Age “spiritual-not-religious” discourse that now infects even self-proclaimed “conservatives.” The story of local religion emphasizes religious congregations, portraying them as among the few functioning face-to-face communities in an increasingly impersonal world. The market story applies neoliberal economic ideas to the religious sphere, to claim that religious decline is a mirage resulting from state favoritism and regulation. Finally, a growing number of sociologists emphasize religions’ increased transnationalism. From studies of immigrant religion to the intercontinental trade in religious paraphernalia, to the worldwide recruitment of religious warriors, it is no longer possible to understand religion within national boundaries. This, too, becomes a master narrative to explain the shape of our era.

Each of these six stories has advocates. Each has generated a good deal of research. The problem is that research alone does not provide a secure picture of what is going on. One can, for example, read the membership declines of American liberal Protestant denominations as the result of growing religious disenchchantment or as the result of growing religious conservatism. One can see these declines as a sign of increased individualism or an organizational shift from the national to the local level. Or one can see them as the result of the established churches’ failure to deliver a religious product that appeals to consumers. The various narratives too often resist data that does not fit their mold.

That is how narratives work. The sociology of religion is not pre-paradigmatic, in the Kuhnian sense; instead, we suffer from a surplus of (supposed) paradigms. Understanding why tells us a lot about sociology in general, about the sociology of religion in particular, and about how the study of religion can contribute to sociology’s future.

I shall make three points in what follows.

First, I shall argue that narratives are nothing new in sociology, particularly narratives about religion. Our discipline’s intellectual beginnings in nineteenth-century France led us to conceive of religion in a rather peculiar way. This shapes especially secularization theory and the story of religious resurgence, but it shapes some of the other narratives as well.

Second, I shall summarize each of the six narratives, pointing out a few of their strengths and weaknesses. Each of them does see real aspects of religion, and thus generates useful research. As theory, however, each comes up short. I shall hint how.
Third, I want to suggest a consequence of having a subdiscipline that mistakes narratives for testable theories. This is not just a consequence for sociology, but for society at large.

The fact is, certain ideas about religion were baked into sociology at birth. Despite German, American, British, and Italian contributions, early sociology arose in France. As Manuel Vásquez (2013) has written, like all pioneers, French sociologists had to distinguish their new discipline from other late-nineteenth-century intellectual movements. In constructing their science, they posed religion as a conceptual “Other.” Where sociology was scientific, religion was superstitious. Where sociology was built on intellectual merit, religion embodied authoritarian repression. Above all, sociology looked toward the future and religion was stuck in the past. This was not just Comte, with his famous three stages (theological, metaphysical, scientific). It also responded to the political fight between Republican France and the ultramontane Roman Catholic Church, whose proclamation of papal infallibility became a compressed symbol for religious authoritarian reaction. The Church did try to undermine the Third Republic; defenders of that Republic—including sociologists—hoped that religion would vanish as science triumphed. Social progress demanded nothing less.

Such anti-religious bias has continued through much of sociology’s existence. Marx, Durkheim, and Weber all saw important roles for religion in the past, less so in the present. The Parsonian synthesis treated religion as one of several specialized institutions, increasingly relegated to society’s margins. Even in America, continued religiosity is something to be explained. Secularism is the unmarked category in most sociological writing.

This way of thinking would support the religion-is-vanishing narrative, even if we lacked data about religious decline. That’s what Vásquez meant when he called secularization theory sociology’s default view.

The resurgent religion narrative stems from a parallel source. First, there is Marx’s famous “opium of the people” remark, whose intention was not to denigrate religion but to point out its role in adjusting people to soulless conditions. In this view, religion resurges in response to social dislocation, status anxiety, and as a means of reorienting the self in a rapidly changing world. We talk about revitalization movements: those religious revivals that claim to restore the past while making the present more palatable to people in crisis. We talk about relative deprivation, which drives those who think they are losing status to embrace radical groups, religious ones among them. These views treat religion as false consciousness. They say, in effect, that participants think they are doing religion, but they are actually trying to salve secular injuries. To use Rodney
Stark’s term, religion is a “compensator” (Stark and Bainbridge, 1987: 36). It is not the real show.

The slip, here, is from examining the social correlates of religious life to treating religion as something that needs to be explained. We find this attitude in five of the six stories we are considering. Besides the vanishing and resurgent stories, attention to religious individualism treats religion as primarily a source of meaning in a society where overarching meaning systems can no longer be assumed. Attention to religious communities similarly contrasts those communities with the (supposed) erosion of face-to-face ties in other parts of life. Market models of religion emphasize the “purchase” of “religious goods,” the consequences of “religious investment,” and, in early versions of the approach, the supernatural compensations that religion brings. Each of these narratives treats religion as an example or a symptom of other social processes. None of them treats it as a fact in itself.

Only the global-religion narrative sticks mainly to description (though some other narratives produce description as well). This is not just a matter of the global narrative’s newness, nor the fact that it does not yet constitute an overarching theory of the direction in which religion is moving. It may be that sociology has shunted religion aside for so long that we lack a ready way to explain religion’s new transnationalism as anything but a sideshow. Global economic forces happen on the main stage; global religion becomes a me-too. We sociologists simply do not know how to put religion in the center of the picture.

Going forward, this is the sociology of religion’s main task. We need to find new ways to think about religion that do not reduce religion to an afterthought or an epiphenomenon. In many ways, nineteenth-century religion was early sociology’s “Great Satan.” Each of the current narratives inherits this attitude. Each sees part of the religious picture, but only through a narrative lens.

What are those six narratives? We have met two, both of which connect religion to the social processes underlying modernity. The secularization story connects the decline of religion to modernity’s increased division of labor, to its emphasis on the national rather than on the local community, to its emphasis on the individual, and to its pluralism. The resurging religion story reads religion’s increased “conservatism” as a reaction to modernity’s destruction of traditional life and to the relatively rule-less nature of the contemporary world. Benjamin Barber’s *Jihad vs McWorld* (2001) contains both, drawing the connection between them. Some recent work usefully pushes these narratives’ boundaries. Examples include two collections that compare secularization regimes around the globe (Burchardt et al., 2015; Calhoun et al., 2011). Other examples are
works by Juergensmeyer (2003) and Roy (2004), each of whom differently explores the ways that radical resurgent religion creates a complex sense of identity.

The story of religious individualism runs as follows. In the past, religions were centered on organizations: churches, synagogues, mosques, and so on. People were socialized into following their organization’s institutional package. One could expect a Catholic to believe in the Trinity, attend Mass, and to venerate the saints, and one could expect a conservative Baptist to read the Bible, to proof-text, and to believe in personal salvation. The same held for other groups. The religious present, says this narrative, is much different. Today, people demand the right to choose their religious views for themselves, whether or not they follow the official line. For example, Meredith McGuire argues that the era of organizational hegemony was an anomaly, based on the Reformation effort to control believers’ lives; that era has now passed, as she shows in her studies of spiritual healing groups (1988) and individual “lived religion” (2008). Other studies by Davie (1995) on Presbyterian women and Brown (2001) on immigrant Haitian voodoo show similar religious patterns.

The story of religious localism was designed to explain American religious trends—specifically the decline of national denominations and the rise of local congregations as the core unit of religious life. American churches have long been organized locally, but never so much as today. At present, finding “the right” religious community is less a matter of matching the group’s theology to individual beliefs than it is a matter of finding a congregation whose social patterns one finds congenial. “Church shopping” is a common practice when people move to a new town. Typically, “friendliness” is high on the list; theology appears much lower down, if at all.

Why might religious localism be so important? The growth-of-congregations story sees it as a response to the increasing power of large-scale institutions in late-modern life. As governments, big industries, and big commerce expand their reach, individuals may retreat to localism as a haven in a difficult world. The religious congregation stands alongside family and friends in offering personal support and close social ties. As the growth of a mass society makes such personal connections all the more important, religion—in its local manifestation—becomes increasingly significant.

In any event, the religious-localism story tells us that religious declines on the national level do not add up to a decline of religion overall. In fact, it tells us to expect an expansion of religious localism in all of its forms.

A fifth religious narrative begins with the idea that churches compete for “customers” in religious “markets” (Stark and Finke, 2000; Finke and Stark, 2005). Those markets may consist of hundreds of competing small “firms” or they may consist of one or a few large churches that hold national or local religious monopolies. Postulating that the “demand” for religious “goods” is nearly
always constant, the religious market story claims that the dynamics of religious life are merely a special case of the dynamics of all market behavior. Religious consumers, like other consumers, rationally seek to maximize their benefits. If one knows something about the characteristics of religious “firms” and the applicable religious market structure, one can predict any specific religious future.

Despite its previously claimed status as a “new paradigm,” the religious-markets narrative is not so common of late. Not only did it depend on some rather questionable assumptions; its stronger claims also failed empirical testing (see Spickard, 1998; Olson, 1999; Chaves and Gorski, 2001).

Our final narrative is less coherent than the others, but that is perhaps because it moves in so many simultaneous directions. The story that religion is going global includes studies of religious immigration, of multi-polar religious communities; of “transnational villagers,” of dual- and multi-national religious organizations, and of “reverse missionizing” (Warner and Wittner, 1998; Smith and Kulothungan, 2006; Levitt, 2001; Spickard, 2004; Catto, 2012; Adogame, 2013). It includes Beyer’s 2006 Luhmanian analysis of religion as a global conceptual category. And it includes some of the work on transnational religious “conservatism” cited with the resurgent-religion narrative, above. The common thread is a new social ecosystem: national borders matter less than before, as cheap communications and air travel create new opportunities for non-local interaction. As the Indian-British writer Salman Rushdie put it, with globalization “things do not belong together and do live side by side... you can live upstairs from Khomeini” (i.e., from the very man who issued a fatwa calling for his murder; quoted in Beyer, 1994a: 1). Sociologists of religion are still figuring out how this changes things, if it in fact does.

These six narratives do not cover the entire subdiscipline, but they cover most of it. They are the too-often unexamined underpinnings of our investigations.

III

These underpinnings have consequences, and not just for sociology. They also influence public policy in detrimental ways. The religion-is-vanishing narrative, for example, leads to patronizingly liberal policies toward religion so long as it remains part of private life. Religion is seen as good, but we worry about people being “too religious,” particularly when they are religious in the public sphere. The French headscarf controversy and Americans’ fright over resurgent “fundamentalisms” are two examples. Each involves religion that refuses to stay private.

The resurgent-religion narrative goes a step further: it creates an opposition between religion and modern life. It is but a few steps from The Fundamentalism Project and Jihad vs McWorld to the calls of various American presidential
candidates to “fight back” against (supposedly) “medieval” religion (Marty and Appleby, 1991, 1992; Barber, 2001). In fact, this narrative has fed an anti-religious reaction. Hout and Fischer (2002), and more recently Putnam and Campbell (2010), have argued that the growth of irreligion among young Americans amounts to a statement that “If that’s religion, I don’t want any part of it.”

These two narratives undercut religions’ moral critique of the status quo. So do most of the others. Why pay attention to religious critique, if religions are vanishing from the world stage? Or individualizing? Or turning inward to form small communities? Why pay attention, if religions are just self-interested organizations with their own goods to sell? Especially why pay attention, when religions of all kinds seem to be increasingly and violently anti-modern?

None of our six narratives engages social teachings as a core part of religious life. None of them emphasizes the ability of religions to shape social life in intentional ways. Instead, religions are seen as irrelevant, as obstructionist, as inward, or as self-interested. There is no place for Selma, for Cape Town, or for Gdansk—i.e., for religiously driven social liberation—in these stories.

Why does this matter to sociology? Former ISA President Michael Burawoy (2015) has argued that we are in the midst of an intellectual movement that he calls “third-wave marketization.” This is the ideology that free markets cure all ills. The first wave began with the British critique of mercantilism, articulated by Adam Smith in the 1770s. The second wave began after World War I. The third wave took political power with the Thatcher and Reagan regimes in the 1980s. Each wave increased social inequality. Each destroyed workers’ rights. Each led to one or another form of economic collapse. The third wave is with us still.

Burawoy describes some of the forces that opposed (and still oppose) this marketization: workers’ movements, unions, political activists, intelligentsias. He does not mention the religious voices that opposed the first two waves, from the Christian Chartists through the Catholic social encyclicals to Protestant neo-orthodoxy, the civil rights movement, and liberation theology. This is symptomatic of sociology’s treatment of religion as a sideshow.

More importantly, where are the religious moral voices protesting the third wave? European churches are either silent or unheard. America’s Protestant Mainline has lost its public presence, Latin American and African Christianity concern themselves with personal, not social, betterment, Jihadist Islam attacks engaged Muslim intellectuals, Hindutva activists attack post-colonial theorists, and on and on. The 1986 American Catholic Bishop’s pastoral letter on the economy was heard, but Pope Benedict’s near identical Caritas in Veritate

* Besides Republican candidate Donald Trump’s pledge to bar Muslims from the U.S., candidate Carly Fiorina claimed that her undergraduate degree in medieval history would help her defeat the Islamist terrorist group ISIS.
(2009) was not. Only Pope Francis and the Dalai Lama seem present sources of religious morality to the public mind.

I am not just arguing that the social trends on which these six narratives focus undercut religious moral critique of the contemporary world—though I think they may. More than that, the six sociological narratives themselves reinforce this loss of voice, because they hide that aspect of religious life. To the degree that ordinary people look to sociology for insight, our accounts of religion hinder religions’ moral authority.

We sociologists of religion need to pay attention to what our discipline’s stories do not let us—and the public—see.

REFERENCES

VIII. CHILDHOOD, EDUCATION, AND CARE
Good Childhood—Good Future World?
Global Programs and the Sociology of Childhood

Doris Bühler-Niederberger
RC53 Sociology of Childhood

Better childhoods—a royal road to a better world?

To create a better world by providing better childhoods is by no means a new attempt. Early modern Europe discovered the importance of the individual and its interiority for an ordered society; hence men of the churches and the states, and later on experts, systematically attempted to shape childhoods and to educate society members as they were required.

Extreme images of children guided such endeavors. Religious reformers reminded their contemporaries about children’s sinful nature and aimed at complete subordination of children to parents and schools—for the sake of society’s future. The opposite was true for some early pedagogues, who saw children as characterized by natural innocence and attempted to preserve this innocence by an education which should not prescribe and intervene, but rather follow. Evidently, real living children and their quality of life were not of much interest (Bühler-Niederberger, 2015). The images and programs were inherently ideological; the starting point was the definition of a universal character of the child, and this was deduced from the basic world view and put into the service of this view. Last but not least, the childhood institutions they created were soon exported into large parts of the world.

Today’s public and organized concern about children and childhood remains inextricably tied to the interest in societal reform and development. Hence, such programs rather focus on society, while children’s experiences often remain unconsidered. Therefore, this contribution will question the underlying assumptions concerning children and childhood in today’s programs. Furthermore, it will ask in which way childhood research initiated around RC 53 Sociology of Childhood has challenged such programs. Finally, it will make suggestions for future childhood-sociological research contributing to the search for good childhoods, as well as good societies.
Today’s programs—global and local approaches

International organizations became more active in childhood policy after the Second World War (Therborn, 1996), and this resulted, for example, in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1990. This program is not only global due to its protagonists, but also due to the claims: worldwide standards for childhood enforced by an internationally accepted legal framework. This framework is based on the image of a child who is in need of care, protection, and education, but who shall be involved in decisions concerning his or her own life, too. This can be summarized by the notion of the “three p’s” that governments ought to ensure for children: protection, provision, and participation (Bardy, 2000).

The activity of international organizations is not focused on children’s actual lives; it is mainly oriented towards the future of the world. World Bank promises social and economic profit for global society if countries adopt Early Childhood Education programs as World Bank has initiated them since the 1990s: “A child’s earliest years present a window of opportunity to address inequality and improve outcomes later in life. The potential benefits from supporting early childhood development (ECD) range from improved growth and development to better schooling outcomes to increased productivity in life” (World Bank, 2014). In this report, World Bank refers to the work of the economists Carneiro and Heckman (2003). Their famous curve of educational return rates serves as a proof that a childhood according to global standards is a good investment. This curve is, however, based on several preschool programs that were running in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s addressing mainly African American children living in deprived urban areas. Global conclusions are based on such local evidence, and World Bank writes in a report on education in Africa: “If Africa is to fulfill its economic development objectives, it must start with investing in young children . . . to transform today’s young children into human capital assets for Africa’s economic transformation” (World Bank, 2001: 2).

Last but not least, the programs are global in their way of assembling data to assess the outcomes. Evaluation is based on national and international statistics and large-scale studies. UNICEF is actively involved in collecting this data in the reports titled “State of the World’s Children,” in the “Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys” (MICS-Program), and in the “Innocenti Report Cards.” Such data show, for example, the decline in infant and child mortality, growing school and preschool enrollment rates, etc. The figures they report are impressive. However, critique may be heard as to the way the effects were assessed and to their alleged magnitude (Pogge, 2007). The use of these results in league tables and worldwide country rankings is criticized as a (postcolonial) mode of government (Tag, 2012).
Such critique may be referred to as a local approach. While the global program is especially the approach of “doers,” the local standpoint is that of scientists and of smaller NGOs. Many of the members of RC53 are in favor of such a standpoint, too. They criticize the global actors for the promotion of a universal nature of the child which as a matter of fact would correspond to a merely Western concept of childhood. Moreover, they object that the discourse of the global actors adds up to the naturalization of a world of efficiency by the child’s (alleged) universal development; Einboden et al. call this “technobiopolitics” (2013: 549). More specifically, the critique concerns the “parentalization” and “schoolification” of childhood, the preparation of children for market-economy adulthoods, and the disregard for local cultures (Ambert, 1994; Boyden, 1997; Burman, 1999; Penn, 2009; Monaghan, 2012).

The preferred research methodology in this approach is qualitative and ethnographic. Taken together, these studies show that children growing up outside their (nuclear) families in rather unprotected childhoods, with high workloads and sometimes considerable responsibility for siblings, are a common phenomenon in many places in the Global South. The most important concern for the authors of the studies is to let the readers know that children struggle with the conditions they live in—to try to make the best of the situation, but also accept the rules of their context and in this way acquire the prerequisites to survive in their localities. Furthermore, several of these studies argue that survival may become more difficult due to the intrusion of global childhood standards (Liebel, 2004; Jacquemin, 2006; Woldehanna et al., 2008; Payet and Franchi, 2008; Twum-Danso Imoh, 2013). Many such studies can be found in the most important journals of childhood sociologists like Childhood, Global Studies of Childhood, Children’s Geography.

These studies taking a local perspective follow what Tisdall and Punch (2012: 251) called the “mantra” of childhood sociology: i.e., they perceive children as “social actors.” This implies that children are considered sufficiently competent to get along in the social world and even to realize their own advantage against all odds. Additionally, researchers have to give “voice” to children; they have, therefore, to respect them as “knowers” of what it is to be in the world in the position of a child (Alanen, 2009: 169). Accordingly, research reports include many and long quotations of children’s views: Children, with their “voices,” become chief witnesses for this research.

Such studies serve as a clear warning that no programs for better childhoods should be established without considering children’s local experiences. However, their theoretical and methodological starting points prove to have their own bias. They diminish researchers’ attentiveness to the very steep and brutal generational and gender hierarchies that often characterize local childhoods. Because researchers make children their chief witnesses they can’t consider that children’s statements in favor of local conditions might well be a form
of “complicity” of the victims (Bourdieu, 1990), submitting to local structural asymmetries.

Therefore, we have to conclude that today’s approaches to improve childhood have not changed fundamentally in many respects. The definitions of children remain normatively overloaded, obliged to the worldviews of their respective protagonists. In this way they largely ignore the social structural conditions in which the children live.

**Hybrid childhoods: Towards a social structural and mixed methods approach**

The search for qualities of societies and corresponding qualities of childhoods is not made obsolete by such shortcomings. In recent years many researchers have approached childhood qualities with the concept of “well-being.” But most researchers worldwide use one and the same definition of well-being; they assess and compare continual well-being measurements at the national level and do this mostly in large-scale studies (Rees and Main, 2015; for a qualitative approach see Fattore et al., 2016). Therefore, systematic attempts to analyze social conditions and consequences of childhood qualities are still pending. In this context, UNICEF’s recent effort to interconnect its periodically repeated measurements of (national) child wellbeing with social inequalities is clearly a step into the right direction (UNICEF, 2016).

My proposal to study childhoods and their qualities in interconnection with structural characteristics of societies wants to overcome the gap between a local and a global stance and between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Firstly, I suggest considering today’s childhoods as *hybrid* childhoods. They mix elements of schoolified and parentalized childhood with experiences of the childhoods of the adult generation; this mixture is adapted to local exigencies and possibilities (cf. Twum-Danso Imoh, 2012). Hybridization is part and consequence of economic changes and of geographical and social mobility. This implies, secondly, that childhoods are in continuous process of change; their variety in and across regional and local contexts is considerable and has to be assessed in terms of their multifaceted quality. Thirdly, it is by constant comparisons of social contexts and the childhoods lived in them that the search for structural conditions and consequences shall be advanced.

Three studies may be presented to illustrate this approach. The first one is a completed study on Kyrgyz preschool children. The central part of the data collection was sessions in kindergartens with 117 children aged three to six. We used several child-adapted methods to assemble data on children’s joys, sorrows, views of themselves, and their context. These children belonged to the less than 20% of Kyrgyz children visiting institutions of early education; many of these institutions were supported or initiated by international organizations.
The study included interviews with 60 parents of these children. The results showed that these very young children had to deal with the burden of being a promise of escape from poverty for the whole family. The message of early education as a path of upwards mobility was taken as an opportunity in a region with a very unfavorable labor market and obscure processes of status allocation. Parents’ high aspirations went along with close surveillance of children’s preschool achievement and considerable pressure in case of failure. These high expectations were adopted by the young children, and they defined themselves in this frame of reference. While children gained a sense of their importance in this way, their main concern was the harsh style of education. Parent interviews gave much insight into situations where they were short and strict with their young children, too. Evidently, schoolification of childhood did not result in democratic generational relations (Bühler-Niederberger and Schwittek, 2014).

The second study is an ongoing project on changes in childhood across generations. It involves university students in Italy, Germany, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan; around a hundred students in each country. These students are asked to write short essays concerning their own childhood, the childhoods of their parents, and the childhoods they would like to realize in the future for their own children; open-ended and closed questions were asked. To this point the data for 75 Italian students of teaching and social work have been analyzed. The upward mobility of these students was considerable: One fourth of the parents had finished obligatory schooling only, just one fifth had a university background, and two-thirds grew up in poor regions of the South or villages and little towns in rural regions. When students described the childhoods of their parents, only one said her parents had grown up in economically more favorable conditions than she had, but more than one-third mentioned economic scarcity or real poverty for their parents’ childhood. Their parents had to be useful for their families, to work in the field or the house or to enter early into the labor market. Rigid rules, harsh authority, strong gender differences were other characteristics mentioned of parents’ childhoods. We may call such ways of growing up “functional childhoods.” Less than one-tenth said their parents’ childhood had been about the same as their own. In all other cases several of the characteristics of such a functional childhood were mentioned.

Meanwhile, they described their own childhoods as very different. Some still mentioned economic shortages, especially in relation to the childhood they aimed at for their own children: About one-sixth wanted to have more to offer. Nevertheless, 80% of the students judged their childhoods to have been of a very high quality. Childhoods were often described by the same words: to have been “spensierata,” “gioiosa” (unburdened, joyful). The most important element of these happy childhoods was unconditional parental love and care, while other elements like siblings or peers were mentioned rather rarely. Unlike their parents, these students were now freed from all other duties besides their educa-
tional project (only one of the girls said she had helped her mother with household duties), and they were supported by parental love and care. The schoolification of these childhoods went along with a clear improvement in their quality. They never mentioned parental pressure for academic success when they described their childhoods, and the path to success seemed to be relatively easily accessible; although this might be different in cases of more ambitious branches of study.

In one and the same local context real and perceived chances of social mobility are unequal for different social groups. Childhoods differ due to such inequalities. This is what the third study shows, which is currently ongoing in Germany. In contrast to the two previously presented studies, which included both qualitative and quantitative methods, this one is mainly quantitative, working with questionnaires administered in classrooms. Below I refer to the data on fourth graders, 8-to-10-year-old children living in an urban area of North-Rhine-Westphalia: 214 children with a German family background, 93 children with a Turkish immigrant background, and 109 children with an immigrant background from post-Soviet states.

The autochthonous group is quite confident as to the future success of their children. According to the answers of the German children, their parents remain supportive and avoid pressure even in the case of bad marks. Meanwhile, parents with a Turkish immigration background incite their children to be more successful by invoking emotional involvement: The children say their parents are disappointed if they get bad marks but unconditionally take the position of the child in cases of conflict with the school. Parents with an immigrant background from post-Soviet states try to boost their children’s success with considerable pressure: They yell and scold more frequently. The pressure is successful—their children get by far the best marks. But both groups of children with an immigrant background have higher school anxiety; children say they worry about school before falling asleep. Asked for their wishes for the future, children with an immigrant background have particularly high aspirations. Considering their marks and teachers’ recommendations for their future school career, these high aspirations are less than realistic as far as the children with a Turkish background are concerned. All these differences proved to be statistically significant.

Conclusion

Are attempts to improve childhood successful, even if they are actually and primarily interested in efficient societies—and are they so concerning the quality of society or the quality of childhood? This was the question that initiated this contribution. It was supported by the very evident disinterest of the protagonists of such attempts in real living children and their local conditions. The question
cannot be answered on the basis of an ideological dispute, though, and the gap between representatives of a local or a global approach is merely an obstacle. Rather, we need empirical studies analyzing the qualities of (always hybrid) childhoods in varying circumstances. The three studies outlined above provide some insights into the effects of what may be called a schoolification and parentalization of childhood. The case of the Italian childhoods showed how much the fact that children no longer had to be useful for their families but rather received parental support for their education went along with an overall improvement in and a democratization of intergenerational relations. Based on data from different countries, Baker and LeTendre (2005) showed that gender inequalities are reduced in the same way. Schoolification, besides improving childhoods, could be seen as an important step toward a more democratic society. However, schoolification may also induce stress and strain, and the generational hierarchy may remain a burden; as was the case for Kyrgyz preschoolers and the children with an immigrant background in Germany. The interpretation offered here is that this is consequential to limited and maybe haphazardly distributed chances for social mobility.

The promise for parents and children that is implied within schoolified childhoods is that of a good future for the next generation. International organizations allege that “good” childhoods create structural chances on the individual and macro levels. On the basis of childhood research, we rather conclude that structural chances create good childhoods. Thus, we seem to end up with a hen-and-egg-problem when looking for the interconnection of “good societies” and “good childhoods”; the least we can say is that the qualities of both are closely linked: there is not one without the other.

Note

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References


26. Emerging and Continuing Inequalities in Education

Anthony Gary Dworkin and Marios Vryonides
RC04 Sociology of Education

Introduction

Education is an institution that profoundly affects most segments of society. It serves myriad functions, from the socialization and training of the young, to preparing and retraining a competent labor force, to securing for the elderly a meaningful and enriched retirement. Around the world there are a plethora of factors that facilitate or retard educational goals. Sociologists of education focus on an array of issues, seeking to explore unanticipated and unintended outcomes of educational policies, practices, and procedures among diverse groups. Much of our work addresses issues of educational inequality. Sociology of education is both global and local in its focus and applies a broad range of sociological theory and research methods. In our 2013 contribution to the ISA journal *Sociopedia* (Dworkin et al. 2013), we and our colleagues on the RC04 (Sociology of Education) board enumerated an array of current topics in the sociology of education. In the present chapter we focus on two areas of emerging and continuing research: uses and misuses of educational accountability systems and concerns about multiculturalism in light of immigrant and refugee populations. These two areas play central roles in the sociology of education and are not isolated only to the sociology of education. Rather, accountability and multicultural themes raise research questions in numerous areas of sociology, including in the areas of social stratification, race/ethnic relations, gender relations and equity, the status of immigrants and refugees, concerns about political stability and civic participation, the study of youth and of continuing education of adult populations, to identify only a few.

Educational Accountability

Over the past three decades the nature of school accountability has changed due to the influence of neoliberal policies and expectations. In several developed nations the form of accountability has been identified with what has been termed the “Standards-based School Accountability Movement.” Neoliberalism stresses the
“marketization” or “commodification” of social life and social institutions (Ball 2003). Consequently, the movement and, generally, neoliberalism see the value of an educational system being a commodity, as couched in its capacity to raise the competitiveness of a nation, and more locally in terms of the ratings of schools and school systems. Social institutions can be best assessed in terms of their effectiveness (raising achievement based on standardized test scores) and their efficiency (reducing costs). Central to the marketization model is the perception by neoliberals that the private sector can provide goods and services of better quality and at a lower, more competitive cost than government or the public sector. It is central to the neoliberal assumption that private schools by their very competitiveness will produce the best results in student achievement. The standards-based movement holds that the test of the superiority of private sector–generated goods and services in education can best be demonstrated by periodic, externally imposed standardized tests because they offer an easily understood, relatively inexpensive “bottom line” assessment of educational quality. Schools, school districts, teaching staffs that produce low student test scores are to be replaced, and nations whose students score poorly on international standardized tests are to be ignored by multinational corporations seeking competent labor forces. Pigozzi (2006) noted that countries with well-educated populations and high scores on standardized tests are likely to thrive, while those without such populations and test results tend to stagnate.

The Standards-based School Accountability Movement emerged out of forces in both the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1980s. In the US the movement began with the release of a report by the President’s Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) entitled “A Nation at Risk,” under the Reagan administration. Concerns over low aggregate student achievement and the competitiveness of the US labor force among corporate leaders were combined with fears among elite and middle class white parents that multiculturalism and humanistic directions in education in the public schools would diminish the advantages their children had over students of color and those in poverty. In the UK concerns over the extent to which non-Europeans in the Commonwealth might change the nature of British society led to policies under the Thatcher government that would also diminish pressures toward multiculturalism and maintain the educational hegemony of the middle class (especially over working class families who also wanted stronger trade unionism).

As examples, in the United States accountability took the form of high-stakes testing under the aegis of No Child Left Behind in 2001, Race to the Top in 2009, and the Every Child Succeeds Act of 2015, as well as earlier state-initiated accountability tests following the 1983 “A Nation at Risk” report. Each of the accountability measures mandated externally imposed standardized tests as a means by which schools and teachers were to be assessed. Australia also adopted a high-stakes system, the NAPLAN (ACARA 2010). The standards-
based movement changed the nature of testing, from measures designed to assess student learning and in turn foster remediation, to tests designed to weed out ineffective teachers and close low-performing schools. Externally imposed accountability, without meaningful input by educators, often creates the kind of alienation and anomie among school personnel described by Robert Merton (1968). It involves a disjuncture between societal goals and structurally available means toward those goals. Children in high-poverty schools bring few educational resources to their classrooms and, combined with lifetime experiences of discrimination, frequently perform poorly on standardized achievement tests. Teachers and school administrators endorse the goal of high student achievement, but conclude that the attainment of that goal through legitimate instruction is problematic or even impossible. Instead, educational personnel innovate by “gaming the system,” engaging in practices that increase the appearance of high student achievement without producing real achievement. In short, they cheat by an array of strategies such as teaching to the test, changing student test answers, encouraging low-performing students to stay home during testing, and reclassifying and moving low performing student to a grade level not subjected to the standardized test (Dworkin 2005, 2008; Dworkin & Tobe 2014a; Duggan 2009). The school children are often the victims of this gaming because, by producing the external appearance of academic achievement, actual learning deficits are never revealed and children do not receive the remediation they need, thereby handicapping them and often resulting in dropout behaviors. School districts and state education agencies likewise engage in similar gaming, sometimes by selecting tests that are relatively easy so that on the surface their state appears to outperform others (Booher-Jennings 2005; Booher-Jennings & Beveridge 2007). Countries engage in a degree of “gaming” too, by preventing some lower-performing groups of students from taking such international exams as PISA, TIMSS, PIRLS. In that way the whole of their future labor force appears to be more competent than those of other nations and the countries thus obtain a competitive economic advantage over others.

**Accountability and the Transformation of Trust**

Underlying the externally imposed school accountability system is a “hierarchy of distrust.” The public, business leaders, and the national government do not trust the states to produce a competent labor force; the states do not trust the school districts, and school districts do not trust their school principals, who do not trust their teachers, who do not trust their students or the parents of their students. The current conditions have emerged from a basic transformation of the system of trust that has supported public education for generations. High-stakes accountability systems violate the system of trust between schools, teachers, and society.
In most countries the relationship between teachers and school systems has been what Bryk and Schneider (2002) called *organic trust* or the unquestioning trust that exists in small-scale societies (*Gemeinschaft*). However, in the case of neoliberal accountability systems there is a supposition that teachers cannot be trusted to do their jobs competently unless threatened with termination. Relations become based on *contractual trust*, vested in formally defined relationships that necessitate the force of law. Prior to accountability systems there existed a social contract between teachers and societies in which teachers were able to exchange access to high, more competitive salaries for job security (at least after the granting of tenure), teaching autonomy (in terms of course content), and job flexibility (including summers off). The accountability systems voided all of those options, with the prospect that low student achievement could result in termination even of tenured teachers and the closing of schools. Further, standardized tests dictate what is to be taught, and the need for remedial classes frequently results in teachers being expected to work through the summer. Nevertheless, accountability systems do not tie improved student achievement to the attainment of salaries comparable to what college-educated individuals earn in the corporate world (see Dworkin & Tobe 2014a, 2014b). The transformation of trust has thus resulted in both gaming the educational system through cheating and heightening the levels of job burnout and work alienation among school personnel (Dworkin 2009; Dworkin & Tobe 2014b). Instead of producing greater degrees of educational excellence, accountabilities often operate to make educational excellence less attainable.

**Emerging Trends in Immigration and Multicultural Education**

In recent years political events that produced shockwaves in Europe prompted many commentators to associate them with education. These include recent terrorist attacks in Belgium and France by homegrown minority youths. Many saw the phenomenon of drafting youths to extreme and radical terrorist groups as a failure of the education system among other things to culturally integrate minority groups in society, making them vulnerable to calls for radicalization. Because of the migration flows in Europe, recent discussions focused on the changing cultural character of European societies. During the last quarter of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, Europe has witnessed wide sociopolitical and demographic changes as a result of increasing migration and transnationalism, which has had an impact on interethnic relations and social cohesion. One of the consequences of these demographic changes has been the creation of the notion of multicultural societies and the need for education to respond to this new reality.

Recently, and possibly as an indirect consequence of the recent global economic crisis, the political goal of cultivating multicultural policies has suffered
a significant blow from an emerging changing attitude towards multiculturalism exemplified by the realization of many European leaders (such as German Chancellor Merkel) that the multiculturalism project has in fact been unsuccessful for Europe. This realization could likely point to shifts in national policies in the near future, and specifically to changes in the direction of educational policies away from the goal of multiculturalism. The way multiculturalism changed the face of European society had inevitable effects on the way education systems operate. These changes inevitably brought about changes in the political aspects of education and educational policy making in many countries.

**Promoting Policies of Multiculturalism**

In a book edited more than a decade ago, Smith (2003) brings together a collection of studies that point to the fact that the increase in the number of students from immigrant groups in schools could potentially lead to racial tensions in some countries. When migrant groups are targeted due to reasons unrelated to education (e.g., economic crisis, unemployment, or crime), this may produce adverse effects on the well-being of young individuals from migrant or ethnic minority backgrounds. The problem of inter-ethnic relations in schools was the focus of a 2004 project led by the Italian Centre for Research in Social Affairs, with partners in Spain, Germany, and Latvia (cited in Smith 2004). The partners aimed to identify and analyze examples of good practice in dealing with inter-ethnic conflict labeled as “inter-cultural” in secondary schools. They found that when young people of migrant background were involved in school violence, it was often assumed that cultural identity was the cause of the conflict. A similar finding was produced by a study in five European countries (Italy, Cyprus, Slovenia, Austria, and England) titled “Children’s Voices; Exploring Interethnic Violence in Schools” (Medaric, Sedmak & Walker 2014). An issue that currently is a source of difficult interethnic relations in schools is one that relates to religious background and refers to Islamophobia, particularly in the UK. Crozier and Davies (2008) and Shain (2011) assert that the increased Islamophobia in schools was a direct consequence of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York but seems to have been exacerbated due to the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, which are frequently transferred in Europe in the form of terrorist attacks.

Despite the fact that the majority of European countries employ policies of multiculturalism as far as education is concerned, interethnic and intercultural violence in the school environment is visible in schools. The conditions of interethnic and interracial relations among children and youth across European Union states are highly heterogeneous due to the diverse conditions that exist in each country. On the whole, school violence, especially in subtle forms (verbal harassment, rudeness), has been recognized as an important problem that is
increasing (Kane 2008). Given that government-sponsored education encompasses the all-important attributes for strengthening one’s sense of belongingness to a predetermined group (Bush & Saltarelli 2000), the construction of a distinct identity naturally presupposes that multiculturalism threatens the cohesion of any given community. Institutionalized education is more often than not designed to produce civically oriented citizens suitably “educated” in what best promotes society’s norms and values. Likewise, where interculturalism is preferred, instruction in the native language, for example, may allow room for assimilation; however, the mere reproduction of inequalities through intercultural education will almost certainly maintain segregation.

The sheer categorization of pupils based on their national or ethnic background, their subdivision into non-nationals and aliens, as well as the likely distinction between refugees and asylum seekers, for example, essentially render education susceptible to discrimination. When pupils from a distinct background are all together placed into special, minority classes, the racialization of these groups is inevitable, thus ensuring the dominance of the host culture. Limiting their achievement and advancement in such an environment, pupils from different ethnic backgrounds are condemned to lower educational attainments. Furthermore, the placement of pupils in such classes also has a severe demoralizing effect when considering that local culture may become so dominant as to suppress the customs and traditions of ethnic communities.

Models of Multiculturalism

There is quite a lot of evidence that points to the fact that the educational achievements of minority pupils usually lag behind those of the majority (see Kassimeris & Vryonides 2012). Taking into account the poor performance of migrant children at school, one may deduce that their employment opportunities would be limited, as is the likelihood of improving their living standard. The factors accounting for this trend, nevertheless, appear far more complex. That many Western states have long-established ethnic communities, for example, may suggest that they are experienced enough to look after their communities but not necessarily well equipped to actually meet their needs. In spite of the multitude of measures available to address inequality, such as new curricula intended to foster cultural diversity, instruction in the native language as well as second language courses, and anti-discrimination legislation, the end result of such attempts is not integration and neither is it incomplete or even failed integration. Rather, it is segregation and social exclusion. The presentation of the various ways in which many countries approach the issue of multiculturalism reveals interesting issues that are often examined in a comparative fashion. In the European context, multiculturalism has been influenced by trends in migration. What appears to be the case is that the multicultural project seems to be
failing, as the educational policies that have been introduced over the years have not smoothed the tensions between ethnic groups, but rather, following a number of political events, have led to polarizing effects which are now visible in the form of radical extreme populists and political groups whose voices appear to be on the rise.

This creates a precarious and uncertain future for modern societies, and sociologists of education have a role to monitor and critically examine the outcomes in terms of their effects on issues of social cohesion and social justice.

**Conclusion**

While the array of topics addressed within the sociology of education have implications for many other areas of sociology, the two we selected in this paper, accountability and multiculturalism, speak to key research questions raised within the purview of many research groups in sociology and speak to the theme of the 3rd ISA Forum. Achieving *The Futures We Want* rests on effective schools and on educational systems that promote educational equity and opportunity for all peoples. It further necessitates belief systems that accept cultural differences as elements that enrich a society, rather than as obstacles to be suppressed. Yet there are barriers to the attainment of the goals, and these are encapsulated in the two constructs we address. Educational accountability systems have the potential to highlight where equity and opportunity are being attained and denied. Accountability systems can uncover information about underserved populations and lead to redress of inequalities. However, many times gatekeepers use accountability results to discredit public education and to enhance the privileges of dominant groups and affluent students. Likewise, diversity and inclusion are educational goals that do threaten historical privilege. Nevertheless, Green et al. (2006) illustrated how societies with educational systems that promote inclusion and equality, while stressing excellence, result in greater social cohesion, more civic nationalism over ethnic nationalism, and greater societal stability. In light of the great refugee crises experienced around the world, the use of educational accountability to measure and promote equity and a focus on multiculturalism in education are preferable alternatives to nativism and elitism.

**References**


In contrast to inequalities in health that stem from biological differences brought about by age or genetics, social inequalities in health are mutable and avoidable, as they are affected by public policies. The scope of this global issue is such that the World Health Organisation Commission on Social Determinants of Health (WHO CSDH) stated in its 2008 landmark report that “social injustice is killing people on a grand scale” (WHO CSDH 2008). Fortunately, social inequalities in health are not ineluctable, as they can be affected by governmental social policies.

In recognition of this governmental responsibility, WHO adopted in 2012 the resolution WHA65.8 endorsing the Rio Political Declaration on Social Determinants of Health (WHO 2016). Through this resolution, member states recognize the existence of social determinants of health (SDH) and pledge to implement actions outlined in the Rio declaration, among which to “monitor progress and increase accountability to inform policies on SDH.” As Link and Phelan (1995: 80) put it, to achieve this, we need to understand “what puts people at risk of risks.” This suggests we need to study the root causes structuring the differential opportunity exposure that play such a fundamental role in producing gradients in individual health risk factors and outcomes. Accordingly, in this piece I argue that sociological research on health inequalities must put renewed emphasis on the policy context that structures life chances and opportunities, notably through the stratification system. To do so, medical and health sociology must draw more explicitly on sociological theories and would also gain much from cross-fertilisation of ideas from other sociological subfields.


As argued in Quesnel-Vallée (2015), Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework that should guide the interdisciplinary scientific enquiry of the relationship between policies and social inequalities in health. The center of the figure depicts the central focus, namely the relationship leading causally from social policies to health inequalities. Before we can empirically demonstrate this relationship,
however, work on (1) Definitions and measurement of social policy and health inequalities must occur. As the figure suggests, this work encompasses and shapes the context of the other dimensions of the research conceptually isolated in this figure. In the second axis, two processes building on definitions and measurement proceed in parallel, namely (2a) Monitoring and reporting of health inequalities and (2b) Empirical demonstrations of the effect of social policy on health. Finally, evidence gathered in the previous two dimensions (ideally) informs policy making in a (3) Retroactive feedback loop.

From a sociological perspective, we have much to offer in the realm of the (1) Definitions and measurement of social policy and health inequalities as well as (2b) Empirical demonstrations of the effect of social policy on health, and thus, my comment here will mainly focus on these particular areas.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework

**Taking Stock of the Field**

The observation of an inverse association between socioeconomic status (SES) and poor health and mortality is not novel, and indeed this area of research has generated an exponential growth of publications since the 1980s (Kaplan 2004). However, there is also growing concern that much of this research has been engaged in risk-factor epidemiology or sociology, reporting associations between socioeconomic position and health, but has seldom delved into the root causes of the association, namely the political context and the policies enacted (or not) in this context (Coburn 2004; Kaplan 2004).

Thus, the last decade has seen an increasing number of attempts to take stock of the field to identify gaps, and from there to suggest new theoretical avenues to move knowledge (and eventually action) forward. In this section, I
will briefly discuss key findings of recent literature reviews pertaining to policies and health inequalities from a sociological or social epidemiological perspective.

Beckfield and Krieger (2009) provide a first systematic assessment of research on the political determinants of health inequities. Among the 45 studies they reviewed, they find four primary strands of research represented, namely: 1) transition to capitalism, 2) neoliberal restructuring, 3) welfare states, and 4) political mobilization of subordinated groups. The first two were associated with increasing health inequities, while the last was associated with reductions in health inequities. Results for the welfare states were mixed, insofar as the social democratic countries are not always found to have the lowest health inequities. For the most part, transitions to capitalism and neoliberal restructuring have largely occurred historically, and thus offer perhaps little room for further generalization or intervention; in contrast, the review highlights the potential benefits of policies furthering inclusivity (though reverse causation also always looms large). But the question of the impact of a welfare state remained largely open and in need of clarification. Adopting a similar approach, Muntaner et al. (2011) also sought to examine the role of politics in population health, from a political economy and welfare regime framework. From the 73 studies they identified, four research programs emerged: welfare regimes, democracy, political traditions, and globalization. Again, welfare regimes research exhibited mixed results with regard to social inequalities in health.

In Brennenstuhl, Quesnel-Vallée, and McDonough (2012), we sought to provide some answers to this conundrum of the mixed effects of welfare states on health inequalities. Focusing specifically on studies relying on welfare regime theory, we identified 33 studies meeting the inclusion criteria. Studies fell into two broad types: 1) contrasts of population health or health inequalities across countries classified according to welfare regime typologies, or 2) political determinants or specific policies associated with particular welfare regimes and their relationship with health and health inequalities. In the first group, less than half of the studies confirmed the broadly held hypothesis that countries identified as social democratic would have lower health inequalities. In contrast, studies of the second group, focusing on specific policy instruments, were more likely to show that the inclusive and universal policies that are more typically associated with social democratic countries were associated with better population health and lower health inequalities. This suggests that focusing on what policies actually do, and how they do it, holds more promise for the study of health inequalities than attempting to lump countries together in typologies that may offer heuristic advantages in parsimony, but lack specificity in terms of capturing the processes at play in structuring differential opportunities for equal health.

Finally, Bergqvist, Yngwe, and Lundberg (2013) conducted a meta-review of the aforementioned reviews, focusing on the theoretical approach adopted by
the studies, which were classified as belonging to one of three approaches: the regime approach, the institutional approach, or the expenditure approach. This review then conclusively establishes that the regime approach, the most prolific, is fraught with unmeasured heterogeneity, and is likely too crude an analytic tool for the study of policies and health inequalities moving forward. In contrast, both the expenditure and institutional approaches offer a concrete operationalization of “welfare outputs” that is amenable to a more granular assessment of policy variation between countries. This increases both variance and the power to detect an effect, as well as the potential policy relevance of studies adopting these approaches. In general, studies associated with these approaches suggest that more generous spending and social rights are associated with better health outcomes and lower inequalities, and the authors point out that this may help explain why typologies fail to converge to a straightforward answer: while these policies are perhaps more systematically adopted in social democratic countries, they are not exclusively found in these countries, which muddles the effects in other clusters (i.e., a problem of misclassification of exposure). In contrasting the expenditure and institutional approaches, the authors highlight their respective strengths and weaknesses, ultimately concluding that they are complementary approaches. Indeed, while the expenditure approach offers a more quantifiable exposure, it also is liable to reverse causality, as higher spending may be occurring in response to a more important social problem. In turn, the institutional approach focuses on legislated social rights, which are the theoretical underpinnings of welfare regimes, but indicators based strictly on rights may fail to capture the implementation of policies, which may only exist in principle. Furthermore, as these indicators are not routinely produced, they require deliberate collection efforts.

Such efforts, I would argue, should in fact be seen as an opportunity for sociologists, and indeed, we have seminal models to draw from, such as the Social Citizenship Indicator Program (Korpi 2010) or more currently, the Social Policy Indicators (SPIN 2016; see Lundberg et al. 2015 for a summary of research using these indicators). Going back to Figure 1, there is undoubtedly a need for sociologists to continue to draw from and even develop measures of the indicators of policy, as indicated in oval number 1 (also see Quesnel-Vallée et al. 2012 for an example of development of health systems indicators). On the theoretical front, Beckfield et al. (2015) offered a promising framework for bringing sociological theory more squarely into the comparative study of health inequalities.

**Moving Forward**

The above section highlights that the association between policy and health inequalities has generated increasing interest—and debate—over the past dec-
A consensus is emerging that approaches focusing on policy instruments (the institutional approach) and their outputs (the expenditure approach) offer the promise of reconciling previously observed inconsistencies in the field, in contrast to studies adopting a welfare regime approach to the study of health inequalities. But much remains to be done, and sociologists have theories and approaches that can fruitfully move research forward at their disposal. In suggesting where the field might consider moving forward next, I will first highlight the value of incorporating a life course approach to the social origins of health and disease with a more concerted focus on stratification and the policy context through an example of this approach for understanding health inequalities in older age.

**Example: The (inadvertent) contribution of policies to health inequalities in older age**

Social inequalities in health at older age provide a compelling example of the intersection of life course cumulative processes of advantage and disadvantage that were shaped by prevalent policies, and whose effects can be mitigated or even amplified by policies targeting older adults. As we argued recently (Quesnel-Vallée, Willson, and Reiter-Campeau 2016), drawing on sociological theory and research can shed light on these sometimes unintended consequences of policy action and can help to design policies that transcend existing inequalities in older people, fostering more equitable health outcomes. What follows is a brief summary of the arguments we offer in Quesnel-Vallée, Willson, and Reiter-Campeau (2016) in favor of greater consideration of sociological theories in policy development.

Sociological theory frames the development of inequalities over time and policies’ possible effect on these. Cumulative (dis)advantage theories are well suited to examining inequalities in older age (Pavalko and Caputo 2013). They suggest that relative advantage creates compounding returns over people’s life spans, producing inequalities as an end product (DiPrete and Eirich 2006). For example, the ability to invest in education leads to even more advantage for those who are wealthy enough to afford it (assuming education is not free, that private education confers benefits over public education, or simply factoring in the opportunity cost of more education vs. earlier entry into the labor market). Cumulative inequality theory is an extension that specifically links these life processes to unequal health outcomes (Ferraro and Shippee 2009). It describes how human agency can also mitigate against the cumulative effects of disadvantage while stressing the importance of social systems. These theories ultimately predict that policies that only reach people along existing fault lines born from lifetime disadvantage, like privatized pension schemes and differential access to long-term care, further inequalities.
First, pension schemes can worsen health inequalities in old age through increased privatization and retirement age reforms. Worldwide there is a trend towards privatization or reforms of pay-as-you-go public pension schemes (OECD 2013). For instance, in Canada, public transfers now supply less than 40% of a retiree’s income. This shift away from public transfers means that only those with jobs providing generous benefits and/or who are wealthy enough to contribute to private pensions during their working years have adequate retirement income. Retirement incomes then become polarized according to pre-existing means. Furthermore, many countries are raising the retirement age of eligibility to a full pension. However, people from lower social classes tend to experience a faster deterioration in health over the life course, notably because of deleterious working conditions (Lowsky et al. 2014). If these groups are not able to work until official retirement age, they could miss out on full retirement benefits, which would also worsen inequalities. Yet it is possible to mitigate these effects: in France, in recognition of this life course process of cumulative inequality, the 2014 labor law reform (Service Public 2014) raised the legal retirement age of eligibility to a full pension, but also introduced a new “work hardship” [pénibilité] personal account, awarding points for each year spent in jobs with certain demonstrated noxious characteristics (e.g., atypical shift work and particularly night shifts, repetitive work, underwater work, and exposure to noise, chemicals, extreme temperatures). These points can then be used by the worker for retraining, salary supplements, or earlier retirement.

Second, long-term care services can worsen inequalities for older people when access depends on personal means. Most countries provide universal access to acute care, but seldom do so for long-term care, a much broader set of services that help to support older people (Colombo et al. 2011). Such services can help older people stay in the community longer, rather than forcing institutionalization for necessary support. Informal caregivers, such as family members, provide most of the care at home, while high demand has catalyzed the development of countless private and means-tested supplementary support services (Wiener and Tilly 2002). As older people’s needs increase, they generally spend more out of pocket to access support services dependent on personal means. In Canada, all but the wealthiest quintile spend more than 60% of their disposable income to meet these greater needs (OECD 2013), and there is a high proportion of older people who are unable to do so. Health declines disproportionately faster in those with unmet needs, further compounding inequalities (Keefe, Carrière, and Légaré 2007).

In sum, building on sociological theories such as cumulative inequality, policy-oriented research can further support the development of effective policies for older people that guard against worsening health inequalities in older age. There are several empirical and methodological challenges sociologists must try to address in this area. For instance, there are no control groups available to study the
impact of population-wide policies since, by definition, everyone is affected. Short political cycles and the complexity of causal chains also make it difficult to study lifetime effects of inequalities to better understand manifestation in old age and properly attribute causal effects to specific policies (Exworthy 2008). To address these challenges, researchers can make use of natural policy experiments and methodologies specifically designed to study policy impact, such as difference-in-difference; contribute to harmonizing cross-country data to enable comparisons; and participate in disseminating research results, but the first step, as I have argued here, is to be clear on our sociological theoretical bases.

The Future We Want: Mobilizing Sociological Perspectives for a Better Understanding of Policies and Health Inequalities

In closing, I would like to end with some thoughts about the contribution of work done at professional association meetings such as ISA. In pursuing research to help usher in the future we want, where social inequalities in health are mitigated though policies thoughtfully designed to take into consideration life course and stratification processes, such meetings are paramount, first to ensure diffusion of ideas within areas of specialization, but also to foster cross-fertilisation across areas.

As an example of key within-area exchanges, the RC15 meeting at the ISA Forum in Vienna showcased empirical work drawing on a theoretical framework developed by Chloe Bird and Patricia Rieker, coined Constrained Choice theory (Bird and Rieker 2008). This is a theoretical model that is increasingly generating a following, as was eloquently illustrated by the fact that the session proposal by these authors garnered such an enthusiastic response that we had to create overflow opportunities in a roundtable session. In this body of work, the authors provide a compelling and operationalizable model of “what puts people at risk of risks” (Link and Phelan 1995: 80), recasting models of individual responsibility in a structural framework where choice sets are constrained by the social context in which individuals (and their biological potential) are embedded. Policy features explicitly and prominently in this model as a modifiable environmental factor inequitably structuring (constraining) choices. Thus, this is a very pertinent model for the study of policies and health inequalities, and one that will hopefully fruitfully orient much research in this area in years to come.

Beyond this session on constrained choice, policies and health inequalities was a prominent theme of the RC15 meeting. Indeed, out of the 17 scientific sessions allotted to RC15 at the meeting, six pertained to this topic, along with many tables in two roundtable sessions that served as overflow for the numerous abstracts received for these sessions (ranging between 20 and 40). Furthermore, many of these sessions reached beyond RC15, as they were jointly held with other RCs (RC11 on Aging; RC19 on Poverty, Social Welfare, and Social
Policy; and RC20 on Comparative Sociology), and thus we have seen a lot of cross-fertilisation of ideas in this context. Much remains to be done, however, and certainly other opportunities for joint sessions should be pursued, for instance with other RCs focusing on key stratification processes (education, work) that generate inequalities through the life course (e.g., RC04, RC06, RC28, RC30), other life course periods (children with RC53 and youth with RC34), with specific outcomes particularly sensitive to these inequalities (e.g., mental health with RC49), and finally with an eye to uncovering intersectional processes of gender and ethnic disparities (with RC05 and RC32). These are wicked problems, and only through such collaboration will we be able to mobilize knowledge and achieve the retroactive feedback loop in Figure 1 where this knowledge informs policy and gets us closer to the future we want.

Note

This text is based on the presentation given by the author at the Common Session 1B The Futures We Want: Global Sociology and the Struggles for a Better World at the ISA Congress in Vienna, July 10, 2016. Some arguments in this text have also appeared in part in Quesnel-Vallée (2016).

References


IX. EMOTIONS, SENSES, AND SELVES
28. The Sociology of Happiness: Topic in Social Indicators Research

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RC55 Social Indicators

History

Happiness was a topic in early sociology (Veenhoven 2000a). Sociological interest in the subject waned for quite a while, but revived in the 1970s in Social Indicators Research.

Social Indicators Research can be seen as a rope, consisting of several strands. This metaphor nicely illustrates that 1) Social Indicators Research covers many topics, 2) these topics are intertwined, 3) the topics strengthen each other, and 4) together they are stronger than each strand taken separately.

What are these constituting “strands”? In their lucid review of the last 50 years of Social Indicators Research, Land and Michalos (2016) mention topics such as “inequality,” “poverty,” “safety,” and “social cohesion.” “Social” indicators have been used to cover all qualities of life that are not typically “economic,” since the movement emerged in the 1960s in reaction to the limitations of mere economic indicators, which dominated research and policy at that time.

“Happiness” is one of the strands in the Social Indicators Research. Below I will add some detail about this particular research line.

Ideological roots

Sociology, and Social Indicators Research in particular, is rooted in the view that human society can be improved using scientific knowledge. This view emerged in the eighteenth century as part of the European “Enlightenment.” This intellectual movement contested several views common in the “dark” Middle Ages.

One of these contested views was that society is a moral order given by God, which humans cannot and should not change. Enlightened thinkers saw society to be a result of human contracts, which can be revised and should be changed if these appear to involve undesirable consequences. Taking a, still prevalent, religious perspective, they emphasized a moral obligation to perfect “God’s garden” on earth and to weed out injustice.

Another challenged view was that earthly life is not to be enjoyed, since man has been expelled from Paradise, and that happiness will only be possible
in an afterlife in Heaven, if only for the chosen. Enlightened thinkers rejected
the view of a punishing God and rather believed in a loving God, who likes to
see his children enjoy his creation.

A third “dark” view that was contested was that human rationality is too
limited to count on and that we would do better to rely on traditional wisdom
and divine revelation. Enlightened thinkers advocated the use of reason and
pressed for investment in science and education.

This change of views had a great impact: it inspired revolutions and later
practices for “planned social change” in more peaceful and incremental ways.
These changes were attended by a lively discourse on what is a good life and
the social conditions required for it. The concept of happiness figured from the
beginning in these discussions (Veenhoven 2015).

Philosophical approaches

Happiness was a main topic in classical Greek philosophy, and interest in hap-
piness revived during the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment (Mauzi
1960, Buijs 2007). The term “happiness” was mostly used as an umbrella for
various notions of the good life, which today is denoted as “quality of life” and
“well-being.” Since most philosophers earned their living as moral advisors,
many tended to equate the good life with a morally good life. Founding father
of sociology August Comte used the term in a similar way (Plé 2000).

The term “happiness,” from the beginning, was also used in the more li-
mited sense of subjective enjoyment of life, in other words as “life satisfaction.”
Democritus (460–370 BC) was one of the Greek philosophers who addressed
this meaning, while Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) defined happiness as “the
sum of pleasures and pains.”

Bentham (1789) articulated the difference between a morally good life and
a pleasant life in his consequentialistic ethic, which holds that good or bad
should not be judged in terms of abstract moral principles, but rather by the
reality of the consequences for happiness, the morally best action being the one
that produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. In this
view happiness should be the main aim of governments. A present-day propo-
nent of this view is Richard Layard (2005).

Though welcomed in enlightened circles in the eighteenth century, this
view was rejected by the dominating ideologies of the nineteenth century and
the first half of the twentieth century. The strongest opposition came from the
churches, which preached a principalistic morality based on the biblical Ten
Commandments. The liberals of that time also had reservations about the grea-
est-happiness principle; in their power struggle with the aristocracy they pre-
ferred to emphasize freedom. The socialists who entered the scene in the late
nineteenth century prioritized social equality. Nationalism dominated in the first
half of the twentieth century when the two world wars took place, and nationalists were more interested in national glory than in individual happiness.

As a result, interest in happiness declined, and one of the indications is a sharp drop in the use of the word “happiness” in book titles after 1800 (Buijs 2007). When I took a course in social philosophy in the 1960s, I found happiness described as a historical concern, not as a contemporary issue. But change was coming; in the bookshops I saw ever more of the “How to be happy” type of self-help books, and “happiness” became a buzzword in the media.

**Emergence of empirical happiness research in the 1970s**

This renewed interest in happiness in the second half of the twentieth century was driven by several factors. One of these is that many of the pressing ills had been overcome at that time, at least in the West. The era was characterized by peace, democracy, and an unprecedented rise in the standard of living. This gave way to more positive goals, such as health and happiness. Another factor was the development of a multiple-choice society in which individuals could choose how to live their life and therefore become interested in which way of life would be most satisfying. The rise of happiness on the political agenda was also facilitated by the weakening of the earlier ideological opposition mentioned above. The churches had declined in power, the liberals and the socialists had achieved their main aims, and nationalism had lost much of its appeal.

The effect of these long-term ideological shifts was amplified by technical developments and the development of empirical social science research, survey research in particular. Life-satisfaction is something we have in mind, and as such it can be measured using self-reports. Hence happiness of a great number can be measured by including questions on life-satisfaction in large-scale surveys among a general population. This has become common practice. Happiness is now a standard topic in many periodical social surveys, such as the American General Social Survey. This has yielded a lot of data, on the basis of which initial qualms about the quality of responses to such questions have been tested. Though not free of measurement error, these questions appeared to do quite well (Diener 1994).

The first surveys on happiness date from the late 1940s in the United States and were part of public opinion research (AIPO studies, cited in Easterlin 1973). In the 1950s happiness became a topic in research on successful aging (e.g., Kutner et al. 1956), in some studies on family life (e.g., Rose 1955), and in studies on work (e.g., Brayfield et al. 1957). In the 1960s happiness was used as an indicator in studies about mental health in the general population (e.g., Gurin et al. 1965). The number of scientific publications on happiness started to grow, as can be seen from Figure 1. The numbers in Figure 1 are not based on a count of publications that use the word happiness, but of publications that deal with
the concept, however named. Fit with the concept of happiness as “subjective enjoyment of life” was ascertained by close reading of the texts.

Figure 1: Number of scientific publications on happiness over time. Source: Bibliography of Happiness (Veenhoven 2016b)

**Measurement of Happiness**

As indicated above, attention has shifted to happiness in the sense of life-satisfaction; more formally defined as “the overall appreciation of one’s own life as a whole” (Veenhoven 1984). Thus defined, happiness is something we have in mind, and consequently we can measure it using questions. That is, by simply asking people how much they enjoy their life as a whole.

Questions on happiness can be posed in various contexts: clinical interviews, life-review questionnaires, and survey interviews. The questions can also be posed in different ways: directly or indirectly, and by means of single or multiple questions. All questions that fit the above definition of happiness are listed in the collection “Measures of Happiness” of the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2016b).

A common question reads as follows:

| All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                 | Dissatisfied    | 0               | 1               | 2               | 3               | 4               | 5               | 6               | 7               | 8               | 9               | 10              |
|                 | Satisfied       |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |

Figure 1: Number of scientific publications on happiness over time. Source: Bibliography of Happiness (Veenhoven 2016b)
Many misgivings have been advanced about such self-reporting of happiness; it has been doubted that responses validly reflect how people feel about their life, and it has been posited that responses are erratic and incomparable across persons and cultures. Though plausible at first sight, these qualms have not been supported by empirical research, see for example Diener (1994).

**Findings on Happiness**

Research findings obtained with acceptable measures of happiness are gathered in the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2016a), which currently contains some 25,000 standardized descriptions of research results: about 10,000 findings on how happy people are at particular times and places (distributional findings), and some 15,000 findings on things that go together with more and less happiness (correlational findings). This findings archive is available on the web at http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl.

The following are some illustrative findings.

**Most people are happy**

The earliest investigations on happiness took place in modern Western nations and observed that most people were happy. This appeared not only in responses to questions about life satisfaction, but also in measures of daily mood, such as the Bradburn (1969) Affect Balance Scale.

Responses are not so positive in all countries of the world, but still the average is above neutral in most of today’s nations. This can be seen in Figure 2, in which average happiness in nations all over the world is presented. Of the 159 nations on this map, 37 score lower than 5 on a scale of 0–10, while average happiness is 7 or higher in 35 nations. The world average weighted by population size was 60; standard deviation was 0.9.

**Average happiness is rising**

Since the 1970s happiness has been periodically assessed in most Western nations. Comparison over time shows an upward trend in most of these nations and few cases of decline. Trend data on non-Western nations are less abundant, but show greater gains in happiness. This rise in average happiness appears to be linked to economic growth, which goes against the famous “Easterlin paradox” (Easterlin 1974; Veenhoven & Vergunst 2014). Life-expectancy has also risen considerably in this era, which means that this generation has witnessed an unprecedented rise in “happy life years.” Americans gained 5.2 happy life years between 1973 and 2010, and Western Europeans about 3.6 happy life years.
Inequality in happiness is going down

This rise in average happiness has been accompanied by a reduction of the dispersion of happiness in the general public, which manifests in a lowering of standard deviations over time (Veenhoven 2016d). This reduction is partly due to the rising average that causes a concentration of responses at the top of the scale, but not entirely. The lowering of inequality in happiness is also due to a reduction in unhappy responses.

Strong impact of kind of society

Average happiness differs widely across nations (see Figure 2). There appears to be a pattern in these differences. Happiness is systematically higher in nations that combine a good material standard of living with good governance, freedom, and a climate of tolerance. Together, such societal characteristics explain about 75% of the differences in average happiness across nations (Ott 2005). There are also societal characteristics that appear to be unrelated to the average happiness of citizens. This is the case for income inequality in nations (Berg & Veenhoven 2010) and for state welfare efforts (Veenhoven 2000b).
Little impact of place in society

Several surveys on happiness have been done in the context of marketing research for the welfare state and aimed at identifying client groups. Investigators expected social deprivation to be accompanied by unhappiness, which would legitimize policy intervention. Yet they found little correlation between happiness and income position and between happiness and the level of education of an individual. Together, social positional variables explain at best 10% of the differences in happiness found within nations. At least in modern affluent nations, happiness depends far more on embedding in intimate networks and on psychological characteristics (e.g., Headey & Wearing 1992).

Reception in Sociology

There are good reasons to expect that these findings would attract considerable attention in sociology. One reason is that the subject was on the agenda of the nineteenth-century founding fathers of sociology, such as Auguste Comte (Plé 2000) and Herbert Spencer (1857). Another reason to expect avid interest is that these findings involve answers to long-standing questions in sociology; the finding that most people are happy is indicative of how livable modern society is; the finding that happiness is rising embodies an answer to the question of social progress; the finding that inequality in happiness is going down is telling about the relevance of “new” social inequalities; and the finding that happiness differs so much across kinds of societies is highly relevant in the debate of what a good society is like.

Still another reason to expect close attention is that some of the findings flatly contradict some common beliefs. The finding that inequality of happiness has diminished during the last decades contradicts the common notion that inequality is rising in modern societies. Likewise, the finding that income inequality in nations is unrelated to average happiness contradicts the commonly held belief that socioeconomic disparities cause deep frustration. The same holds for the finding that the effects of income and education are small.

Yet the reality is that these findings are not acknowledged in sociology. Happiness is absent in current sociological textbooks and dictionaries. While the subject has been picked up in psychology and economics, it is still marginal in sociological journals, with the exception of the niche journal Social Indicators Research.

There are several reasons for this absence. One reason is professional bias: most sociologists earn their living dealing with social problems and are therefore not apt to see that people flourish. Another reason is ideological: many sociologists are “critical” of modern society and can therefore hardly imagine that people thrive in these conditions. Lastly, some sociological theories play
them false, in particular cognitive theories implying that happiness is relative (Veenhoven, 2014).

**Note**

Parts of this text are taken from earlier publications, in particular Veenhoven 2014 and Veenhoven 2017.

**References**


29. A Social Psychological Perspective on “The Futures We Want”

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Introduction

In this paper, I will discuss future directions in sociological social psychology that have the potential for advancing our understanding of social actors and their behavior. These future directions are divided along theoretical, methodological, and substantive lines. I will argue the following. Theoretically, researchers can work to bridge different theoretical traditions, using concepts and processes from different theories to provide a comprehensive understanding of self and society, thereby yielding new and powerful insights into the human condition. Methodologically, neurological, biological, and genetic discoveries can aid in supporting or disconfirming processes underlying social actors and their behavior that have been theorized and tested primarily through self-reports or observational data. Substantively, we are living in a global economy with greater multicultural interaction and in a world that is technologically mediated. Such interactions may require new theories that provide insight into how actors adapt to or abandon new ways of communicating. Let me discuss each of these lines in some detail.

Theoretical Advances

When we think of theory development in sociology, several things may come to mind. Development may mean that previously undiscovered processes or outcomes are now identified, thereby increasing the precision of causal relationships. The theory undergoes refinement through elaboration. Theory development also may involve the ability to predict and explain a larger class of phenomena, thereby increasing the generality of the theory. Essentially, the scope conditions, or the empirical areas to which the theory applies, are tested and relaxed to include a broader range of domains.

Still another way that theoretical development occurs is in studying other theories, and using the insights and processes gleaned from these theories to identify the limitations or potential areas of growth in one’s own theory as well as find a bridge between theories. I am a strong believer in this practice, and I
think the future of sociological social psychology needs to do more of this. In my own theoretical and empirical research on identity theory, I have linked identity theory with expectation states theory (Cast et al., 1999; Stets and Harrod, 2004), justice theory (Stets, 2003; Stets and Osborn, 2008), social identity theory (Stets and Burke, 2000), legitimation theory (Burke et al., 2007), social comparison theory (Stets and Burke, 2014), and more recently, social exchange theory (Savage et al., 2016). Let me provide an example of turning to other theories in one’s own work using my most recent research.

People in positions of power can and do take advantage of others. Social exchange theorists explain this by arguing that using power is a by-product of self-interested actors who take advantage of others given their powerful structural position. However, identity theorists, rather than focusing on the self-interest motive and one’s position of structural power, address the identity verification motive, and how people work to prove who they are to others when others do not confirm how they see themselves. Recently, my collaborators and I examined how the fairness identity, or how fair individuals perceive themselves to be, influences how they interact with two other actors in an experiment where they are negotiating how many points they can get from their partners (Savage et al., 2016). Participants knew that these points would be translated into money that they would earn at the end of the study.

We found that when persons in a position of power who had a high fairness identity received feedback that they were being unfair (which is identity non-verification because they are told they are being unfair when they see themselves as very fair), they responded by giving more points to their partners in an effort to reassert their identity of being fair. This resulted in reducing the level of inequality in the negotiations. Alternatively, when persons in a position of power who had a low fairness identity received feedback that they were very fair, which is again, identity non-verification, responded by giving fewer points to their partners to reassert their identity of being unfair. This increased the level of inequality in the negotiations.

Our findings provide insight into how we might overcome inequality in society. Given the conflicting motives of self-interest and identity verification in interaction, when people are in positions of power and they see themselves as very fair, reminding them that they are being unfair may elicit a response that reduces the very inequality they are creating. Further, for identity theorists, the presence of the self-interest motive and the power process elucidates how both can enable people to behave in ways that are consistent with their identities, such as being in a high power position with a low fairness identity, as well as to behave inconsistent with their identities, as when they are in a high power position with a high fairness identity and performing actions to exploit others is contrary to their high fairness identity. This latter result may create real conflict, and it is something identity theorists need to examine more closely.
Essentially, for theoretical development in social psychology, researchers should look to other theories that might provide insights into advancing one’s own theory. By examining processes that exist in other theories, one’s own theory may develop more rapidly and integration with other theories may result. Now let me turn to the methods we use.

**Methodological Advances**

I am convinced that future research needs to carry out more work that examines how neurological, biological, and genetic factors influence social actors and their behavior. Measures that capture these different dimensions of the physiological can support or disconfirm theoretical processes of the social. To be clear, we are not reducing social phenomena to biological phenomena but rather showing the connection between them. For example, neurologically, we now know that lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex increase antisocial behavior. Additionally, damage to the amygdala (the subcortical region that is especially implicated in fear and other negative emotions) diminishes people’s ability to infer other’s emotional states as well as diminishing emotional activation to negative or threatening stimuli within oneself (Adolphs et al., 1994). Thus, localized damage to particular brain regions is capable of producing rather isolated deficits in social behavior and the processing of social stimuli.

We also know that the processing of social stimuli is identifiable in particular regions of the brain. For instance, we know that the right hemisphere is implicated more in negative emotions or avoidance dispositions and the left hemisphere is more involved in positive emotions or approach dispositions (Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999). We continue to increase our understanding of the neurology of the social actor, but so much of this work lacks theory-driven analysis. Social psychological theory may help. Looked at another way, social psychological theory could be advanced by investigating where there is any neurological basis for a theory, and whether neurological evidence can be used to support or disconfirm a theory. Let me illustrate this with recent work in identity theory.

Kalkhoff and his collaborators (Kalkhoff et al., 2016) recently used electroencephalography (EEG) to examine how the brain represents the identity verification process. When they gave participants both verifying and non-verifying feedback on their student identity, the feedback produced EEG patterns consistent with activation of brain structures along the cortical midline. The cortical midline includes the medial prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the posterior cingulate cortex. These areas are known for relatively automatic and unconscious monitoring of information that is relevant to the self, such as whether individuals are being verified in a situation (Niemeyer, 2013). Thus, neural activity in this region of the brain is consistent with identity theory.
Further, identity theorists argue that when individuals are not verified, this will activate more conscious, deliberative processing of information, including a way to eliminate the non-verification, perhaps by behaving differently in order to obtain identity verification. Kalkhoff and his colleagues found that compared to identity-verifying feedback, non-verifying feedback produced EEG patterns consistent with greater activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which is a key node of deliberative, conscious processing that is involved in the generation and evaluation of courses of action. In short, this research is consistent with identity theory expectations, but much more work is needed linking neurology and social psychological theory and research.

If neurology is important, so is biology. For example, we know that hormones such as testosterone and oxytocin are important in social behavior and mental health, thus revealing that individual outcomes are not simply social in origin. We know that higher levels of testosterone are associated with dominance; that is, behavior intended to gain or maintain status in interaction (Booth et al., 2006). We also know that testosterone is associated with depression, and the effect is a U-shaped curve with those above or below average levels of testosterone showing higher level of depression than those with average testosterone levels (Booth et al., 2006).

We see the important role that oxytocin plays in social interaction and the development of social bonds. Early childhood neglect impairs the increase in oxytocin typically triggered by mother-infant interaction (Fries et al., 2005), and positive social interactions such as social support lead to increased levels of oxytocin (Heinrichs et al., 2003). Genetically, we find that certain variants in the oxytocin receptor (OXTR) are associated with loneliness (Lucht et al., 2009).

Genes are also important, and sociologists can no longer ignore the relevance of genetic differences in explaining individual outcomes. Substantial heritability has been associated with a wide range of individual characteristics, such as aggression, altruism, depression, impulsivity, parenting behavior, and self-esteem (Freese, 2008). This should not threaten the livelihood of sociology. Rather, it offers sociologists more accurate estimates of cause–effect relationships given that genes are a partial cause. It especially provides the opportunity for sociologists to show how particular genes are related to particular outcomes. Specifically, we should be studying the intervening paths that connect genes to individual outcomes (Freese, 2008). One could argue that the paths are intimately social, having to do with the social actor in which the genes are expressed and the immediate social environment in which actors’ actions are embedded. Genes likely interact with one’s social environment to produce varying results on individuals, either depressing or enhancing the specific outcomes that the genes produce. To illustrate the gene*social environment interaction, here is one example.
Over time, research has revealed that exposure to some adverse social conditions, such as abusive parenting, racial discrimination, and economic hardship, leads to antisocial behavior in individuals, but this is more likely to be the case when there is allelic variation in a particular gene, such as MAOA, that amplifies the effects of exposure to an adverse social condition on one’s behavior (Simons and Lei, 2012). This is labeled the diathesis-stress perspective, which holds that some individuals possess alleles that intensify the effects of environmental stress or adversity. However, others began to discover that the amplification occurs regardless of whether the environment is adverse or favorable. Thus, those most vulnerable to adverse social environments are the same who reap the most benefit from environment support. This is known as the differential susceptibility perspective, which holds that some people are programmed by their genes to be more sensitive to environmental influence than others, or are more plastic. In this way, rather than showing that some individuals are more vulnerable than others to adverse conditions, the data supports the idea that some people are simply more susceptible to their environment. If they are exposed to poor parenting, they will display higher levels of antisocial behavior than other genotypes, but if they are exposed to positive parenting, they will display higher levels of prosocial behavior than other genotypes.

While sociologists need to supplement their analysis with information on neurological, biological, and genetic influences, this should occur, simultaneously, with an eye toward how social psychological theory can help inform the outcomes that are observed. Theory and method go hand in hand, even when we incorporate physiological mechanisms into the analyses. Now, let me turn to substantive advances.

**Substantive Advances**

We increasingly live in a global environment. Individuals from different cultures are more likely to interact with one another, and differences in orientation may generate unease, at best, and conflict, at worst. For example, one of the most extensively studied differences among individuals in cross-cultural research in social psychology is the idea that individuals have a tendency to have an independent or interdependent self-construal (Cross et al., 2011). An independent self-construal is a self that is seen as separate from others. Relationships are important to the extent that they provide support for individuals. Positive emotions such as happiness are fostered. Independents are more likely to engage in primary control; that is, to manipulate the environment to meet their needs.

In contrast, an interdependent self-construal is a self that is connected to others. Social comparisons are used to determine whether individuals are fulfilling their obligations within their relationships. Negative emotions are more
likely to be experienced, such as social anxiety, since there is a concern with appropriate behavior in relationships. Those who are interdependent are more likely to engage in secondary control, that is modifying their own thoughts and feelings to fit into their environment. Westerners are more likely to show independence and non-Westerners have a tendency to show interdependence.

At issue is the effect that these differences will have on individuals in a multicultural world over time. There are at least three possibilities. On the one hand, the self may be colonized across the globe; that is, the individual becomes more uniform in its cultural content given capitalist markets and Western consumerism (Callero, 2008). Thus, an independent self may take hold across the globe. On the other hand, a new, multicultural identity may emerge that represents identification with a variety of cultures. For example, we may see an independent self that is open to an interdependent orientation in ways it never was before. Still yet, people may develop a defensive stance toward encroaching cultural influences and work hard to maintain their own cultural identity. Here, individuals may become locked into their independent or interdependent orientations. Given globalization, social psychological research is needed to test the type of individual that is more likely to emerge and the conditions under which it emerges. For instance, multicultural identities may be easier to develop and maintain in immediate culturally heterogeneous than culturally homogeneous contexts. Increasing exposure to different cultures may lead to greater adaptability across space and time.

In today’s world, not only are we more likely to be communicating with individuals from different cultures, but that communication is becoming less face-to-face than in the past, and it is more meditated through computer technology. Often, that communication is instantaneous through such platforms as Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat. Social media provides a rich avenue to study new ways in which individuals present themselves, develop new identities, negotiate identity claims, verify identities, and enact multiple identities (Davis, 2016). These media platforms become sites for studies of the individual in a digital era. For example, while we observe people’s online daily postings of their experiences and events, these accounts are cloaked with positive and flattering self-images that risk being discredited to the extent that viewers see these self-images as contradicting offline performances.

While images and interactions often are spontaneous, there also is an aspect to social media that is controlled by individuals by carefully crafting their own images, producing content as to who they are well ahead of their release to an audience. Sometimes others will actively participate in the content of a person, writing on each other’s walls, commenting on each other’s posts, tagging one another in photographs in a much more public way than with face-to-face communication. Here, individuals lose control over the image that is projected. At issue is how the individual manages the different impressions that are delib-
erately as well as automatically presented as author or not as author, all of which may contradict one another. Further, of concern is how individuals deal with media presentations that they can’t easily erase given the relatively permanent nature of the information on the web. How does this affect the kind of individual they project into the future? These and other issues require careful attention by social psychologists as we move into a rapidly evolving digital era globally.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I’d like to see a broader and more inclusive social psychology that considers the insights of other theories in advancing one’s own. I’d also like to see social psychologists adopt methods that incorporate neurology, biology, and genetics. Finally, we need to study social psychological processes that affect actors globally, such as greater multicultural interaction and communication in a digital age. These three avenues can advance sociological social psychology in such a way that it will be stronger in the decades to come.

References


Social science literature on the senses has proliferated in the last few decades. Sensory studies argue for the senses as social, revealing important insights pertaining to selfhood, culture, and social relations. In this paper, I summarise this field in three interrelated sections. I first provide a brief discussion of the “hierarchy of the senses” and the need to maneuver beyond the hegemony of vision. The second section examines theoretical and methodological issues in sensory studies. Finally, a third section describes the various institutional efforts towards organising and promoting sensory research. The article concludes with suggestions toward broadening the field by focusing on the concept of sensorial transnationalism.

A hierarchy of the senses

Sight has been assigned a pre-eminent status in the sensorium, as reflected in Plato’s (1961) and Aristotle’s (1959) hierarchies of the senses. Plato exalts the supremacy of sight as the foundation of philosophy given its ability to convey beauty, thereby acting as a conduit which leads to God and Truth (Smith, 2007; Synnott, 1993). Similarly, Aristotle shared Plato’s position on sight, privileging it as the first sense, ahead of four others: visus, auditus, odoratus, gustus, and tactus (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch; Jütte, 2005). Other senses such as smell or touch occupied positions of “animality” given the associations with lust, gluttony, and savagery (Classen et al., 1994; Synnott, 1991). This is, however, a sensory taxonomy which should be further queried, given that some cultures may not abide by the same five-sense model as their sensory ordering of the world, nor would some merely subscribe to one variant per sense modality. The ethnographic examples below indicate—and following the works of Classen (1993) and Howes (2003)—that sensory scholars need to identify and explain the social significance of (1) the number of senses within a culture and how they operate, (2) the different types of one sense within a culture, and (3) different sensorial hierarchies that are subscribed to by different societies.

Among the Anlo-Ewe of Southeastern Ghana, balance is an important sense which also connotes the character of an individual and moral uprightness (Geurts,
The Hausa of Nigeria, as Ritchie (1991: 195) tells us, recognise two categories of senses comprising the multimodal (the *ji*-complex) and the monomodal (sight). *Ji* or “to feel,” is the only verb that the Hausa employ for all the non-visual senses. Among the Weyéwa of highland Sumba, Indonesia, there exists a total of seven taste categories, ranging from sour, sweet, salty, and bitter, to tart, bland, and pungent (Kuipers, 1991: 118). Beyond gustatory sensations, Kuipers (1991: 112) notes that the taste vocabulary of the Weyéwa is meaningfully ordered in relation to the context of a “social visit”—where encounters between agemates of the same sex involve an exchange of ingredients such as betel fruits. Taste then serves as a barometer of the prestige and wealth of the giver, including the countenance of the host that is exhibited to the guest. Therefore, linguistic referents of taste wield significant socio-communicative import.

Smell is an emphasised faculty among the Suya of Central Brazil (Seeger, 1981) and the Ongëe who inhabit the Andaman islands (Classen, 1993; Howes, 1991). For the former, olfaction takes on symbolic importance, as it is utilised as a classificatory mechanism through which both persons and substances are categorised. Strong, pungent, and bland smells correspond to different degrees of danger, animality, and sociality. For the latter, odour is the “vital force of the universe and the basis of personal and social identity” (Classen, 1993: 1). In my own work on olfaction, I analysed the social meanings of smell (with concurrent consideration of the other senses) in the context of historical and contemporary Singapore (Low, 2009). This was in line with what Drobnick (2006) terms as “olfactocentrism,” a calculated counterpoint to the hierarchy of the senses that has been broached in sensory scholarship. Drobnick’s use of the term acts as a critique of vision, otherwise known as “ocularcentrism”—a way of challenging Euro-American stances on sensory hierarchy so as to demonstrate the social relevance and importance of the other senses occurring in a plurality of social contexts. The above works indicate how the empire of sight has to be critically evaluated when one pays careful attention to the social life of the (other) senses contextually.

**Studying the senses—Theoretical and methodological directions**

One of the first ways to think about how the senses have been theorised may be to explore senses as *signifiers of cultural expression*, contingent on the social order of a given society produced through the sensorium (Howes, 2003). The fundamental premise of studying the senses involves theorising how senses form modes of knowing. One may turn to Chau’s (2008) suggestion on two interrelated modalities as models of sensory studies. The first is based upon a Geertzian approach of “senses as a cultural system,” and the second, a Csordasian cultural phenomenological approach.

It is from here that we can frame sensory theorising with reference to scholarly directions pursued within the canon in the sociology of everyday life.
Through the everyday life perspective, one studies the banal, the mundane and taken-for-granted aspects of social life which then come to bear upon sensory embodiment in connection with sociality through different sociocultural dimensions. These include food and foodways in local (Sutton, 2010) and transnational settings (Abdullah, 2010; Law, 2005), memorywork and identity politics (Seremetakis, 1994; Waskul et al., 2009), migration (Low, 2013; McKay, 2005; Ray, 2010), urban spaces (Edensor, 1998; el-Khoury, 2006), and dance (Hahn, 2007; Potter, 2008), among others. By referring to the familiar and commonsensical as subjects of inquiry in which the focus lies upon social actors’ everyday practices, theorists such as Goffman (1956, 1963a, 1963b) and Garfinkel (1967) can therefore be made sensorially relevant.

It is also necessary to consider, beyond the senses as ways of ordering social life, sensorial disorders as a second theoretical direction. I am thinking of sensuous disruptions—furthered from Howes’ (2005b: 357) proposition on dealing with “experiences of the senses [that have] gone awry”—that may be located in such contexts as sensory powerlessness and illness (Chuengsatiansup, 1999), sensory distress of the homeless (Desjarlais, 2005), and the presumed sensory inferiority and racial differentiation in the context of slavery (Smith, 2006). Through parallel considerations on both sensory orders and disorders, we may thus more comprehensively analyse the sensorial contours of everyday life which both organise and disarray social life and subjectivity.

A third theoretical strand relates to constructions of self and embodiment, which Waskul et al. (2009) and Ferzacca (2010) deliberate upon by employing the notion of the “somatic.” To illustrate, Ferzacca (2010: 42) explains how somaphores are bodily expressions that represent and operate “in a conceptual system that continually draws upon ‘sense’ for one of its terms from one realm and then associates this with others in the social and cultural reproduction or somaphoric organisation of experience, thought, behaviour, and, of social life.” By focusing on the Javanese kampong soundscape and taste sensation, Ferzacca (2010: 59) adds to theories of embodiment by paying attention to “feeling-meaning” in Javanese social life.

I now turn to methodological formulations that scholars have tendered hitherto. The aim here is to comprehensively illustrate how “experimental strategies” (Vannini et al., 2011) of researching on the senses entail the bodily experiences of both the researcher and the researched. I discuss how sensory data is articulated through the medium of language and other avenues, including brief reflections on the researcher’s own sensorial positionality while conducting sensuous research.

As places are also locales through which the senses transpire and mediate sociality (Sibley, 2001), “smellwalks” may be a useful method towards surveying how “smells may be spatially ordered or place-related” (Porteous, 1985: 359). On the other hand, Pink (2004) has adopted what she terms “visual ethno-
graphic research” in her study on the sensorial performativity of gendered identities in English and Spanish homes. By conducting both tape-recorded and video interviews, Pink contends that the respondent is just as much a collaborator in research as the researcher him/herself. Moreover, the latter is equally taking on an embodied position by carrying out sensuous research.

Sensorial strategies likewise imply that the researcher is neither a neutral nor a non-participating observer; his or her own body and senses are embroiled in the process of being an embodied researcher. Take, for example, Wacquant’s (2004) fieldwork and boxing apprenticeship in Chicago’s black ghetto. He emphasises a “sensual logic that informs boxing as a bodily craft”—by learning how to “capture and convey at once the odours . . . the cadenced ‘thump’ of punches against the bags . . . the rhythmic puffing, hissing, sniffing . . . and groaning characteristic of each athlete” and thereby imbibing these sensory instances as part of the “education of an apprentice boxer” (2004: 70–71).

Wacquant’s sensory education is also discernible in Retsikas’ (2008) work on ethnicity and personhood in East Java. Retsikas shares that he had to “retrain” himself when it came to the various sensory-gastronomic encounters emerging throughout his fieldwork. In sum, Retsikas (2008: 127) concludes that the fieldworker’s body ought to be regarded as a “living, physical, sensing and experiencing agent” in the course of pursuing (anthropological) research. Building upon this positionality brings us to an understanding that the generation of (anthropological) knowledge stems from the “transformable body” of the researcher (Retsikas, 2008). From here on, what then can we make of issues pertaining to the translation of sensuous portraits of social life?

I share Howes’ (2005a) and Hughes and Paterson’s (1997) stance on the role of language, that it provides a medium for articulating sensorial experiences. Linguistic expressions of the sensate contribute toward comparative deliberations on metaphoric, metrical, morpho-syntactic, and metonymic meanings of the senses (Geurts, 2002; Lee, 2010; Ning, 2009; Plümacher, 2007; Porcello et al., 2010). I suggest that it is also through an appreciation of linguistic and cultural variations across different sensoria (Geurts, 2002; Seeger, 1981), that one may garner further insights into how social meanings are attached to different sensory nodes within and across pluri-sensorial paradigms. This entails the incorporation of vivid metaphors, rich sensory descriptions (Stoller, 1989), and such literary techniques as flash-forwards, teasers, autoethnographies, and stories in order to produce sensuous writing (Vannini et al., 2011).

**Organising sensory research and publications**

Beyond the above intellectual trajectories of sensory research, it is also important to be apprised of institutional and pedagogical directions undertaken in sensory studies. I draw attention to both publications and organisational efforts
that have systematically featured scholarship on the senses. In 2006, the first issue of the journal *The Senses and Society* was launched by Berg Publishers under the editorship of anthropologist David Howes.

Berg Publishers also houses a *Sensory Formations* series, where seven readers have been published since 2004. The University of Illinois has recently tabled up a series that locates sensory research in history, with historian Mark M. Smith (2007) as its series editor. Other publishers that have recently put out sensory titles include Ashgate, University of Pennsylvania Press, Duke University Press, University of California Press, Routledge, and Sage. In the 2011–2012 academic year, the Society for the Humanities at Cornell University housed scholars—both faculty and graduate researchers—who worked on the theme “Sound: Culture, Theory, Practice, Politics.”

Vannini et al. (2011: 10–11) suggest that a sign of consolidating a “new sub-discipline” such as the senses may be reflected “when a new study group or section is established within one of the major professional associations.” Sensory work has recently been institutionally recognised by the International Sociological Association as a thematic group (TG07 Senses and Society). This is an initiative which a colleague, Devorah Kalekin-Fishman, and I worked on. Given the overview presented above concerning the sensualisation of theory and methodology, it is only necessary that the senses be accorded an intellectual radius of its own, than for it to be too readily subsumed under its cognate cousins within the parameters of embodied scholarship (Low, 2009).

The above outlets importantly reflect how the field of the senses has developed in many exciting ways that can only add to the cause of recognising such a field in its own right. Where similar domains of inquiry, such as the sociology of the body, of the emotions, and visual sociology, have only recently gained a foothold in the world of academia, social scientific interest in the senses has, by now, also began to emerge from a nascent stage, availing further insights that can and have contributed considerably to theory, method, and epistemology in the social sciences and beyond.

**Suggestions for the next step forward**

I would like to conclude by referring to the concept of “sensorial transnationalism” (Low and Kalekin-Fishman, 2010: 198) as an example of how the field of sensory scholarship can further develop from hereon. While it is logical and necessary to study the senses by contextualising them within the milieu in which they are employed, one also has to consider how such sensory knowledge, when taken out of context, is subscribed to in either a similar or a contrasting manner. Although there have been in the last few years some works that may touch on the notion of sensorial transnationalism (Law, 2005; Thomas, 2004), it is imperative to regard such transnational registers as not only materi-
ally bounded in space and place. Instead, transnational sensescapes (Low and Kalekin-Fishman, 2010) implies an acknowledgement of the importance of sensory memory; how one responds to sensory use in a different cultural context resulting from short- or long-term migration is contingent upon one’s situated sensory paradigm at “home.” Memory, in this instance, serves as a pertinent resource for which the sense of self is sustained (cf. Thomas, 2004). The idea of “sensorial interface” may serve useful, where it refers to “the site of two or more dissimilar sociocultural contexts of sensory knowledge and use” (Low and Kalekin-Fishman, 2010: 198).

By engaging with the transnational aspects of how social actors negotiate these sensorial interfaces, we are then able to augment our understanding of particularity and difference in sensuous appropriation taking place vis-à-vis cross-cultural meeting points. This undertaking would thereby broaden the field of sensory studies by taking into further consideration how sensory models occur both within and between cultures where experiences of the senses are mediated and where sensory memberships are enucleated beyond the local.

Note

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References


31. Challenges in Biographical Research

Gabriele Rosenthal
RC38 Biography and Society

Right from its beginnings about one hundred years ago, when William Isaac Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (1918–1920) published their famous study on Polish migrants in the United States, sociological biographical research has been a field within social research which is focused, whether intentionally or not, on processes of change in “societies,” social settings, or figurations. In biographical research, we often investigate processes of change which are based on, or determined by, the struggle for a better life by members of outsider groupings in Norbert Elias’s sense of the term (Elias and Scotson, 2008; see also Bogner, 2003; Mennell, 1989). They are fighting for a better world, for more equality and liberty—even if sometimes or perhaps initially only for themselves. Robert Ezra Park, who, like W.I. Thomas, was one of the outstanding representatives of the Chicago School at the beginning of the twentieth century, showed the important influence exercised on social change by marginalized people (such as migrants or so-called mulattos), whose own communities often undergo structural changes, or even cease to exist, in the context of largerscale changes. Park developed the concept of the marginal man, a man who is “living and sharing intimately in the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples . . . and not quite accepted, because of racial prejudices, in the new society.” Park concludes: “It is in the mind of the marginal man—where the changes and fusions of culture are going on” (Park, 1928: 892 et seq.). I will show that this assumption can be applied to other groupings of outsiders who are not prepared to submit to the prevailing discourses, or to accept a powerless position.

To this day, biographical research has tended to concentrate on the life courses of marginalized people or outsiders. In particular, a tradition has become established of studying migration and transnational biographies (cf. Apitzsch and Siouti, 2007, 2015; Breckner, 2007, 2015; Kaja, 2008; Köttig, 2009; Lutz, 2011; Roukonen-Engler and Siouti, 2014; Siouti, 2016; Wundrak, 2009). Other research fields include Jews in the Diaspora (Inowlocki, 2000; Kazmierska, 2012; Kovacs and Vajda 2002; Rosenthal, 2009), people who have been, or are, active in political resistance movements (Miethe, 2002; Pohn-Lauggas 2016; Schiebel and Robel, 2011), people with a mental disorder (Riemann, 1987; Zillig, 2016; Schulze, 2006), and juvenile offenders (Santos, 2010). And there has been plenty of biographical research on women’s unequal
power chances, and generally in the field of gender and “intersectionality” (see Apitzsch, 2012; Dausien, 1996; Lutz, 2011).

By and large these research activities satisfy Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) demand for a logic of discovery, thanks to their methodological orientation toward the tradition of the interpretive paradigm (see Wilson, 1970), and their concentration on case studies mainly based on narrative interviews (see Schütze, 2008, 1977; Riemann, 2006; Rosenthal, 2004). If you are conducting interviews on people’s life histories, and if you are open to the themes people bring up in telling their life story, if you give them the freedom to choose the parts of their personal or collective history they would like to tell, you will usually discover more than you expected at the beginning of your research project. You will be confronted with parts of the interviewees’ collective history which play a role for them in the present, but which you may not have thought about, or which you did not think were still relevant in the present. It may happen that you discover parts of the collective history that you did not know about before, even after studying the relevant literature. You will discover aspects of the subordination or dependency of outsiders or the power of the established that you were never aware of. You may also discover that the dominant discourses do not match the stories told by individuals (Bogner and Rosenthal, 2014, in press), and you may be in the lucky situation of being able to identify new social movements, new patterns of interpretation that are in the process of emerging, and to see that certain groupings are active in fighting for a better or more independent life, and that they have more autonomy and strength than you ever thought possible. All this can only happen if you are open to a process of discovery, and if you take pains to avoid trying to prove pre-existing hypotheses. Social realities are more complex and more constantly in flux than is normally assumed. The general underlying assumption of biographical research is that the most appropriate approach is to conduct life history interviews in combination with other diachronic “historical” or idiographic methods.

When collecting and analyzing the life stories of outsiders, we are increasingly confronted with social phenomena to which insufficient attention has been paid in both public and academic discourses, and which probably have a great impact on social processes of change. We have to invest more effort in investigating these phenomena systematically; we have to include them in our research designs and in our conceptions of diverse populations and groupings and their processes of struggling for a better future. In this paper I will take a closer look at some of the phenomena with which we are increasingly confronted in our empirical work as biographical researchers. They include, for example, transnational (and transethnic) histories of individuals, families, and larger social groups or groupings. The transnationality and transethnicity of life histories and family networks, and a transnational orientation of specific groupings (see Anthias, 2009; Apitzsch and Siouti, 2007; Lutz, 2011), has already been studied by
many members of our Research Committee on Biography and Society, especially in the context of migration studies. But in my opinion, we have to do more. On the one hand, we need to consider the transnational relations and interdependencies within or between continents that existed before the individual migration process, which in some cases go far back in the family and collective histories. On the other hand, we need to look more closely at the figurations between different groupings of migrants, and the figurations between migrants and “long-time residents.” We have to ask in which figurations or situations people benefit from a “transnational” orientation, and in which figurations or situations they are expected to identify with only one national or ethnic or religious grouping, or to be “integrated” into a new society. In addition, we need to investigate the unequal power balances between different groupings, and the impact of these figurations on the future of the societies involved, and on the interrelations between these societies. For example, what does it mean for our European societies, and for our interconnected “world society,” that there is currently great inequality in policies regarding migrants or refugees from Syria, and migrants or refugees from Afghanistan, Libya, and the sub-Saharan countries? What are the long-term implications of these policies? The current research on illegalized migration that I am doing together with a team of colleagues (see Rosenthal et al., in press) shows very clearly the increasing conflicts, forms of competition, and tensions between the various “national” groupings of refugees and other migrants in Europe. The figurations we have observed between migrants from Arab countries and Black migrants from Africa show that the history of slavery and Arabization or Islamization by “Arabs” or Arabic-speaking groups, is currently becoming an important issue again for Africans. In our interviews with Black Africans from Arab-dominated countries (like Mauritania or the Republic of Sudan), we observed that the historical background of being suppressed and enslaved by Arabs in the past, and similar issues in the present, were matters they readily talked about and were more and more explicitly thematized. Some of them started to regard their situation in their home country as slavery only during their migration. They began to investigate their history after arriving in Europe, by reading about their country and the history of their ethnic, religious, or national grouping. Their need to learn about their own collective history and the history of slavery is intensified by the current discourse in Europe on the “legitimacy” of refugees from war-torn areas like Syria, in contrast to the illegalization of other forms of migration.

When investigating the life histories and life-worlds of outsiders, researchers are also confronted with the discovery that societies are much more diverse than is often suggested by the literature or than is claimed in the dominant discourses. This is due to specific we-groups who tend to homogenize and harmonize their diversity and thereby cover up internal fragmentation, power imbalances, and other inequalities. This was one of the main results of the research I
carried out with my team in Palestinian society in the Middle East (see Rosenthal, in press). When talking to us German researchers, most Palestinians in this region were eager to stress that they had no inner conflicts among themselves, and that there was (and is) conflict only with the Jewish Israelis. But as in the study I conducted together with Artur Bogner in northern Uganda (Bogner and Rosenthal, 2014), we observed that people in a pronounced outsider position are not willing to comply with this discourse. They give us much more insight into the internal diversity of their specific we-group(s), or society, into the powerlessness of the outsiders and the unequal power balances between outsiders and established groups. This needs to be considered more systematically in our sampling procedures in social research—meaning, we need to diligently seek out and investigate the voices of different kinds of outsiders, including identifying their positioning in different social fields.

Through our research in regions of the Global South, and our reconstruction of the collective, familial, and individual histories of migrants and refugees from the Global South, we find ourselves increasingly confronted with the discovery of phenomena that do not fit into our Eurocentric categories. It is to be hoped that more attention will be paid to this kind of research in social anthropology, and in so-called development sociology (a field that, at least in Germany, has too often been marginalized for pious and flimsy reasons), and that closer collaboration with colleagues from these disciplines will be possible in future.

In the process of analyzing life stories, we are faced with the problem that some of our material is not easy to subsume under the categories dominant in European discourses and in the academic literature. This applies, for example, to our understanding of family structures, or national borders, or our concepts of state and “nation.” For biographical research, it would be very helpful to have comparative research designs that include fieldwork in the countries of the Global South (and not only in the big cities there). We need more knowledge of these societies, their histories and different life-worlds, in order to gain a better understanding not only of the migrants and refugees in our societies, but also of our own “national” and state-centred societies, and all the social phenomena we so often take for granted. In biographical research, as in ethnographic research, when studying our own society or milieu we have to put ourselves in the position of a stranger. As discussed in the methodological literature, for instance by Stefan Hirschauer (1994: 340), who follows Harold Garfinkel (1967), we need to make the effort of estrangement in order “to get an outsider’s insight of one’s own everyday life.” This happens without any effort when, after an extended period of fieldwork abroad, we come back to our own societies and have to readjust; at first many things seem unfamiliar and strange.

Another phenomenon with which we are repeatedly confronted in biographical research is the impact of the distant past on the present. We sociolo-
gists are not normally trained to take the relevance of the historical past into consideration, and therefore tend to ignore it. For example, when doing research on illegalized migrants, it might happen that you fail to appreciate the boundaries dominant in their collective histories, because you are only familiar with the modern concept of national borders. This is important for example in the case of West African groupings who had a tradition of easily moving between different (local) societies, polities, and geographical regions, in the past and far into the colonial and post-colonial periods. In other words, in West Africa, as in other regions of the Global South, mobility between different regions has been a characteristic feature of people’s way of life for centuries. Let me refer again at this point to Robert Ezra Park (1931/1950: 11), because it is necessary to reject what he says about mobility. Park claims that mobility, for him a measure of social change, is characteristic of America (he means North America!), and is in general more rapid in the Occident than in the Orient. In order to avoid this Eurocentric perspective, which fails to take into account the history of other regions, and thus overlooks historical continuities in the Global South, biographical research—and sociology in general—needs more research and discussion in the field of comparative historical sociology (cf. Rosenthal, 2012). I fully agree with Stephen Mennell, who also claims that comparative historical sociology is indispensable when looking to the future.

But in conclusion it must be said that this has been practiced in our Research Committee on Biography and Society since its foundation in 1984, and that it was especially promoted at that time by Daniel Bertaux (Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiame, 1988/1997; Bertaux and Delcroix, 2000). Over the last thirty years, we have established an intergenerational perspective and an elaborate conception of family history, involving analysis of interconnected biographies of multiple genealogical and sociohistorical generations. This was and is an important step toward overcoming an ahistorical methodology, and toward embedding biographies within the diachronic context of social history. Case studies across several sociohistorical generations can reveal how social phenomena emerge and develop over a long period of time. What are still needed are more comparative studies, including investigations into the history of social structures, milieus, subcultures, and sociopolitical figurations in the Global South.

References


X. MOBILIZATION
Introduction

Civil society groups have become major forces of change in a world characterized by high levels of economic and social inequality. They operate all over the world to advance processes they defend and seek to resist co-optation by existing political interests and structures. One way to do so is to refuse to play politics as usual. This chapter raises the question of the potential of contemporary social movements in Northern and Southern countries in terms of social transformations. Our discussion focuses on the elements that determine the success or failure of a social movement. We will examine the connections between social movements and social, economic, and political changes since the 1990s.

Today, globalization has proved incapable of ensuring the needs of large groups of people not only in the countries of the South but also in the countries of the triad (US, EU, Japan), the center of the global economy. It seems as if new social movements that work towards a transformation of the current political and economic order into a more democratic and equitable order have the possibility in this historic moment to launch global changes. This hypothesis justifies the analysis of recent changes among the members of transnational social movement organizations in the North and the South in order to see how these movements can go beyond regional and national frontiers (cf. Bringel and Domingues, 2015). A different social and economic world may be possible that avoids the prospect of force, coercion, and marginalization of the majority of social actors.

This chapter aims to understand local processes in the North and the South, including continuities and ruptures, linked to transnational movements that correspond to very different national and regional realities. This will allow us to understand the specificity of social movements that continue to be local and global at the same time. National and global elites (in organizations of the United Nations or political groups such as the G20) react to the challenges posed by social movements by reforming political institutions and creating openings or formal access to resources so that leaders within social movements can continue their struggles within existing institutions. This can be regarded as an adaptation of sociopolitical structures to movements and as an ability to challenge the so-
cial order. Transformations imposed by battles will then contribute to changed structures that are related to the conflict.

Social movements change while interacting with states: They can adopt reformist or anti-systemic strategies. Their choice is determined by the broader context of globalization and the particular historical situation, as we could see in North Africa in 2011 or in Greece in 2015. Indeed, the foundations of power and justifications for states are put into question by transnational movements. Global change will then result from the competition between global actors operating within these institutions (World Bank and IMF) that define the standards and the prevailing values. Since institutions are supposed to ensure the stability of political regimes, they have the monopoly to define sanctions against those who seek to change prevailing rules. Nevertheless, global institutions can also help to define the form and the anti-systemic potential of transnational movements, even if movement leaders express their skepticism about achieving social change through institutions.

Inside the movement, a consensus may prevail that these organizations should function on a transnational and not a local level because the international arena provides resources and potential allies that can promote the interests of social movements against the neoliberal globalization supported by political and economic elites. However, international organizations and NGOs also meet in social movements and reformulate their policies. Political elites and international organizations send observers to these world social forums, although the leaders of these social movements debate whether these elites are welcome or not.

The question remains whether a common organization of these social movements is feasible in the current era of networks. Some years ago, research still considered that these movements were too disparate to achieve their goals (Caillé, 2003). Despite many similarities resulting from the structural features of contemporary capitalism, social movements in the South seem to retain some differences vis-à-vis specific social movements in the North. The forms of dominant sociopolitical struggles differ according to the country (e.g., Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco). Historical peculiarities and given political trajectories allow various social movements to appear. For example, countries coming out of conflict seem to be less responsive to social movements, especially those oriented towards material demands. In countries that are at the threshold of their “democratic transition,” dominant social movements are generally oriented towards issues of “governance” and respect for human rights and the constitutional order.

Social Movements in the Global World

The social movements of recent years have sometimes been vague about their preferred economic model, but it has become quite clear that people want to have a greater voice in global economic decisions that influence their lives.
There has been competition among different world visions that have shaped global economic institutions and social movements. It seems as if major social changes can currently be introduced with some success if those excluded from power challenge the existing social order. In times of crisis, elites have in fact to accept pressure from social movements so that more fundamental societal changes may become possible.

Recent decades have seen an increase in transnational associations of all sorts, and in particular of those advocating for social change. Since the 1990s, networks among transnational organizations have become denser as a result of new technologies that have facilitated transnational communication, but also in response to UN international conferences. It seems as if the timing of this growing influence of social movements is linked to the global economic crisis of the last decade, so that various groups hope to challenge the dominant order and advance alternatives. These economic crises trigger opportunities for democratic movements, but also for xenophobic movements (Moghadam, 2008). The question is thus how political actors and the global economic system define the opportunities that shape the rise of social movements. New ideas and models of action introduced by these social movements may then eventually help transform global political actors and the global economic system itself.

Global Crisis and Changing Opportunities

Several types of crisis have occurred in recent years: A global financial crisis and increased unpredictability in the financial sector, large-scale climate changes, rising energy and food costs, and rising expulsions (Sassen 2014) of the economy triggering high inequality levels and poverty in the North and the South. The contemporary world economy in its form of neoliberal capitalism requires constant economic growth based on expanding markets. However, there are social and economic limits to the extraction of profits from the globe and its peoples, based on salaries and the limited possibility of introducing additional workers into the world economy. In recent years, threats to the global order have arisen in the form of large-scale protests in many regions, terrorism, and military interventions. One of the main reasons for these crises is the failure of the economic system to continue assuring benefits to groups such as workers and middle classes that are impoverishing in the North and that may rise (China and India) or stay poor in most countries of the Global South. Massive strikes have become frequent in multiple countries, such as Greece, Spain, France, countries of the Middle East, Turkey, Chile, Brazil. Some of these have been directed against authoritarian political regimes; others have been opposed to austerity measures or to specific grievances, such as tuition costs (Brazil). The reasons for these protests are not only linked to globalization but also to national and/or regional financial and economic situations that can be contested. Popu-
lar protests against the policies of the global financial institutions have been transmuted into electoral influence: Leaders of these movements are becoming more powerful in their countries and may unify with other movements in their demands for new rules for the global economy. The “development project” (McMichael) launched after World War II did not mean benefits for all in the South, so that now a wide variety of peoples are asking for changes in an era where global capitalism is still the dominant economic form. Yet it is not clear what sort of transformation of the existing system is possible. Will there be a world-system based on coercion and increasing violence, or will there arise a more democratic, more participative world economy? This possible world-system shapes the opportunity structure of movements working to transform the global economic and political system.

Globalized capitalism has extended its social and geographic reach via outsourcing and increasingly precarious forms of employment all over the world. Protests are now calling into question the gap between ideological justifications (e.g., free market and unlimited possibilities) and actual practice. In a first step, elites have been trying to reform political institutions by opening up formal means of access in order to give to political leaders of these movements the possibility to continue their struggle inside these institutions.

Movements shape the interactions between states and global actors: either they adopt reform projects, or they follow anti-systemic strategies. These different strategies are influenced by the larger global context of international cooperation. Globalization and the neoliberal economic order challenge the capacities of states to provide for the well-being of their populations and to control activities on their territories, so that new actors—such as social movements—emerge who contribute to the shifting discourse of interstate relations. Global institutions such as the UN are influenced by contestations among a multiplicity of global actors, including social movements. Some are human rights movements, environmentalists, or pro-democracy movements. Within each category, some of these groups are rather influential, such as Doctors Without Borders; others consist of a group of people united around a common goal without funding. These struggles contribute to the structural change in the identities of global actors and to processes of world-systemic changes. They include anti-systemic responses of transnational movements that try to achieve social transformation through institutions. To give examples: the feminist and the ecological movements have led to important changes worldwide in the last decades, materialized in the form of UN resolutions and the Millennium Goals.

**Theorizing Global Change and Social Movements**

A world-system perspective helps to understand the functioning of global change and to look for discontinuous changes in the basic structures of the
global economic and political order. Transnational social movements contribute to the normative challenge of the global order. They expand existing political and economic opportunities. They let appear splits among elites and the emergence of new political forces through elections.

One of the most important dynamics that have triggered protest movements is proletarianization caused by urbanization and the development of industrial manufacturing, which together integrate national economies into global markets. Moreover, small farmers are pushed out of agricultural production by transformations of local food markets and land ownership schemes. This process contributes to the expansion of urban slums and the growth of transnational agrarian movements. As Smith and West (2012: 26) have shown: “As proletarianization reaches its limits, labor costs rise, limiting economic growth and profitability. Extensive depeasantization contributes to vulnerabilities in food supplies, generating social instability.”

It seems as if today’s social movements can only be understood in world-historical terms. The democratization of the countries of the South and the globalization of labor markets, the expansion of Internet communication, and the spread of globalizing ideologies have supported the global economic system but also the growth of transnational associations around common identities. These networks are capable to trigger collective actions of popular groups that challenge states and global institutions but also empower less powerful states and social movements. The current multicentric global system has emerged into a critical subsystem of global politics characterized by new forms of analysis and alternative thinking on the functioning of the global economic system. Moreover, people have begun to argue against recent austerity measures in different countries.

UN global conferences have helped social movements to expand. The participants in these movements have changed as more and more of them have come from the Global South. In their respective countries, they take part in protest actions, advance cultural change through mass media, or engage with international institutions and their staff. Topics that have already been challenged include threat to indigenous peoples, child labor, and gender discrimination (Moghadam, 2008). Global conferences help transnational groups to meet each other and to focus on shared global projects. World Bank projects have also involved activist groups, giving them access to local networks and displaying the gap between social and community benefits and the global development project (SAPRIN, 2012). However, civil society groups’ engagement with global institutions shows that segments of these groups are interested in the idea of defending changed economic outcomes and therefore want to challenge dominant assumptions. Nevertheless, the existing institutions continue to define the terms for working within them, so that movements remain more or less powerless if they don’t create political parties, such as Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece (Smith and West, 2012: 171).
Another strategy used by elites is to question the representativeness and accountability of social movements. This strategy aims at reasserting the monopoly of states and corporate interests in global politics. It means limited advantages for movements despite greater access to global institutions. These processes help maintain the privileges and the power of elite groups by orienting activists towards interstate projects and by fostering competition and division among movements.

The strategy of bringing critics into institutions has changed movement dynamics. Earlier movements had only the street to express their criticisms; today’s movements have multiple possibilities to advance critical discourses and perspectives within the institutions themselves. Movement-generated norms and different goals will thus influence world politics, contributing to a democratization of global politics. Participation in these movements already produces a critical understanding of the global political and economic order insofar as participants are exposed to new political and economic arguments. The potential for global change becomes obvious, as movements, institutions, and critics are mutually reinforcing. Recent social movements show that hopelessness, despair, and self-blame no longer constitute the only responses to global neoliberal capitalism. The hundreds of thousands who have globally protested have drawn attention to an increasing social inequality and have created some hope in difficult times. These movements have appeared at a time when social conflicts around wages and labor unions have been waning, being faced with atypical employment situations, more and more precarious jobs in the North, and an increase of the informal sector in the South.

These past years, collective actions have taken place in China, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Traditional labor unions may be absent from conflicts, but NGOs, self-help groups, and cooperatives have become instruments of the expression of workers’ interests. Negotiations no longer take place in the workplace, but in the local community. In this form, they may protect societies from economic outcomes of ‘free markets’. Workers alone—as history has shown—cannot realize changes. They need the political action of states. In India, social movements have created political parties that change politics by integrating notions such as inclusive growth and sustainable development. Elites are then obliged to undertake reforms in order to obtain electoral support. Insofar as the masses have become aware of their rights, they also want to exercise power. However, if the country is small, the state can only resist the neoliberal economy and the forces of globalization with difficulty. If the country is important economically, it can—as recent policies favoring the middle class in China have shown—attack problems of equity and ask for an improved consumption level inside the country.

It is this mutual interaction between reforms initiated by elites and new movements of contestation that will probably shape the future of societies in the
South and the North. The state is no longer a neutral agent, but a heavily disputed one that faces protest and power shifts. In fact, it is no longer possible to decide on distribution, accumulation of wealth, conditions of employment, and production only in national parliaments. The ruling principles of the economic elites need to be enlarged by political processes that include several levels in front of the transnationalization of the economy. Different groups of actors are reconstructing their interests in the political system, such as in Spain or in Greece. However, implementing new social rights as an alternative to liberal constitutions can only be the result of future social struggles. The social question is thus linked to processes of democratization. Social movements create something that has been named post-democracy. “Across the world, squares and plazas have become public spheres where people can not only share alternatives, but where they can also develop a sense of continuity and incubate novel forms of collective projects and identities” (Tejerina et al., 2013: 382).

The 2011–2012 protests gave democracy a new meaning, turning it into a participative dialogue among everyone, not only activists, around political issues. Decisions have been made at general assemblies using the principles of direct democracy. Activists are thus living their own utopian political ideas.

**Concluding Remarks**

We can conclude from this theoretical overview of recent social movements that these are networks where alternative societal visions are negotiated and where actors are engaged in struggles to realize social change. People reunite around projects that can influence the future. They create and promote new collective identities and eventually transform society (Poletta and Jaspers, 2001). There is a certain agreement that these movements may have broad consequences in the short term and/or in the long term. As these movements show, if the issue has been raised, it becomes part of a societal agenda, so that the goals may be achieved in the future. These movements try to change national discussions, for instance, in Europe, from austerity to inequality, and encourage large groups of the young to become politically active. These young people will continue to support progressive government policies, faced as they are by few employment possibilities. At this moment, the outcomes of these movements in Europe remain uncertain. The already realized changes in support of more solidarity between people and less austerity can be considered as promising signs.

I have shown in this chapter that it is difficult to suggest the outcomes of the current wave of social movements and its possible consequences for social transformation. There are some common global causes, but local responses differ greatly. However, these new social movements are promising signs that the neoliberal global economy has important deficits and that it is time to look for adaptive changes that will have positive influences on inequality and pov-
erty among increasingly large segments of the population in very different world regions. These movements may challenge the dominant economic principles in the short term, but also in the long term in order to create hope and not despair.

References


33. Capitalism, Crisis and Indignation: The Social Mobilizations of Today

Lauren Langman and Tova Benski

RC36 Alienation Theory and Research

Crisis

Marx devoted considerable attention to the contradictions and crisis tendencies inherent to capitalism (Marx, 1972). While he believed these crises would lead to overcoming capitalism, he little anticipated the extent to which rising standards of living, the welfare state benefits and entitlements, nationalism and consumerism/mass media would serve to quell discontent and sustain the reproduction of capitalism. But as will be seen, between stagnating, if not declining incomes, precarious employment, the privatization and/or the retrenchments of benefits fostered by neoliberalism, we would suggest that as inequality has grown, and capitalism has become more crisis prone, we surely expect more crises of global capitalism.

In the 1920s, the American stock market crashed and precipitated a long-term global depression that precipitated two different political agendas. In the United States, FDR embraced Keynesian principles of regulation and targeted state investments in infrastructure, roads bridges and dams, post offices and conservation activities. In Germany, Hitler rose to power and we know where that left us. Following the war, there was a period of rapid economic growth, a growing middle class, and greater equality. Keynesian economics solved one set of problems, but created another over the legitimacy of the State which required ever greater taxation to afford its growing expenses, domestic as well as military, and the profitability of corporations—especially as they were becoming more multinational in focus. It was at this point that neoliberalism as both a justification for structural change and legitimation of those changes, and promises of prosperity for all began to take hold and then came crises. But how do we theorize their causes and consequences?

Habermas (1975), theory of legitimation crises, provides crucial insights for our times. Crises occur at the level of the system, namely the economic system concerned with producing and distributing goods, the political system that maintains the stability/growth of economic system and sustains legitimacy for the system and the cultural system that provides shared meanings and fosters loyalty to the system; such crises, at the level of system, nevertheless
migrate to the life worlds, the subjective experiential realms of identity and emotion. The contemporary political-economic contradictions and crises of neoliberalism, quite often foster growing hardships, and quite often, particular crises. The 2008 implosion led to “moral shocks” (Jasper, 1999) along with various humiliations and insults to the self and self-esteem that led to strong emotional reactions from fear to anger and often aggression that may be targeted to elites, out-groups or whomever. Such subjective reactions typically precipitate withdrawal of loyalties to the system, and open the actor to critiques of the system and/or its leadership, then s/he may join with others who have been similarly adversely impacted to join groups/networks that seek to understand and indeed frame the situation and then join or initiate social movements that seek social change. The emotional consequences of insults to one’s identity mediates between the structural and the individual. The economic consequences and crises resulting from neoliberal capitalism have been the primary factors fostering both left and right wing mobilizations. But at the same time, while quite often the initial impact of economic crises may be the pocketbook factors, bankruptcies, foreclosures, job losses, retrenchments of benefits etc., we suggest that the emotional reactions stem from the loss of one’s sense of dignity.

**Dignity**

Marx’s critique of alienated labor suggested that wage labor, the basis of value in a capitalist society, led to the objectification and estrangement of workers. As workers alienated their labor power, the products of their labor and indeed their very selves, they produced a system of domination that stood outside themselves that refluxed back upon them as an alien force rendering them powerless, objects without agency or recognition and thus devoid of humanity. Workers were estranged from each other as well as from realizing their full human capacities of creativity and self-realization—they were alienated from their “species being.” Langman (2015) argued that within the manuscripts there was an implicit notion of human nature and thus a social psychology and normative principles suggesting that when these various aspects of human desire were frustrated, when people were denied recognition and rendered devoid of dignity as both a state in which people find emotional gratifications and normative virtue as a basic human right. Otherwise, we see shame, self-denigration and violence as a reaction; this was clearly seen by Frantz Fanon (1959) as well as by Scheff (2000). Similarly, Schulz (2016a), influenced by Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, has argued that history is a struggle for recognition while noting that for Nancy Fraser, economic justice, distribution plays a central role. Thus we would argue that certain aspects of political economy, especially moments of crisis that thwart freedom and un-
dermine dignity beget a variety of strong emotions beginning with indignation, anger, humiliation and shame that in turn, dispose networking, framing the situation and envisioning alternative futures that prompt various kinds of social mobilizations.

Global Justice Movements

The current cycle of global contention began in the 1990s when the Internet enabled the emergence of broader, global networks that enabled virtual “public spheres” where people could widely disseminate information, exchange ideas with others, critique aspects of their society as well as globalization, and critique the corruption of elites, exploitation, inequality, violations of human rights, environmental despoliation and above all its crisis tendencies, this led to “internetworked social movements” (Langman, 2005). With the rapid ascent of financialization in the late 90s, global capitalism become more vulnerable to crises and contradictions. As the adverse consequences of neoliberal globalization fostered greater inequality, retrenchments of resources/services and growing pollution, a number of both local and transnational activist networks emerged in opposition to the policies of the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO. It was at this point, in the 90s we can first note the emerging Global Justice movements such as the indigenous movement of the EZLN, the Zapatistas seeking autonomy (not independence) from Mexico (See Schultz, 2015b). This was followed by subsequent anti-or perhaps alternative globalization movements such as massive 1999 demonstrations against WTO meetings in Seattle, subsequent protests against the IMF, WTO and WB followed by the World Social Forum, a “movement of movements” in the “spaces of flows” that began in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in which activists from various social movement organizations across the globe, various NGOs, INGOs, various indigenous rights, peasant rights and landless groups, as well as feminists, LGBT groups, environmentalists etc. gather to share ideas, develop networks with each other, and plan and often coordinate strategies and actions. The WSF meetings have taken place in India, Kenya, Senegal, Tunisia and most recently Canada. Moreover, as an offshoot, we have seen United States Social Forum meetings in Atlanta, Detroit and most recently, Philadelphia and San Jose. The actors of such movements are quite diverse, ranging from large and powerful labor unions—e.g., CUT in Brazil—to local neighborhood tenants rights or gay-rights organizations. While such movements rarely make headlines, they have nevertheless been instrumental in fostering a number of reforms and have become major forces promoting human rights, economic justice, ecology etc. In the USA, we have seen a resurgence of such movements such as Black Lives Matter and the growing demands for $15/hour wages. Perhaps the Sanders quest was the legacy of Occupy turned political.
Arab Spring, the Indignados and Occupy

Our primary concern is to understand the massive and indeed widespread global justice movements. We saw the proliferation of a variety of progressive NGOs and SMOs, including various feminist organizations that were often highly dependent on ICT (Moghadam, 2012). Perhaps the best known was the Ibn Khaldoun Center in Cairo, established in 1988 by Saad Eddin Ibrahim, an American-Egyptian sociologist well known among the academic community. Such civil society organizations and NGOs in the MENA regions played important roles in spreading ideas of representative democracy, illuminating inequality and publicizing elite indifference and/or human right abuses. The work of many such organizations thus prepared if not inspired subsequent mobilizations in the Middle East.

While each of these mobilizations has its own unique features beginning with cultural traditions, the existence of certain NGOs and SMOs often including labor movements, feminist organizations student movements and other progressive organizations, our present concern is generally the common features of the 2011–2012 mobilizations/occupations relevant for social movement perspectives. In most cases and surely this was clear in Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria, the long-term consequences of neoliberal capitalism, intertwined with corrupt indigenous elites has generally led to a combination of economic stagnation for the majority, especially rapidly growing populations of youths, while the various elites, from the military classes of Egypt to the presidents of countries like Tunisia and Morocco, together with other sectors of the transnational capitalist class, have constituted a modern version of the compradors, local elites closely tied to imperialists—but in the present context, the imperialists are less likely to be nation-states as such, but rather transnational corporations and/or their financial arms such as the IMF, WTO or World Bank. But the dominant common characteristics tended to be economic stagnation, growing classes of young, precarious workers in economies that generally serve to undermine both economic adaptation and thwart personal dignity for vast numbers. And then, when a Tunisian fruit peddler set himself ablaze, he ignited vast waves of protest that quickly spread throughout the Middle East, most notably Tahrir Square in Cairo (see Benski, Langman and Tejerina, 2013). But ironically enough, save Tunisia, the forces of reaction, often aided and supported by Western imperial powers led by the USA, struck back and reversed the various trends toward democratization. We might also note however the imperialist interventions, has generally led to chaos, disorganization and as a result the civil wars and fundamentalist mobilizations we’ve discussed elsewhere.

In the wake of the 2008 implosion, the banking interests of Europe, the EC and ECB and especially Germany the economic powerhouse of Europe, em-
braced the typical neoliberal solutions in which debt repayment became the primary tool requiring of course massive retrenchments in social benefits, in other words following the implosion came massive requirements for austerity which of course led to growing unemployment, especially for the young and retrenchments in pensions for the retired. Thus, much like what happened in the Middle East, the economic conditions not only fostered economic hardships, but undermined people’s self-esteem and their sense of dignity. Following the eruptions of Arab Spring, came massive mobilization/occupations in Greece, Portugal and Spain etc. quite aptly, the Spanish activists called themselves the Indignados, the indignant ones the ones who have been treated without a sense of dignity.

Given similar conditions in the United States, preceded by massive demonstrations against neoliberal policies in Wisconsin, then a call for occupation, by Ad Busters magazine, there was a massive occupation in Zucotti Park not far from Wall Street—the belly of the capitalist beast. Overnight, a tent city appeared that soon grew to many thousands of activists and numerous marches, actions etc. Within a very short time, similar occupations began to take place widely across the United States and indeed in many other countries as well protesting the growing inequality led by the elites now termed the 1% of the elites that it has now garnered most of the wealth primarily through financial speculation. To be sure, much like the aforementioned mobilizations, most of these activists tend to be progressive youth, perhaps not members of workers groups or NGOs, but many of these activists, have histories of prior progressive activism and in places like New York and Berkeley, many actually had degrees, often postgraduate, it feels like sociology, anthropology and cultural studies and were well-versed in the critiques of domination and capitalism..

From the present vantage point, it might be said that the various progressive movements “failed,” the Egyptian government under Al Sisi is far more brutal than under Mubarak. Libya is in chaos, the Civil War in Syria has been one of the greatest humanitarian disasters since World War II between massive death, destruction and migration. A progressive party, Syriza emerged in Greece but acquiesced to the demands of the Troika. Were such movement’s failures? To be quite brief, in the short term yes! But that is too simplistic, such movements, as suggested by NSM theory, are future oriented, and whatever else might be said, the generations of protesters, given participation/interaction in such mobilizations, experience changes collective identity. As Mannheim (1952) suggested, the very experiences of demonstration/occupation and changing governments, will shape significant segments of the young cohorts that will in turn impact political transformations in the future. A hint of this is already been evident in the United States with the massive support of the millennial generation for the campaign of Bernie Sanders.
Right-wing Mobilizations: Tea Party, Trump and Brexit

One of the most important consequences of the growing inequality of the past decade or so, has been a massive shift to the right as has been seen throughout Europe, the demise of the “pink tide” in South America and indeed the ascent of first the tea party in the United States, and finally, the election of Donald Trump. By and large, the primary actors in such mobilizations tend to be older typically white, typically conservative, typically male populations facing economic anxieties and uncertainties, and often declining incomes. At the same time, many of these populations are seeing their long-standing cultural values, such as patriarchy, racism, homophobia under siege; and quite often their religious values have been undermined by the secular trends of the larger society. As a result of the liberalization and the cosmopolitanism of values, for many of these lower middle and working class populations, their sense of honor, pride, and most of all the denial of dignity, has been eroded by the combination of neoliberal globalization on the one hand and the waning of their cultural values racism, patriarchy and homophobia that are closely intertwined with evangelical Christianity. Moreover, given the pre-existing, it becomes quite easy to direct anger and resentment various outgroups. Thus was clearly evident with the rise of the Tea Party following the election of Obama, when given the combination of economic anxiety and the election of an African American president, a segment of the more traditional lower middle class, religious conservatives in the Republican Party, supported by both money and organizational efforts by conservative organizations, ascended to power (Langman, 2013). And while their support would drop, they were nevertheless able to elect a number of representatives to the Congress that were able to thwart much of a progressive legislation sought by Obama and the Democrats.

More recently, similar factors, enabled the ascent of Donald Trump, who fused together the anger and rage of many white males, especially those with no more than a high school education who tend to be increasingly “atomized” and nostalgic for a past that they believe would have provided them with greater economic security as well as dignity. Many such workers, feeling a combination of humiliation, fear, anger and often hopelessness, quickly gravitate to right-wing candidates/parties who mobilize that anger and locate that anger as the “legitimate” response to selfish, indifferent elites, who have gamed the system for their own advantage.

Given their anger against establishment elites as well as tapping into the pre-existing prejudices of white working-class males, especially in Southern states and blaming the loss of dignified lifestyles on women, racial and ethnic minorities, while the same time, between the authoritarianism dispositions of his followers, media reporting, and capitalizing on both, most of Trump’s followers felt a strong fear and hatred towards Moslems now seen as supporters of Isis.
that was seen as the major threat to American security.² Between his narcissism, authoritarianism and angry bullying style, and a certain kind of media-based “reality show” charisma, Trump’s message of restoring greatness, at least to white working-class males, strongly resonated with those who have been, humiliated by the economic conditions and at the same time, resentful toward the federal government for having seemingly helped minorities, women and immigrants—at their cost (cf. Hochschild, 2016).

**Brexit**

Brexit, the English referendum to withdraw from the EU can be understood in much the same way as the right-wing mobilization of the USA. One might suggest that there were two major populations of the English within the same national border with radically different political agendas (cf. Calhoun, 2016). There was London, especially the City of London, one of the most important financial centers for global capital. London itself is one of the more cosmopolitan cities of the world in which various immigrants have been able to find a work and career in many sectors of the economy from the lower ends of restaurant service to participants in the financial centers, research centers, hospitals and universities and we might note that the Mayor of London is a Moslem. Immigrant populations are widely distributed throughout the city. The economy of London is vibrant, alive and growing as is indeed reflected in its real estate being among the most expensive in the world. And surely the prosperity of London is closely tied to the fortunes of the global political economy in general and the EU in particular.

But so too is there another England or should we say sector of political actors in the Midlands and Southern regions with large numbers of older, working-class, less educated workers and/or former workers who have not only seen their mines close, the factories shuttered and even many pubs have closed. These people are the downside of the growing inequality of neoliberalism. All about them, they see large numbers of recent immigrants. For these older, English blue collar workers, there is a great deal of resentment toward the cosmopolitanism of London and rather than looking toward a glorious and prosperous future that is unlikely to ever return to these regions, they look back and vaguely remember the glory of the British Empire and would restore those wonderful days of yesteryear when English imperialism may well have made the wealthy more wealthy, but it also meant jobs and relatively well paid secure, stable careers for the workers. As Calhoun (2016) put it, “Brexit was a vote against London, globalization and multiculturalism as much as a vote against Europe and the EU.” And surely while many of these Brexit voters harbored racist, ethnocentric and often Islamophobia attitudes, these proximate targets for rage and resentment are the correlates of the loss of pride and erosion of dignity that have
engendered the populist nationalism that like most such reactionary/ethnic nationalisms, would seek to restore a glorious past—“to make England great again.” One might hear “Rule, Britannia” in the background.

The cosmopolitans of Londoners could clearly see the anger, racism and bigotry of the Brexit voters, but could never see that their vote against the EU was rooted in genuine pain and resentment-not a cost-benefit spreadsheet more typically found in the financial institutions responsible for neoliberalism that brought such hardships. But those financial institutions are central to the new global economy that indeed was at the basis of the waning of the industrial working class and segments of the petit bourgeois. Indeed, as many have noted, the same growing stagnation of the working and lower middle classes is fostering the resentment that fuels growing right wing populist nationalisms throughout Europe as protests against the EU that may well marked the beginning of its demise. Think Le Pen, Hofer.

**Conclusion**

The conditions of economic anxiety, the growing inequality and stagnation if not decline of incomes and precariously for many, and the ever more insecure nature of work and social life in the advanced countries has undermined the sense of dignity for many people that has in turn generated highly motivated mobilizations left and right. A number of left progressive groups seek futures with more democratic distributions of economic rewards, often through innovative types of cooperative economic arrangements such as Mondragon, the reclaimed factories of Argentina or the co-ops of Bologna. At the same time, many of the right-wing nationalist/populist movements have embraced various moments of racism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, and have openly articulated expressions of anger, and quite often actual violence toward various outgroups. Quite regrettably, the various reactionary groups, some bordering on fascism, have seen their power ascendant in the last several years. It is at this point that sociological theory and research, harkening back the the Frankfurt School studies of Fromm, Adorno and Horkheimer, becomes especially necessary to implement policies that would thwart the growing inequality and precarity of growing polarization and potential dangers. We would suggest that one of our primary tasks should be to more fully consider the centrality of the quest for dignity and how neoliberal capitalism has thwarted such quests. To achieve the progressive, democratic, inclusive cosmopolitan future that we would desire, we need to better understand the dynamics of dignity/indignation and how more democratic political economic policies might pave the way for progressive social movements to bring us another world-the one sought by the WSF.
Notes

1. O’Connor (1974) and Offe (1985) have written about the fiscal crisis of the state circa the 1960s.

2. It should be noted that such fears are vastly disproportionate to any threats that Isis might pose to the United States. On the one hand they have been facing defeat after defeat on the battlefield, growing problems of recruitment, finances, and many of their top leaders/operators have been taken out by drone strikes. Further, the massive attacks as seen in Paris, or Brussels, and depend on the existence of large concentrations of disgruntled, alienated, and often jobless Muslim refugees which is definitely not the case in the United States with notwithstanding the existence of Islamophobia, most Moslems have been able to adjust to American society, and pursue education and/or careers.

References

34. Institutional Ethnography and Activist Futures

Eric Mykhalovskiy
TG06 Institutional Ethnography

Introduction

In recent years there have been growing calls across the social science disciplines, including sociology, to articulate, encourage, and reward what has been variously termed public, critically engaged, or activist scholarship (Burawoy, 2005; Hale, 2008; Low and Merry, 2010). While these calls have various specificities, they all express some form of support for scholarship that is explicitly politicized, that speaks to and intervenes in issues of the day, that encourages scholars to connect with social actors beyond the university, and that imagines itself contributing to social justice and to struggles against oppression, domination, and human suffering. Imagining a sociology that contributes to the “Futures We Want” as expressed by the ISA Forum 2016 is, of course, a welcome development. It is particularly welcome at a time of rapid globalization, environmental degradation, widening social inequalities, resurgent racism and xenophobia in political discourse, police violence, and unyielding armed conflict.

While there may be nothing particularly new about critically engaged scholarship, particularly in countries with rich traditions of participatory and activist research, what would appear novel is the degree of reflexivity of current discussions about public social science. In recent years, versions of public, engaged sociology and anthropology have been discussed and debated, and, along the way, there has been produced a sustained critical interrogation of what, in research, is or can be meant by such practices as engagement, collaboration, activism, and advocacy (Mullins, 2011; Susser, 2010). Within these discussions there are threads or flashes of a frank consideration of what different versions of critically engaged scholarship involve, concretely, what challenges they face, and what theoretical and practical insights they offer.

I find those discussions refreshing, particularly in the context of a more prevailing academic disposition to theorize about social activism, and this article is meant as a small contribution to them. The article is focused on the relationship between institutional ethnography (IE) and social movement activism. IE is new to the ISA, having been recently established as a Thematic Group. I begin with a short description of IE. I then describe how George Smith (1990),
in his groundbreaking article “Political Activist as Ethnographer,” articulates a vision of the use of IE in activist research. The article ends with reflections on how the relationship between IE and activism can contribute to current debates and discussions in the scholarly literature on engaged research.

**What Is Institutional Ethnography?**

IE grew out of Canadian sociologist Dorothy Smith’s experiences of the women’s movement in the 1970s. Like other feminist sociologists, she was deeply concerned about how the sociological discourse of the day, while declaring itself as universal and objective, either ignored women or failed to provide a conceptual language for expressing their experiences of oppression. Smith’s response was to re-envision sociology in order to free it from objectified modes of knowing. She named her alternative sociology institutional ethnography (IE). The term might be interpreted as suggesting a mode of ethnographic investigation of a closed organizational space, such as an ethnography of a particular school or hospital. That is decidedly not what IE is about.

IE is a scholarly project that empirically explores the coordination of people’s activities across time and place. It has intellectual roots in feminist thought, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and Marxism and has been developed through Smith’s engagement with a diverse range of intellectual currents, including the work of Mead, Marx, Foucault, and Bakhtin (Smith, 1987, 1999, 2005). Drawing on her unique interpretation of the concept of ideology as developed in The German Ideology, Smith formulates a materialist ontology of the social, such that institutional ethnographic inquiry begins with and returns to the embodied site of actual people as they experience the world (Smith, 2004). Institutional ethnography seeks to preserve the embodied presence of people in investigations of how our worlds are put together through extended institutional relations. Rather than drawing on disciplinary concepts and categories to explain or theorize about people’s activities, institutional ethnographers treat people as competent knowers and seek to broaden the scope of what we can know, from our local sites of experience, about how our lives are organized by ruling relations.

Ruling relations are conceptualized within IE as reaching across a range of institutional sites such as government, the corporate sector, the mass media, the professions, and the law, as well as the forms of discourse that interpenetrate them. IE commits to mapping or explicating these relations rather than generating theory about them. In order to do so, institutional ethnographers orient to language, discourse, and representation as social practices. They investigate translocal processes of coordination, often emphasizing the role that texts play in coordinating extended social relations by circulating forms of discourse that translate experience and actualities into a standardized, objectified, and governable form (Smith and Turner, 2014).
IE formulates a particular mode of critical inquiry of pervasive, but often taken for granted, features of contemporary forms of governance or rule. It is an intellectual project that ethnographically explores how the world is socially organized—how it is put together such that our lives and experiences hook into, shape, and are shaped by translocal forms of coordination mediated by texts and the discourses they bear. IE has become particularly popular in Canada, the US, Australia, and Scandinavia. For recent references see http://www.sssp1.org/index.cfm/pageid/1236/m/464.

**Political Activist as Ethnographer**

There are many ways to practice an activist sociology. And there are many ways that IE can have an engaged, political character. The most significant statement of the activist potential of IE research was made over two decades ago by George Smith (1990). His article is the focus of an edited collection on activism and social research in Canada (Frampton et al., 2006) and is an ongoing source of inspiration for sociologists and others interested in using IE to contribute to social justice and progressive social transformation. I had the good fortune to work closely with George in the early 1990s prior to his death due to complications related to HIV.

George’s article discusses the use of IE in the context of social movement activism. He describes how he used IE research in two examples of activist work. The first was his involvement with the Right to Privacy Committee, a grassroots organization established to defend gay and bisexual men arrested in the mass raid of gay bathhouses by Toronto police in 1981. The second was his work as part of the activist group AIDS ACTION NOW! to improve access to treatment for people living with HIV in Canada during the late 1980s.

One of the devices George uses to represent his research is to contrast the results and effects of institutional ethnography with conventional activist ways of understanding what was at hand. For example, he notes that many gay men explained the bathhouse raids as a result of police homophobia or as part of a Progressive Conservative Party election strategy meant to curry favour among voters (1990: 633–34). Similarly, lack of treatment access was understood by some AIDS activists as a consequence of the homophobia of the Conservative Minister of Health or, more generally, as a result of bureaucratic red tape (1990: 634).

George takes issue with these sorts of explanations because of how they treat ruling practices as a kind of black box that is left unopened. Neither set of explanations encourages any empirical investigation of “how the way people were treated came about, either by the police or the AIDS bureaucracy” (1990: 634). George positions IE as a form of sociology that can aid activism by doing just that. So, rather than attributing the bathhouse raids to individual, homophobic police officers, an explanation that calls for sensitivity training among police, George investigated how the raids actually happened; that is, how they
were produced by the activities of police officers and the ways those activities were coordinated translocally.

George’s analysis focuses on how police officers conducted covert onsite investigations of bathhouses prior to the raids. He offers an analysis of the disclosure documents police used to collect facts to be used to prosecute the accused in court. His research focused on the social organization of gathering evidence, in particular how it was coordinated by the bawdy-house section of the Criminal Code of Canada (Smith, 1988). His research reveals the text-mediated relations that organized the bathhouse raids and calls attention to the importance of the Criminal Code in ideologically organizing the homophobia of the police. To prevent further raids, George’s ethnography recommends activism to change the criminal law, rather than police sensitivity training.

In an analogous fashion, George explored the institutional and professional relations through which access to treatment was organized for people living with HIV in Canada during the early years of the epidemic. He explored how the Canadian government’s response to HIV was organized by public health reasoning and practices that emphasized curtailing HIV transmission, rather than responding to the health needs of people already living with HIV (Smith, 1995). He further examined how medical practitioners’ work was organized around regimes of palliative care coordinated ideologically by the notion of AIDS as a fatal illness. The upshot of his analysis was that the problem was not homophobia, but the absence of an organizational infrastructure for managing the delivery of experimental treatments in Canada. That analysis informed the work of AIDS ACTION NOW! to help establish such an infrastructure by, for example, advocating for a government-run AIDS treatment registry (Smith, 1990).

**Conversations**

George’s engagement with institutional ethnography to inform activist struggles, what has come to be termed political activist ethnography, offers a fruitful place from which to consider contemporary discussions about engaged scholarship. Let me suggest how IE can contribute to discussions regarding three issues raised in the literature: what is meant by engagement, the politics of collaboration, and the institutional challenges faced by engaged scholarship.

**Varieties of Engagement**

The literature offers many ways to think about what engagement in activist research might mean (Hale, 2008; Low and Merry, 2010; Vaughan, 2006). The answers generally suggest particular conceptions of the role of engaged scholars and how their research may have a political impact. Thus, we have the social critic who illuminates oppressive practices, the researcher whose work informs
policy making, the public educator, and the scholar who studies social movements, among others. IE suggests something quite different from these possibilities.

George’s example of political activist ethnography suggests the notion of an embedded or allied scholar. The embedded scholar is someone who uses extensive and long-lasting involvement in the activities of a social movement not as a basis for writing or theorizing about the movement, but as an ethnographic resource to study the ruling relations that the movement seeks to challenge.

I think this is distinct, in important ways, from much of what happens in the sociology of social movements. My own experience is that graduate students in sociology are very much drawn to the forms of politics afforded by social movements, in contrast to those associated with formal electoral politics. But when it comes to the matter of how, as emerging sociologists, to conceptualize a relationship with social movements, they can imagine very little else other than treating the movement as an object of analysis. Of course, they are guided in that direction by the social movement literature, which privileges questions about how social movements are formed, how the identities of social movement activists are constructed, how movements develop particular strategies, and so on.

These questions, interesting as they are, produce an objectifying stance toward social movements that is quite different from the forms of engagement afforded by IE. As I have already emphasized, institutional ethnography does not treat social movements as an object of empirical analysis. Instead, embedded within or as an ally of a given social movement, the political activist as ethnographer turns investigation outward to the complex ruling practices that the movement confronts. In the case of my own work with activists seeking to end unjust HIV criminalization, this has meant exploring the complex relations of legal, scientific, and public health knowledge that support and sustain the criminal law governance of HIV non-disclosure (Mykhalovskiy, 2016). Of course, to the extent that political activist ethnography is meant to inform movement politics, by demonstrating how ruling practices work and offering versions of translocal practices that shape the immediate problems that movements face, its political stakes, forms of responsibility, and potential consequences are of a much different order than those associated with, for example, the study of identity formation.

The Politics of Collaboration

George’s article was written before complex issues about the politics of collaboration became widely addressed in the literature on activist and engaged scholarship. Such issues include working across social difference and power inequalities, the politics of identity and representation, and the many proposals for
how to materialize forms of collaboration between scholars and activists (Denzin and Lincoln, 2013).

One way that political activist ethnography contributes to the literature is by deepening questions it already about poses about the complexity of the scholar-activist relationship. For example, on the one hand, the very term political activist as ethnographer disrupts any sense of a tidy or clear distinction between the scholar and activist. Much of the discussion of collaboration in the literature on engagement presupposes a scholar researcher who works out of the academy who must bridge multiple divides to connect with, study, offer research to, or otherwise connect with activists. It is important to imagine the work relations of the embedded scholar in other terms. She does not reach out to a social movement from her university office. Rather, she is already an activist who works within or alongside the movement, and her research problematic arises out of the historical connections already there formed.

There is also a way that presenting the scholar as always other to the activist contributes to a diminished conceptualization of the activist. In Canada, the context from which I write, there are few paid social movement activists. Most activists are always something more or other than activists. The term political activist as ethnographer helps remind scholars that we are not so special, that we stand in a kind of equivalence with the doctor as activist, the service provider as activist, the community worker as activist, and so on.

Of course, this is not meant to suggest that the scholar does not bring to her work with social movements particular skills and expertise or that scholarship and activism are equivalent, or that there are no tensions or challenges in activist scholarship. George’s discussion of the discord between activist political theorizing and the forms of analysis produced by institutional ethnography provides one example.

There are others. Institutional ethnography is a very specific approach to conducting sociological research. It has a particular approach to generating research questions, conducting interviews, doing text analysis, and writing up research findings (Devault and McCoy, 2002). In the years since George first wrote about political activist ethnography, models of participatory action research and community-based research have led thought about collaboration between academics and activists. They place a premium on democratizing the research process. In some instances they create expectations among activists and communities that research is a completely leveled endeavor; that questions about how research should be conducted are a matter of complete negotiation and deliberation. Institutional ethnography sits in some tension with such expectations. How to respect the specificity of institutional ethnographic research methods while also recognizing the value and potential of democratizing the research process represents a central tension for those who wish to bring forward IE as an intellectual resource for social movement activism.
**Challenges**

Changes in the organization of universities and academic research, often described as involving processes of commercialization and commodification (Rolfe, 2013), pose significant challenges for political activist ethnography and other forms of engaged sociological inquiry. Creating a vibrant future for political activist ethnography will require its practitioners to face the crisis that has taken hold in universities and to refuse, resist, challenge, and change the direction of transformation.

George’s research might be described as slow scholarship (Berg and Seeber, 2016). It emerged out of years of his participation in gay and HIV activism, was not formally funded, and did not follow a rigid, predetermined research plan. His investigations were emergent projects given direction by ongoing confrontation with police and other state actors. As George practiced it, political activist ethnography created data from meetings with authorities that took place as part of social movement activism rather than from “interviews arranged from [his] office that used [his] professional credentials as entrée to the field” (Smith, 1990: 638). While committed to the methodological principles of IE, George’s research had an open and iterative quality.

The entrepreneurial relations that have come to organize university-based research can make it difficult to conduct IE that is explicitly political, emergent in design, and embedded in social movement practice. Around the world, university administrations have turned to crude metrics to measure and assess faculty research performance (Wright, 2014). More and more, our work is subject to the same forms of managerial assessment and governance typical of other work settings. Managerial-inflected discourses about university research encourage scholars to value publication output, speed of publication, and dollars earned through externally funded research. In the health field, in which I work, the pressure to conduct research by securing large grants with multiple partners and to contribute to applied, instrumental research rather than research that critiques managerial forms of knowledge can be stifling.

It is also the case that in some settings, engaged scholarship has been incorporated into university strategic plans and promotional materials. Deep contradictions take hold when social engagement becomes a catchphrase of university social marketing campaigns at precisely the same time that university administrations are systematically dismantling collegial governance, increasing faculty workloads, and eliminating secure tenure-stream faculty positions, all while pursuing closer ties with dubious corporate donors and sponsors.

These and other features of the current institutional environment of university-based research demand a reflexive response. Using IE’s insights about the transformation of academic research by translocal managerial relations can help secure an organizational future for political activist ethnography and related forms
of inquiry. In order to use political activist ethnography to help create the “Futures We Want,” we will need to work differently. We will need to critique oppressive institutional relations that are corrupting the university. But we will also need to counter them by creating alternative arrangements and cultures that support what is most valuable about traditions of embedded, activist scholarship.

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Ever since the closing decades of the last century, the world has witnessed ever more human-caused and natural catastrophes resulting in both cascade and long-distance migration. As a result, ever more—also, reluctant—countries are becoming “immigration countries.” In the future we can expect even more such migration. The question is how the migrants are received. This text does not discuss xenophobia or indifference towards refugees. Instead it raises the question of how the past discourses of transnational solidarity and the present-day discourses of compassion can be expected to shape emotions towards refugees. It is, in other words, a text concerned with a specific part of an emotional regime and its specific feeling rules for managing relationships with refugees.

The text does not trace the shift between solidarity and compassion discourses, but rather asks what these two discourses imply about how we (should) deal with “distant suffering.” “Distant suffering” (Boltanski, 1999) is a figure of speech referring to one—today heralded as central—outcome of exploitation and repression on continents seemingly far away from the “West.” The West receives reports about this suffering through the media, and also, increasingly, through NGOs and international organizations (IOs). This text investigates first how the West positions itself to this “distant suffering” in terms of its discourses and practices. Secondly, it takes a look at contemporary Germany—a country that put on a singular display of compassion by conspicuously calling for keeping borders open to the refugees in 2015–2016, even as the resistance of its neighbors mounted.

The Language of Solidarity

Looking back at the 1960s and 1970s one can say that these were the times of high hopes and of “romantic” solidarity movements—with the liberation movements in Africa and left-wing movements in Central and Latin America. Anti–Vietnam War protesters demonstrated in solidarity with the Vietnamese people. “Whites” marched in solidarity with “Blacks” and joined the US Civil Rights movement. Today these romantic solidarity movements appear naïve, but their idea that at stake is a common battle is worth holding onto.
The ups of enchantment and the downs of disenchantment about the “Black & White” solidarity movement in the US are well documented (McAdam, 1964; Robnett, 2004). Hope, enthusiasm, and happiness drove young “White” volunteers to swell the ranks of “Black” civil rights activists in the South. They were heartily welcome at first. But “Black” civil rights leaders after a while came to the painful conclusion that it was necessary to send the domineering “White” enthusiasts back home because they threatened to undermine the burgeoning autonomy and self-assertion of their “Black” peers as well as voters whom they were supposed to support. In sum, the lesson was that solidarity could only work if “White activists relinquished their claims to dominance, starting with their assumption that they knew everything best.

In the 2000s the disenchantment felt by the representatives of the global South about the dominance of the global North in their shared transnational Anti-Debt Campaigns (Somers, 2014) showed that the lessons of the 1960s–1970s were lost rather than learned. Global South activists saw themselves ignored when it came to agenda setting, adopted time frames, and forms of mobilization. This is just one of many examples.

Even if today forgotten, some valuable positive experiences were gained. For example, that a successful struggle for democracy is only possible if it takes place in one’s own country and abroad, since the power holders seek to curtail democratic rights in both. In a successful US-Chile Solidarity Movement, “activists on university campuses, religious groups, non-governmental organizations, and several key figures in Congress . . . not only educated the American public about [the US military and political contributions to the installation of the murderous Pinochet regime and] the country’s role in Latin America, but also turned human rights into a discussion topic. . . . [This] solidarity movement was the driving force behind cuts in aid to Pinochet’s Chile in 1974, as well as the Special Parole Program for Chilean Refugees in 1975, [a program that] brought four hundred families into the United States. . . . Americans perceived US interference in Chile in the context of Watergate and the Vietnam War, which led many to identify dishonesty and aggression as recurrent themes in their nation’s leadership. These Americans concluded that US interests would not be best served by forced economic and political dominance abroad, but by the restoration of a healthy democracy at home” (Girard, 2015: 2–3).

In the same vein, the Leftist Fair Trade Movement learned that true solidarity entails the willingness to heed the wishes of the other: selling staple goods, such as coffee, rather than trinkets, paying “fair” prices and offering various free services (credit, help with applications, etc). Fair trade goods are ultimately “ethical goods,” saving one’s own moral standards from a general malaise (Verrea, 2014: 15, 37).

Western Leftists have long taken vicarious pleasure in distant uprisings and revolutions. These offer the thrill of looking at the shackles being cast off and
the new being born out of the old. They prove that moral outrage and courage can conquer fear, resignation, and cynicism, and thus everyday routine become defeated. Seen this way, the enchantment with the Soviet and the Nicaraguan revolutions, Chile’s Allende, Poland’s Solidarnosc, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, or the Arab Spring becomes understandable. For these uprisings reassure by proving that all men are created equal in their quest for autonomy and freedom. They promise to put an end to distant suffering. Still, enthusiasm for and involvement in these revolutions is a surrogate for liberation of our own selves, stopping short of making our own revolutions and also not seeing “local suffering”—whether at home or around the corner.

So what are the lessons to be learned about “true” solidarity? The most important is that it is all about a common struggle against a shared enemy. Solidarity is not and should not be either “vicarious” or “on behalf of” or “for” others (see also Interface 2014). Instead solidarity for others is the same as solidarity for us, on one’s own behalf. This is so mainly because wrongs at home are a cause of wrongs abroad, and vice versa. Their common source has to be challenged.

The Language of Compassion and Indignation

The discourse of compassion made a strong appearance in the West in the 1980s. It had probably already started with iconic images showing starving children of Biafra—innocent victims of the “Biafra War” (1967–1970), which caused a terrifying, widespread famine. In rapid succession, starving children of Biafra were replaced by a series of other victims—from Cambodia, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Sudan, and elsewhere. In the early 1990s the Balkan and Rwandan genocides alerted even the most indifferent to distant suffering.

In this context, the armchair critics of the West, such as Susan Sontag (2003), urged the Western media to provide the authentic image of “distant suffering” and the Western publics to acknowledge it. She rejected spontaneous compassion and called for a process of critical deliberation leading up to mindful compassion: only true and undeserved suffering, both proven and unstaged by the media, deserves attentive compassion. Boltanski (1999) argued that even if one feels hot accusatory indignation about the perpetrators of atrocities, one has to cool it down to sift through evidence—documents, artifacts, and testimonies. A factual presentation is much more convincing to the Western publics than displays of indignation. Together they advised mindful compassion and cooled indignation.

Humanitarian organizations (HOs) and human rights activists (HRAs) started out by adopting diametrically opposed positions towards human suffering (Leebow, 2007). The HOs aimed to offer immediate compassion and relief to everybody in need. The HRAs in contrast have argued for compassion for the victims and indignation towards perpetrators, making a distinction that the HOs did not. HRAs are for time-consuming investigations of facts to establish who is
the victim and who is the perpetrator. By the 1990s HRAs and HOs had agreed that fact-finding had to precede both compassion for the victims and indignation for the perpetrators.

Similar politicized distinctions stood behind the calls for the “Right to Protect” (R2P) human beings from states unwilling or unable to do so and also behind the “War against Impunity” of the (elite) perpetrators (Flam, 2013). New laws, resolutions, and institutions testified to more “formal” compassion for a greater variety of victims, including those subject to genocide and to sexual violence (Buckley-Zistel & Kater, 2011). However, in practice, compassion extended also to perpetrators and past bystanders to their crimes, absolving them from both their legal and their moral guilt. And the media reported less and less about the new perpetrators. It focused instead on victims and their human suffering. These developments paved the way for distant suffering-shopping.

**Distant Suffering–S/Hopping**

While refugees in the West are often accused of welfare-shopping, it is rarely noted that some Westerners engage in distant suffering-s/hopping. Among university students and activists it is standard to stay abroad living among the poor, ostensibly to help them. These days also an increasing number of tourist agencies cater to, for example, “pro-poor,” “community-based,” “eco” or “favela” tourism.

Well-meaning Westerners—whether “socially responsible” tourists or solidarity activists—indulge in “feel-good” tourism and “do-good” activism (Mahrouse, 2010, 2011). The point is that most do not reflect upon how racialization and differences of privilege, and power play into what they imagine to be “authentic” and symmetric encounters (Mahrouse, 2014). Instead they focus on their (often imaginary) contribution to the empowering of others and on how good having seen the “real life” makes them feel. It is a fully egocentric exercise. The line between activism and tourism becomes attenuated. Well-intentioned Westerners choose when, where, for how long, from what distance, and with what intensity they will engage in solidarity. In a way they shop for an elevating emotional experience, of which they stay in control. This they do already when they a) select a country/continent in which they will come in touch with “distant suffering,” b) choose a form—as a tourist on vacation, as a student or an activist on a short visit, or as a long-term employee of an NGO or IO—in which they will approach it, and, finally, c) pick the distance from which they will become involved and experience “distant suffering.”

“Doing good” also takes other forms. The last three decades have witnessed a boom in IOs and NGOs selling stories of distant suffering (Chouliaraki, 2011). They often rely on “human branding” of specific cases of suffering, engaging celebrities, inventing fictional campaigns, or transmitting “disaster-tweets” gener-
ated by bystanders. Human branding foregrounds the emotional experiences of the storyteller, overshadowing the victims. It is ironic that the great effort that “charitable” Westerners put into forging their own moral universe ends with a mundane consumer act. Faced with a (neoliberal) public realm void of legitimate arguments about justice, the affluent Western self—both self-ironic and greatly embarrassed about its inner need to be moral—embarks on defining and realizing its own projects of moral self-fulfillment. These, often highly idiosyncratic, testify to the inner pressure felt to heed moral claims of the less fortunate to unscathed and dignified lives. The irony is that in heeding these moral claims, affluent Westerners, who want to “engage” with the distant suffering of the vulnerable others, end up shopping for the best story to decide which IO or NGO will receive their charitable donation. Their moral quest amounts to choosing among sad stories which blend the victims out.

It may very well be that branding takes other forms outside the UK, US, Canada, or Australia. A typical Doctors Without Borders information leaflet in Germany, for example, shows a “white” Western doctor/expert, perhaps assisted by a local “non-white” doctor or nurse, taking care of a suffering mother and/or child. It provides relevant statistics. The World Wide Fund for Nature, similarly, will show a few shots of beautiful, nearly extinct, animals and top it with statistics. Both will tell how much a donation can accomplish and argue urgency. These more factual stories are still about suffering that is meant to elicit both compassion and donations. While the first is “racialized,” the second is hygienic-beautified. Such discourses seep into Western minds. It is therefore legitimate to ask what effects they might have on the inhabitants of countries habituated to hearing stories of suffering at a safe distance.

When “Distant Suffering” Hits Home

Imagine a country with a long history of immigrant labor as well as of outward and inward migration which, however, lives in permanent and adamant denial. Imagine Germany. Recent news from Germany focuses on PEGIDA and AfD—a movement and a party that are both xenophobic and racist. Their message is that of hatred, resentment, and anger. But they are still a minority in Germany and stand for a well-known end of the political spectrum on which there is vast literature. My interest therefore is instead on the pro-refugee “people of good will”—politicians and regular people alike.

Let me start with the German ruling parties. In 2015 a Red-Black coalition government was in power, headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel. Many articles attribute German exceptionalism to the person of Angela Merkel. She herself repeatedly argued for showing (Christian) compassion to the refugees. She was heralded as “the indispensable European” by The Economist (7–13 November 2015). However, the decision to keep the borders open was also important to the
Christian Democratic Party (CD). It has long been keen on proving that the Holocaust is a “thing of the past” and Germany is an enlightened country, “open to the world.” The CD’s coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SD), by keeping the borders open “simply” went back to its long-lasting support for the original—largely SD—formulation of the asylum article of the German Basic Law, stating that “any persecuted person has the right to asylum” (see section 16a GG). When CD, headed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, attacked this SD “holy cow” in the late 1980s, the SD defended it bravely until trading it in in 1993 for, as it turned out, empty promises. In 2015 the SD had a chance to go back to its pre-1993 principles. This would be in essence an idealist account of German exceptionalism.

A materialist account revolves around a thesis that the idealist account was nothing but expediency, a case of cynicism pure. For indeed the state of the German economy is at stake. As a German historian tells us (Herbert, 2001), the German economy has always relied on imported labor, even before “Germany” was established in 1871:

- “Seasonal” Polish workers were recruited for Prussian agriculture from the 1870s;
- Poles, Italians, and Austrians predominated in mining, textiles, construction, etc. in the 1900s;
- “Forced labor” became the chief workforce during WWII;
- GDR-refugees supplemented the BRD workforce until the Berlin Wall was built;
- “Guest workers” (Gastarbeiter) and refugees have played a buffer role since 1960.

However, under the CDU-CSU pressure that mounted from the late 1980s on, laws were passed and binational and proto-European agreements made to limit immigration. In effect, from the early 1990s until about 2014 Germany saw an unusual downward trend in its immigration figures. The effect is that the German economy today hungers for labor.

Even though Germany steadily multiplied legal barriers to entry, at least since the Red-Green government (1998) it has simultaneously been engaged in devising various means (Blue Card!) of attracting a highly qualified and skilled labor force to Germany. Yet it was losing battle after battle in the ongoing “war for brains.” Bureaucratic obstacles, extreme right-wing mobilization, everyday and institutional racism made Germany less attractive than the US or Canada. Indian or Polish specialists have preferred to gain work experience in the US to then return to their own countries rather than to brave German mixed signals of racism and the mounting pressure to “integrate.”

Seen from this perspective what appears to nationalists and administrators as the “refugee crisis” is a successful maneuver in a “war for brains”—a stop-
gap measure against the dent in the supply of labor. Let me cite just one of many expert statements to this effect. Announcing a new report on the employment of an international labor force (Sievert and Legge 2016), the Berlin-Institut (2016) wrote:

Ever more firms in Germany fear that they will have the difficulty of filling vacancies anew in the near future. Alone between 2006 and 2012 their proportion rose from 34 to 64 percent. Immigration can help. But most migrants do not come to Germany for economic reasons. ‘This does not, however, mean that the German immigration law ignores the needs of the economy,’ says the [author] of the report. . . . As examples he names the blue card EU that smoothes the path for the highly-skilled, and the “Positive List” of the National Labor Agency that focuses on people with completed occupational education. . . . As groups that do not come to Germany for economic reasons, but which could constitute a potential for [filling] the vacancies on the labor market, the Berlin-Institute for Population and Development identifies the big group of asylum seekers, family members of the non-EU countries as well as foreign students (Source: E-mail service of the Berlin-Institut Veranstaltungen@berlin-institut.org, 17 Feb. 2016).

It is important to note that neither German nor foreign media make much of the fact that the German economy is starved for labor and the refugees are in demand. By now attention focuses on the personality of the chancellor, Angela Merkel, as a cause of “wrong” political decisions leading up to the “refugee crisis,” understood as a simultaneous rescue, administrative, integration, identity, political, and EU crisis (Barthel, 2016).

Arguably, one can speak of “duped Germans.” They are very sparingly informed about how business and politics “really” see the refugees—as the potential labor force that needs to quickly learn German and German mores to become useful to German enterprises—large, medium, and small. Administrators, local politicians, foundations, and volunteers live under tremendous pressure of continuous insufficient effort at the same time that the few past achievements in refugee care rapidly disappear (“Merkel Cheers/Encourages Foundations” / “Merkel macht Stiftern Mut,” LVZ, 12 May 2016). As so often in German history, industry, in contrast, reaps the benefits. Having established the context, I now ask: What sort of emotional responses to refugees can we expect from those Germans who help?

The Helpers and Their Emotions

It is estimated that 10–11 million Germans belong to the category of helpers. A study (Karakayali & Kleist, 2015) based on interviews with 470 voluntary helpers...
and 70 interviews with the representatives of voluntary organizations tells us a little bit about the volunteers hastening to help the refugees. Half a year before the refugees began to reach Germany in great numbers, the young (20–30 years old) constituted 34% of all helpers. Students were overrepresented (23% of helpers, 2.8% of the population). People 60 or older made up approximately 25%, women 72%, and the employed 41% of helpers. Retired people were underrepresented (20% of helpers, 43% of the population). Eighty-eight percent had at least a school diploma and ranked themselves as well off. Overrepresented were people with migration experience or migrant parents (29% compared to 19% in Germany). Nearly half (48%) were not religious, otherwise Christians dominated.

Most help occurred at the interface between the refugees and the authorities. Self-organizing and self-coordination consumed a lot of time. Volunteers accompanied refugees to the authorities (50%), taught German (44%), translated (36%), offered social advice (34%), helped in interacting with authorities (33%), offered integration advice (26%), searched for apartments (29%), drove (21%), tutored (17%), etc.

What emotional discourses and practices can we expect of those who help? For sure: shopping for suffering—choosing when, where, how, and how intensely to engage. But apart from that, we can expect:

- Compassion, but spontaneous or mindful? for all or just “those deserving”?
- Indignation against the perpetrators, but hot or cooled?
- Feeling good while doing good?

We can also expect much:

- Emotional (and financial) blackmail:
  - Missionary/Pygmalion effects: I’ll love you, if you civilize!
  - Emotional collusion: I’ll love you, if you tell me a tragic story of your suffering!
  - Gratitude welcome: I will not mind, if you cook or play guitar at my party!

Perhaps we can also expect deep understanding that one’s own mobilization against the corporations, governments, military, IOs, and TNGOs that cause suffering is necessary as the first minimal step towards ending “suffering” at home and abroad—a properly understood solidarity which departs from equality in a shared struggle.
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36. Social Movements and Our Common Future on a Limited Planet

Geoffrey Pleyers
RC47 Social Classes and Social Movements

Introduction

Contrary to economists or marketing specialists, sociologists are particularly uncomfortable when it comes to thinking about the future (Schulz, 2015a). We know too well the limits of over-determinist perspectives and wishful thinking scenarios. The current ecological crisis obliges us however to consider seriously the debate about possible futures: How will we live together on a finite planet with limited resources?

The first part of this text will briefly present and question some concepts of the future and of social change that are widespread among actors of the global environmentalist movement who take this question very seriously. In the second part, I argue that social movement studies is a particularly insightful field when it comes to possible futures, as it provides us with empirical elements that allow us to grasp dimensions of our possible futures on a limited planet. Therefore, as Markus Schulz (2015b) suggests, it is particularly insightful to articulate the sociology of the future with social movement studies.

The Ecological Challenge and Possible Future Scenarios

The natural science community has made a statement that can no longer be ignored by social scientists: the modern way of life is not sustainable. It alters fundamental geological and chemical cycles (Crutzen, 2002) and generates global warming (IPCC, 2013) at an increasing and unprecedented pace. Moreover, resources fundamental for our ways of life and economic systems will be unavailable in a few decades.

As sociologists, we can neither deny the reality of the impact of human activities on the climate and the environment, nor endorse the idea of a determinist social transition resulting from the environmental crisis. While the finitude of the planet and its resources is a fact, it does not presuppose the way human beings, institutions, and societies will deal with the challenges of living together on a limited planet. This has two reasons. First, as industrial modernity was embodied
by various forms of communism and capitalism, the global age as a new social configuration does not presume a particular type of economic and political system. Secondly, the way societies will deal with the constraints of the global age depends on the outcomes of the symbolic and concrete confrontations of perceptions of the world and contrasting ways to face its main challenges. Future scenarios in a world affected by climate change are numerous, as John Urry (2012: chapter 9) shows. The “business as usual in the midst of climate deregulation” scenario is far from excluded. It dominates current policies and habits and is supported by powerful actors, which makes it the most probable option as long as the main resources (and oil in particular) remain relatively easily available.

The “redemption catastrophe” scenario has recently gained impetus. Dozens of intellectuals and thousands of citizens maintain that climate deregulation, the multiplication of natural disasters, and the depletion of natural resources will automatically lead to a “transition” towards more resilient local social organizations (Hopkins, 2009). The belief in the redemption feature of catastrophes has been constantly evoked by progressive thinkers. Some of the major actors and thinkers of the ecology (e.g., Cochet, Dupuy, & Latouche, 2012) even maintain that a catastrophe may be needed to push humanity to adopt the required changes and treat nature with more respect. This direct link between catastrophes or major crises and social change is historically false and politically dangerous. To take recent examples, the magnitude of the 1997–1998 Asian crisis has not impeded an unprecedented expansion of financial speculation in the following years, and the financial crisis that started in 2007 and is considered as the most severe since 1929 has not drastically modified economic policies and regulation of the financial sector. The political impacts of environmental hazards are an even better illustration of this. The multiplication of hurricanes in the US or the heavy pollution smog in Beijing (see Zhang & Barr, 2013) haven’t impeded the governments of the two most polluting countries from carrying on with their energy and industrial policies.

The point is not to deny that a crisis may have an impact on policies or may represent an opportunity for social actors. Nevertheless, no matter how large it is, the crisis itself will not generate social change. The latter depends on the capacity of social actors to highlight the questions spawned by the historic situation and to advance alternative political visions and economic rationality (see Pleyers, 2010: chapter 10). Social actors play a major role in raising public awareness, proposing alternative political and economic rationalities, and pushing towards a concrete implementation of alternative policies and behaviors. Moreover, actors who manage to impose their interpretation of the crisis and foster alternative political and economic rationalities are not always the progressive ones. Canadian activist and journalist Naomi Klein (2008) reminds us that the “Chicago boys” used—and produced—crises to impose neoliberal policies in various countries.
Social Movements as a Heuristic Tool for a Sociology of the Future

While over-determinist perspectives and the “redemption catastrophe” scenario should be challenged, research on and with current social movements offers empirical data for a better understanding of the future of humanity on a limited planet. The heuristic concept of social movements refers to a particular meaning of action when actors challenge major normative orientations of a society and contribute to the transformation of this society (Touraine, 1981). Therefore, by studying the meanings and conflicts raised by social movements, we can understand both the current society and elements of the emerging society these movements contribute to produce. A brilliant illustration was provided by Manuel Castells (1997), who started the second volume of his famous trilogy on the age of information by analyzing two movements that allowed him to understand some of the major transformations and influential actors of the next decade: the Zapatistas in Mexico and the Patriots in the US. The Zapatistas prefigured both the rising impact of indigenous movements in Latin America and the alter-globalization movement. The American Patriots and a grassroots conservative movement became the social constituency of the George W. Bush government and of the Tea Party. In this perspective, an urgent research question is for example “Who are the current actors who contribute to the production of a society able to cope with the challenges of living on a limited planet or, on the opposite side, who resist and build barriers against social, economic, political, and cultural adaptations to the finitude of the planet and its resources?”

The analysis of social movements provides us with two main ways to grasp elements of possible futures with empirical data: social agency on one side, prefigurative action and actors’ subjectivity on the other. Like many current movements, the movement for climate justice and ecological transition seeks to transform our society following two ways to become actors, two political cultures and conceptions of social change (Pleyers, 2010).

Social agency

On one side, social movements are conducted by actors who contribute to produce tomorrow’s society (Touraine, 1981). Activists and intellectuals intend to transform the world and the worldview based on a critical analysis of contemporary society and on rational alternative proposals made on behalf of the public interest. Other committed researchers and activists tackle the critical pillars of the dominant economy, as the imperative of economic growth. To do so, activists act at three levels. (1) They carefully examine and criticize current policies and dominant discourse. (2) They propose concrete alternative measures such as new environmental standards or renewable energy policies. (3) They develop and promote different visions of the world and of its main challenges. By de-
mystifying what is presented as the only worldview and demonstrating the existence of alternatives, they contribute to open new possible horizons.

The climate justice movement is however not the only actor seeking to shape our future. The way societies and humanity will address environmental and climate challenges will depend on the result of the confrontations between actors that defend different interests and promote different visions of the world. We have to analyze both progressive and conservative actors, as well as the actors and mechanisms that foster the apathy in most individual and collective actors. The analyses of conservative actors who seek to maintain the modernization status quo and from “movements from above” would require much more attention from empirical sociologists.

**Prefigurative actions**

Actors of progressive social movements do not only protest and struggle against the dominant social forces. They also seek to embody elements of an alternative society it in their action. Gandhi did not only oppose British colonization, he also asked his fellow activists to “be the change you want to see in the world.” Prefigurative activism and the quest for more consistency between one’s values and one’s practices has become a central dimension of activism in many movements (Epstein, 1991; Melucci, 1996, Pleyers, 2010). Indigenous communities, small farmers, critical consumers, and “transition towns” have all contributed to renew the environmentalist movement by implementing alternative practices at the local scale and in their daily life. These actors have focused most of their energy in building “spaces of experience” where alternative practices are experimented with and implemented. These concrete actions are closely connected to other visions of the world and concepts of what a “good life” means. For instance, a range of ecological actors, from indigenous people in Latin America to critical consumers in Western countries, struggle against the advertising and consumer society and seek to redefine the criteria for a “good life,” in which social ties are more important than material goods. In this perspective, world visions are both the source and the outcomes of social movements. The study of these actors’ actions and subjectivity thus provides us with empirical data about life and subjectivity in the global age. For instance, we may analyze the impact of acute awareness of global interdependency and of the constraints of a limited planet on an individual’s subjectivity and her sense of responsibility. At the same time, these local actors also face challenges when it comes to extending these alternatives beyond small local groups, which also requires extensive studies.
Glimpses of Possible Futures

As Alberto Melucci (1996: 28) framed it, social movements “show glimpses of possible futures, and are, in some respects, the vehicles of realization of these very futures.” Social movements aim at questioning the core values of our society, transforming cultures and ways of life, experimenting with alternative practices, and promoting alternative worldviews, and thus open new horizons.

To analyze social movements that promote worldviews, behaviors, and policies more compatible with the reality and constraints of the global age provides us with empirical data for grasping some features of possible futures on a limited planet and of the consequences of resource scarcity on life, democracy, society, and subjectivities. This perspective closely connects the sociology of social movements to general sociology, as proposed by Alain Touraine. It fosters a renewed approach able to combine empirical fieldwork and major social questions.

References

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WebForum on *The Futures We Want: Global Sociology and the Struggles for A Better World*

http://futureswewant.net

The WebForum on “The Futures We Want: Global Sociology and the Struggles for a Better World” is an online space that features curated posts by leading sociologists. The WebForum facilitates debate across the social sciences, while being openly accessible to larger publics, i.e., to anyone interested in ideas that question the status quo, engage pertinent trends, analyze dynamics, and imagine alternative futures for a better world.

Screen-shot from the WebForum: http://futureswewant.net. The WebForum’s main language is English but a number of posts are bi- or tri-lingual with versions in French, Spanish, and other languages.
Global Sociology

Over fifty social scientists from two dozen different countries explore the frontiers of global sociology. Taken together, they provide a sociological kaleidoscope for research in the 21st Century.

The authors include: Tuba I. Agartan (USA), Fátima Assunção (Portugal), Tova Benski (Israel), Debby Bonnin (South Africa), Jeffrey Broadbent (USA), Doris Buehler-Niederberger (Germany), Helena Carreiras (Portugal), Catherine Casey (UK), Douglas Constance (USA), Christiana Constantinopoulou (Greece), Tiago Correia (Portugal), Isabel da Costa (France), Gary Dworkin (USA), Charlotte Fabiansson (Australia), Robert M. Fishman (Spain), Helena Flam (Germany), Steve Fuller (UK), Javier Pablo Hermo (Argentina), John David Horne (UK), Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova (Russia), Yuri Kazepov (Austria), Reiner Keller (Germany), Ellen Kuhlmann (Sweden), Lauren Langman (USA), Monika Lengauer (Germany), Kelvin Low (Singapore), Timothy W. Luke (USA), Wolfram Manzenreiter (Austria), Paulo Menezes (Brazil), Stephen Mennell (Ireland), Claudia Mitchell (Canada), Eric Mykhalovskiy (Canada), Eleni Nina-Pazarzi (Greece), Emmanuele Pavolini (Italy), Geoffrey Pleysers (Belgium), Amelie Quesnel-Vallee (Canada), Rhoda Reddock (Trinidad and Tobago), Gabriele Rosenthal (Germany), Julia Rozanova (USA), Shaun Ruggunan (South Africa), Helen Sampson (UK), Hanno Scholtz (Switzerland), Ulrike M.M. Schuërken (France), Markus S. Schulz (USA), Bernard Scott (Germany), Virendra P. Singh (India), James Spickard (USA), Jan Stets (USA), Raf Vanderstraeten (Belgium), Ruut Veenhoven (Netherlands), Marios Vryonides (Cyprus), and Nira Yuval-Davis (UK).

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